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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Because of the historically important responsibilities
of diplomats, historians and former emissaries have attempted
to ascertain what;qualifications were requisite for the
"ideal" envoy.

Many of their accounts stressed abilities

which were necessary during a particular period of history,
while others emphasized those.characteristics that are time
less.

The noted English historian and diplomat, Harold

Nicolson, capably discussed both the particular and general
qualities.

His emphasis upon the universal characteristics

essential for any diplomat-was worthy of attention,*

Nicol

son asserted that' the function of diplomacy is.the management
of the relations between independent states through the
process of negotiation.

The ideal diplomat, he added, should

possess "moral influence" or strict honor, which is the basis
of good negotiation.

This."moral influence" is derived from

special virtues which the envoy must have or acquire.

First

among these virtues is truthfulness, which Nicolson-defined
as "scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of the false or
the suppression of the true."
credibility
in him.

of

Truthfulness will increase the

the diplomat, and fortify future confidence

Precision compliments truthfulness and is imperative,

because diplomacy is a written rather than a verbal act.

2

Nicolson suggested "...the great high-roads of history are
strewn with little shrines of peace which have either been
left unfinished, or have collapsed when completed, for the
sole reason that their foundations were built on the sands
of some verbal misconception."

Calm is also important.

He

explained, "Not only must the negotiator avoid displaying
irritation when confronted by the stupidity, dishonesty,
brutality or conceit of those with whom it'is his unpleasant
duty to negotiate; but he must eschew all personal animos
ities, all personal predilections,, all enthusiasms, pre
judices, vanities, exaggerations, dramatizations, and moral
indignations."

However, a diplomat is not ideal unless he

is modest, since the dangers of vanity are great., And
finally, the envoy should be loyal to several different and,
at times, conflicting sources, such as his own government,
his staff, and his diplomatic colleagues.
cluded:

Nicolson con

'"But1, the reader may object, 'you have forgotten

intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality,
charm, industry, courage and even.tact.1
them.

I have not forgotten

I have taken them for granted."
Graham H. Stuart outlined the basic duties of the diplo

mat.

He asserted that the first and most important of these

^Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University
Press, 1963; First edition, 19 39"), 80, 110-13, 116-17,
119-20, 122-24, 126. See also Nicolson, The Evolution of
Diplomatic Method (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1954.), 57-65.
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is the maintenance of friendly relations with the country
to which the envoy is accredited.

Of course, he must not

lose sight of the policies of his own government, and he
must make every effort'to justify them, even if they are
not,pleasing to the host country.

Among the diplomat's

other major functions should b e :

1) the protection of,

nationals; 2) a degree of assistance to "legitimate''
commercial interest; and 3) the perpetuation,of cordial
relations with his diplomatic colleagues, the foreign:office,
and all government officials.

However, Stuart warned, the

envoy should avoid interfering in,the internal affairs of
the foreign country or making public expressions against
its government;

In terms of reporting, Stuart continued, a

diplomat must observe "with an intelligent and unprejudiced
viewpoint" everything that takes place about'him, and despatch
whatever information he thinks might interest his government,
in order that policy can,be shaped and proper instructions
furnished to the diplomatic officers.

Stuart further insisted

that social functions are also a very important aspect of
diplomatic life, and an envoy's success or failure can some
times depend upon his ability to utilize his social contacts
2
effectively and astutely.
2Graham H. Stuart, American, Diplomatic and_Consular
Practice (New York: D. Appleton-Century do.,. 1936), 240.-69,
27 2. [Hereinafter referred to as Stuart, Diplomatic
Practice.) See also Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1944),
42-43,
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Charles W. Thayer, a former- United States Foreign
Service officer, brought the.discussion of the role of the
diplomat.,a step further.

Like Stuart, he believed political

sense is necessary for an,effective diplomatist.

In addition

to natural qualifications and an understanding of his duties,
the would-be diplomat, Thayer argued, needs a long and
arduous training before he can.qualify for a mission.

He

stated, "Most authorities insist that no government should
employ a diplomat until he has served an adequate apprentice-,
ship.
Thayer's last observation alluded to a major problem
of the diplomatic practice of the United States--the-use, of
the amateur- to represent his government's interests in a
foreign country.

Overwhelmingly, historians, former diplo

mats , and journalists have criticized this practice.
Boothe Luce queried:

Clare

"...who should represent America abroad:

the professional, the amateur, or the 'best qualified man who
can be found?'

Obviously the latter.

And just as obviously,

the reasonable presumption must be that the professional is
most likely to be the man."

4

And E. Wilder Spaulding said,

Charles W. Thayer,, Diplomat (New York: Harper, and
Brothers Publishers,1959), 243-44, 284.
4Clare Boothe Luce, "The Ambassadorial Issue: Profes.sionals or Amateurs?" Foreign Affairs * Vol. XXXVI (October,
1957), 114. See also T O T
:
!
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"Diplomacy is, and seems destined to remain* the only vital
profession in the world where key members without experience
or special aptitude are thought.to be. a d e q u a t e H e specu
lated that the non-professional diplomat might bring some,
advantages to his position, such as infusing the service
with "fresh blood" from,many walks of life, having compatible
political views with the current administration, representing
varying geographic areas, and contributing private:incomes.
However, the amateur often has serious limitations^-inexper
ience, inability to work as a member of a team, unfamiliar
ity with foreigners and their country, and the likelihood of
being overtly partisan for or against the country to which
he is accredited.^
Hugh,Gibson, a widely experienced career diplomat, was
even more critical than Spaulding, and emphasized the many
problems inherent in amateur diplomacy.

He stated:

But as regards what should be the most highly
specialized profession in the world we do a right .
about-face.
In fact, we deny that a specialized
need exists. We as a people are convinced we
should be better served if the career diplomats
were turned out'and their places taken by plain
Americans from private.life. They alone will
E. Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors. Ordinary and Extra
ordinary (Washington D„C»: Public Affairs Press, 1961),..JL3,
(Hereinafter referred to as ..Spaulding, Ambassadors .) See
also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 162; Ray Stannard Baker,
President 1913--I914, Vol. IV of Woodrow Wilson Life and
Letters ..(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co. ,
Inc., 1931), 32.
(Hereinafter referred-to as Baker,
Wilson, IV.)
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stand for no nonsbnse from foreigners and know
how to talk to them.6
He further claimed that?discussion about the failure of
diplomacy was hardly credible, since diplomacy has not been
given a chance to fail;.

The "politicians, amateurs, and

adventurers" usurped the diplomatic functions of the United
States, and were sent abroad with new, untried methods and'
"publicity stunts," resulting in, " „ . a world wide mess of
unprecedented proportions."

Besides, the man appointed

solely because he was an active party worker could not"be
held accountable no matter how outrageously he.behaved,
and must be handled "with gloves."

Gibson also discounted

certain criticisms which had been leveled against the pro
fessional envoy,

For instance, he argued that the belief

that .the career diplomat succumbed to flattery and social
attention was unwarranted.

In reality, it was. the political

appointee who, most, often submitted to, this, leading him to
become an active propagandist for the country to which he
was, accredited.

Gibson summarized:

"It is impossible to

escape the conviction that:we have the worst system that
could be devised for appointment to high office,"
The "amateurism" which Luce, Spaulding, Thayer,,Gibson,
and many others have criticized was an obstacle, to the de
velopment of a capable American Foreign Service, especially
^Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy, 33,
7lbid., 49-50, 63, 156, 167, 169-70,
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from the rise of the United States as a world power in the
a
9
1890's until the beginning of World War II.
With the
election of William McKinley a substantial turn toward a
professional Foreign Service seemed imminent.

The Presi

dent was not opposed to continuing, on good behavior,
diplomatic secretaries from the previous administration,
and about sixty percent retained their positions-

However,

this is not to argue that McKinley was above partisan
appointments.^

Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson clearly

exemplified the mood of the day:
March 4, 189 7, found me in Washington, stand
ing on the curb, near the.Treasury Department
watching the parade.in honor of President McKinley's
inauguration.
I was one.of the countless officeseekers that- turned the place into a mad-house,
making the hotel lobbies swarm with people, hum
with excited:talk, and stink with the odor of bad
cigars. Uncouth men, with Foreign Service Lists in
their hands, would run down the salary column, stop
at. an attractive figure, and ask me "where the hell"
See Ernest R. May, Imperial. Democracy The Emergence
of America as, a Great Power (New York.: Harcourt, Brace and
World, Inc.. , 19 61), 269-70;.. Samuel Flagg.. Bemis , The United
States as a. World..Power A Diplomatic.His tory 1900^1950
(New York: .Henry.Holt, and Co., 1950), 1-8; William Barnes
and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United
States Origins, Development, and Functions (Washington D.C.:
Historical. Bureau, o f .Public Affairs, Department of State,
1961), 154, 188.-89.
(Hereinafter referred to as Barnes
and Morgan, Foreign Service.)
9
See Thayer, Diplomat, 64, 255; Stuart, Diplomatic
Practice, 45, 238; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 128-237^
1A

iUWarren. Frederick. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy. In
the United States 1779-1939 A Study in. Administrative
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 81.
(Hereinafter referred to as Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy.)

the place was. It was the Spoils System working
with a vengeance. One.heard nothing of Civil.
Service or paltry questions of qualification.. The.
thing to do seemed to be to get as many letters of
recommendation as possible from one's state delega
tion in Congress and from.powerful politicians of
the Republican party. So I set about doing this
quite shamelessly.
About his own appointment, he added:
After a little talk at the State Department
with Mr. Alvey A. Adee, the Second Assistant
Secretary of State, Sidney Y. Smith, Chief of the
Diplomatic Bureau, and others, I was given a copy
of the Diplomatic Regulations and speeded on my
way, a diplomat de jure, if hardly cle facto,
Knowing nothing of international law, diplomatic
procedure, or commerce, and little of history, I
had as qualifications only a fair command of
French and whatever natural ability my inheritance
may have given m e .... There were no examinations;
no attempt to determine qualifications. Appoint
ments were made simply under pressure of political
influence or favoritism.
I was thrown into
diplomacy, indeed thrown into life,.without due
preparation.or advice, just as I had earlier been
thrown into the water to learn to swim.
Especially because of the effects of the commercial,
political, and missionary expansion after the Spanish
American War, subtle changes began to occur in the size,
existing hierarchy, and standards of compensation for the
Foreign Service.

McKinley's successor, Theodore Roosevelt,

had gone on record as early as 1894 as favoring a career
Foreign Service.

In December, 1901, he recommended the

reorganization of the consular service, but gave it little
^ F . M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat
(Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1945), 46, 48.
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practical support at that time.

By 1905, he was being

pressured for tangible reform of the Foreign Service, es
pecially in the consular branch, by businessmen involved in
international commerce, imperialists, missionary groups,
and the National Civil Service Reform League.

Many members

of the Department of State approved of the career principle,
and both Roosevelt and Secretary of State Elihu Root, like
most of their predecessors after 1888, approved and supported
its application.

However, most congressmen and a large seg1^
ment of public opinion were unenthusiastic.
Nevertheless,
Roosevelt.acted.

He issued two executive orders in November,

1905, to make lower diplomatic and consular positions more'
professional through an examination process and increased
14
compensation.
But these orders fell short of what the
President had advocated earlier, possibly because he believed
the service had too much "bad timber" in it, and did not
want to perpetuate them in office.

15

In 1906, a statute was.

enacted reorganizing the consular service, followed closely
by another executive order,

The diplomatic corps was not

^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 177- 78.
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 81-82.
13

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 83-84,

■^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 177-78.
IC

See also

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 87,

^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 179-80.
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included in the provisions of that particular statute but,
in terms of practical advances, there were substantial
gains.

Twentyr-five percent of the ministers and diplomatic

secretaries under the Roosevelt administration had entered
the service between.1888 and 1895; the remainder, entered
prior to 1904i

Another 61.4 percent had succeeded in serv

ing under,two parties, and forty percent had received
appointments to,two* or more posts'or,promotions within their
own post.

The number of secretaries reaching ministerial

rank also increased to 31.9 percent in 1906, although the
17
rates of promotion were very uneven.
Notwithstanding the
increased: attention to "professionalizing" the diplomatic
and consular services, the ministerial and ambassadorial
positions overwhelmingly remained in the hands of political
appointees and amateurs.
During the administration of William Howard Taft, some
further steps were taken to continue the merit system for
the lower, offices in the Foreign Service.

By an, executive

order in 1909, all diplomatic officers below the rank of
minister .were granted civil service status.

18

Also, of

the twelve career ministers Taft had retained from the
previous’administration, eight remained in 1912; of the eight
17

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 79.

■^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 179-80; Ilchman, Pro
fessional Diplomacy, 111.

11

original appointments made from the service under Taft, six
remained in 1912.

However, 85.7 percent of the career
19
ministers were;posted in Latin America.
The election of 1912 gave control of the Executive
and;Congress to the Democratic party, which had been in
the■"patronage wilderness" for sixteen years.

Members: of

the Foreign Service were naturally apprehensive of their
fate, since the merit system rested on executive orders,
which were not binding on succeeding presidents.

And,

unlike the consular service, the diplomatic corps had yet
to establish a nonpartisan reputation in the public mind.

20

Nonetheless, security of tenure and promotion by merit, on
the.secretarial level, were fully accepted by the new admin
istration.

But its blatant use of the spoils system.all

but eliminated the prospect of promotions to ministerial
positions
The First World War, however, had a positive influence
on the diplomatic service.

There was. a 38.5 percent increase

in the number of secretaries, compared to 45.6 percent inthe whole previous decade.

?9

Furthermore,, pressure was, com

ing from a,number of organizations for increased reform of
the diplomatic service, and in 1915 a.law was1passed essen^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 111.
20Ibid., 118-19.
^ Ibid., 118-19, 130-31, See also Stuart, Diplomatic
Practice, 181-83; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 183-84.
??

Ilchman,,Professional Diplomacy,.132r33.
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 155.

See also

12

tially ,affirming the executive order of ■■1909.

This placed

all diplomatic officers, below the rank of minister, on
23
the merit system.
When the war ended, one of the necessities was reorga
nizing the machinery for the conduct of foreign relations
to meet the fundamental changes in the world's system of
states and the,new position of power and wealth of the
United States,

24

With preparation for the peace conference,

recognition of new states and governments, and the re-estab
lishment of missions to the Central Powers, the existing
burdens of the Department of State increased.

All this made

a reexamination of the Foreign Service imperative, and immed
iately twenty-five new secretaries were added to the diplo
matic corps.

Further legislative activity ensued.

Repre

sentative John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts introduced a
bill providing for a system of promotion of efficient
secretaries, to ministerial vacancies, which was heartily
approved by the career officers of the Department,

Although

the bill received favorable reaction in,Congress,.the session
closed without,action on it,

7 ^ About the same time, there

was considerable talk of combining the consular and diplomatic
23
^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 183.
24
7^

Ibid., 184.

See also Thayer, Diplomat, 68-69.

Ilchman,, Professional Diplomacy, 142-44.
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services; although members of the diplomatic corps were
initially opposed.

Some changes were soon to take place,

however.
In the election of 1920, the victorious Republican
party.committed itself to government aid in the expansion
of trade, and the diplomatic service would be an importanttool i n ;fulfilling this promise.

Moreover, the Republicans

had traditionally favored a career Foreign Service.

The

time seemed at hand for a major step toward a further professiohalization.of the diplomatic corps.

Warren G. Harding,

who had won the presidency by a margin.large enough to free
him:from many political debts, went on record early -in. 1921
in support of such a venture.

By 1922-, thirty-five percent

of the upper positions in:the diplomatic corps were held by
career men--the highest percentage since the Taft adminis
tration. ^
A major reform of the Foreign Service came in 1924 with
the Rogers Act, which combined the diplomatic and consular
branches into one group.

It allowed for entrance by examina

tion for all who could qualify, and secured tenure and promo
tion ,by merit.

Furthermore, the principle of interchange

ability from one branch of the service to. the other increased
the possibility that a candidate would get the correct type
26Ibid., 157.

14

of assignment.

27

Implementing the Rogers Act was more

difficult than.drafting it, since many inequities occurred.
Eventually, under practical conditions, the most critical
issues were worked out.

28

With all its practical benefits, the Rogers Act.did not
cope with the persistent problem of the political appointment
of ministers and ambassadors.

However, there were some prac

tical advances during the 1930’s.

In 1932, Herbert Hoover’s

administration had fifty-one;percent of its upper diplomatic
posts, including half of the ambassadorships, filled with
career officers..

This percentage did not change radically

under the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, even,though
the new president has been frequently accuse,d of a deep dis
trust of the Foreign Service,

Early in his administration,

Roosevelt and his advisers decided on a rough balance between
career and non-career appointments.

By 1937, fifty-two per

cent of the ministers and ambassadors were.professionals,
and, by 1939, more than sixty percent of the ambassadors were
career men, including holders of some of the most important
posts, such:as Tokyo, Rome, and Berlin,

Yet, Paris, London,

and Moscow remained in the hands of amateurs,
^ I b i d . , 177.
185-86.

29

See also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice,

28Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 190-91.
2Q

Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 211-17.
Thayer, Diplomat'] 73- 75 „

See also
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The diplomatic service made encouraging, if uneven
progress toward professionalism from the 1890's to World
War II.

However, the upper posts--ministers and ambassadors--

were the last to be, involved in this process,,

Of the whole

period, the most1pointed example of the use of amateurs as
chiefs-ofrmission occurred during the administrations of
Woodrow Wilson,

It is the purpose of this thesis to:

1) examine the appointments to all the major ambassadorial;
and ministerial posts during this period; and 2) evaluate
the diplomatic performance of thirteen non-professional
ambassadors and ministers through their published memoirs
and letters and through the analyses of;historians .• Hope-^
fully, this case study will demonstrate the nature of
"amateurism" in the American diplomatic corps.

CHAPTER II
APPOINTMENTS OF CHIEFS-OF-MISSION

It has been said that Wilson and Secretary of State
William Jennings.Bryan, were, like most of their predecessors,
relatively ignorant of and indifferent to foreign affairs0
They also shared, to a remarkable degree, certain assumptions
and ideals, which provided the impetus for their foreign
policy,.

They were both moralists, who thought in terms.of

"eternal.verities;" they were both dedicated, at least theo
retically, to the democratic ideal, and obsessed with the
concept of America's mission in the world; they were both,
fundamentally missionaries and evangelists, confident that
they understood what was best for other countries more clearly
than the leaders of those countries.

And even,though this

"missionary diplomacy" did not explain the politics of Wilson
and Bryan in full,•it demonstrated their desire to act justly,
advance the cause of international peace, and give the peoples
of the world "the blessings of democracy and Christianity."
l.See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive
Era 1910-19.17 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1954),
81-82»
(Hereinafter referred to as Link, Progressive Era.)
See also Harley Notter, The Origins -of- the Foreign. Policy of
Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore! The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931.),
221-314.
(Hereinafter referred to as Notter, Wilson*,.)'.;
Paolo E. Colette, Progressive Politician and Moral, Statesman
1909-1915, Vol. II of William Jennings Bryan (Lincoln:
Uni vers ity of Nebraska Press, 1969), 1.47- 259 . (Hereinafter
referred to as Coletta, Bryan, II).
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However, the idealism that the President and his Secretary
of State brought to the new Democratic administration was.
not always expressed in. their actions*

The pervasive use;

of the spoils system to fill diplomatic posts was a prime
example*
The accession to power of the Democrats after sixteen,
years of Republican domination has been cited frequently as
the justification for the blatant use of spoils politics by
the Wilson administration,

2

Stuart added, that since nomi

nations to diplomatic posts had regularly been,of a political
nature, the Wilson administration was merely following
Republican precedents.

3

But Warren F, Ilchman, believed that

the increasing professionalization of the Foreign Service
under, Roosevelt and Taft.was threatened by the unfettered
4
use of patronage during the Wilson administration.
However,
neither Stuart nor Ilchman -clearly demonstrated why the new
Democratic administration resorted to spoils politics„
Virtually all students of Wilson would agree that upon
his election, he tried to,place.the best possible men in the
^See Stuart, The Department of. State A History of Its
Organization,^Procedure, and,Personnel (Hew~York: -Mac Millan
CoT, 1949) , 22$; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign ,Service, 183
^Stuart, Dip.loma.tie Practice, 182- 83, See also
Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and:East■Central.:Europe
1914-19.18 A Study in-Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda,
(Princeton: Princeton University;,:Press, 1957),
(Hereinafter referred to as Mamatey, Central Europe,)*
^Ilchman, Professional -Diplomacy, 118-19

18

ambassadorial and ministerial posts.^

The possibility that

the President would appoint merely personal and political
favorites seemed highly unlikely, given his idealism and
former position as vice-president of the National Civil
Service,Reform League.

As Ilchman stated, Wilson was an

educator who "appreciated the need for career specializa
tion."^

However, Link noted that the President distrusted

the professionals in the Department of State and thought
many of them were "...either aristocrats, the products of
exclusive schools and a snobbish society, or else syco7
phantic imitators of the wealthy classes."
However, within thefirst few months of his presidency,
Wilson, encountered some serious setbacks in seeking new
chiefs-af .-mission.. Prospective appointees for the embassies
in London, Berlin, Paris, and the legation in Peking, declined
his offers.

In general, the excuses given were.lack of funds,

personal matters, and corporate interests.

It is widely

^See Ray Stannard Baker, President 1913-1914 Vol. IV of
Woodrow Wilson Life and.Letters (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1931), 25-26.
(Hereinafter
referred .to .as Baker , Wilson,IV, 25-26; Link, Wilson the Diplo
matist A, Look at His Major .Foreign Policies- (Baltimore :
Tfte John Hopkins Press, 195-7.) , 25 26; Arthur Walworth,
American Prophet, ,.Vol.. I of Woodrow Wilson (New York.:
Longmans , Green and Co. , 19 58) , 3.47-4.8 . ("Hereinafter
referred to as Walworth, Wilson, I.)'
^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 118-19,
^Link, Wilson The.Diplomatist, 24. For example, see
Wilson to C . W., Eliot, September, 17, .1913 , Wilson Papers,
Library of Congress, cited in above,. See also Link, The
New;Freedom Vol. II of Wilson (Princeton: Princeton Univer-

19

Q

accepted that inadequate finances was the foremost problem,,
The government provided'the chiefs-of-mission with minimal
salaries and only limited expense budgets with which to
maintain the embassies and legations, especially in Europe,
Hence, they would often need to utilize personal savings or
money provided by a benefactor or by a political group.

The

question of wealth complicated the selection of the "best
9
men," and obviously frustrated Wilson,
The inability of the President to persuade his initial
candidates to accept the most important diplomatic posts was.,
in part, responsible for his selection of many Democratic
party favorites.

According to Charles Seymour, Wilson was

acutely aware:of the dangers, that menaced American interests
abroad when'a change in administrations occurred.

Thus,

Seymour continued, the President fought against the "threat
ened intrusion of the spoils system,"

However, the problem

was not simple, in view of the difficulty in finding Ameri
cans with a combination of intellectual backgrounds and
material resources, and also in view of the purely partisan
influences which regarded the Foreign Service as primarily
sity Press , ,195.6) , 98,
Wilson, II,)

(Hereinafter referred to as Link,

8Walworth, Wilson, 1, 247- 4 8 Baker,, Wilson,.IV, 32;
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121; Link, Wilson, II, 101.
9Link, Wjlson, II, 101.

20

designed to furnish jobs for political supporters,,

10

Al

though Link and Paolo Coletta believed that the difficulty
in acquiring the "best men" compelled Wilson to yield to
party pressure in naming ministers and ambassadors, they
also declared that Wilson always considered diplomatic
appointments on the upper level to be political in
nature,^

Acknowledging a- certain degree of inevitability,

Jatnes Kerney, a journalist *and Wilsonian from NeW Jersey,
said, "In the first two years of the Presidency, Wilson,
played considerably at organization politics.

It was not

to his liking.

But every President finds he must be a>
12
politician in one sense.or another,"
Since Wilson.quite universally made patronage appoints
ments, it seems probable that he was never ideologically
opposed to selecting friends and party favorites.

Also,

when he declined to nominate many professional diplomats
to the highest posts in favor of "best men" outside of the
•^Charles Seymour, Behind the Political. Curtain 1.9121915,Vol. 1 of The Intimate Papers of Colonel.House,
(Cambridge: Riverside Press., 1926) , 177-78,
(Hereinafter
referred to as Seymour, House, I.)
■^Link, Wilson, II, 101, 103; Link, Wilson The.
Diplomatist, 25-26; Coletta, "Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan and 'Deserving Democrats,'" Mid-America,
XLV1II (April, 1966), 83, See also Ilchman7 Professional
Diplomacy, 48-49,
James Kerney, The Political. Education of Woodrow
Wilson (New York: The Century Co ,, 19.26) , 308,
(Nereinaf ter
referred to as Kerney, Political,Education,)
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profession, he left himself susceptible to party influences.
Certainly, Wilson’s use of spoils, system was hardly a
transition from his original intentions.

Nevertheless

it

should be noted, that Wilson, with the advice of Colonel
Edward M. House, his confidant and personal adviser, kept
the consular service and most subordinate officials in the
diplomatic corps on the merit system.
Bryan's attitude concerning diplomatic appointments
increased the likelihood that the Wilson administration
would employ the spoils system profusely.

In fact, spoils

politics during the Wilson administration have often been
equated with the "Great Commoner."

He was even,more of a

novice in foreign affairs than the President, and certainly
unfamiliar with the functions of the Department of State.
Although the Secretary came to office with an idealistic
notion of the foreign affairs,of the United States, he was
equally dedicated to the value of. party politics.14

He

simplistically assumed that by "turning the rascals out"
and replacing them with loyal Democrats, the new adminis
tration would be strengthened.

Also, Bryan's opinion of

-*-^Barnes and Morgan, Foreign. Service, 183; Spaulding,
Ambassadors, 9; Seymour,..House, 1, 178; Tlchman, Professional Diplomacy, 120-21.
-t-^Link, Progressive Era, 26, 27.
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professional diplomats paralleled the,President's.

15

Thus,

because of his strong convictions in favor of the spoils
system, the inordinate number of demands on. him for political
appointments, and his powerful position in the. Democratic
party, Bryan-was continually seeking sinecures for "deserv
ing Democrats .

Coletta described one, of Bryan's most

nefarious practices--making a series of temporary appoint
ments for the sake of the honor attached- to them.

For

instance, he had reserved El Salvador "for Nebraskans only,"
He wrote to his brother Charles:

"I think it would be well

to give one year to four of our friends and would suggest
Doc Brown for the first year.
once.

Can make the appointment at

Suppose you. talk to Doc and see if he would like it.

It is $1.0,000 a year."

But. ex-mayor F„ tf. "Doc" Brown

feared that accepting the post, would jeopardize his chances
for postmaster of Lincoln.

Charles Bryan became so angry

with Brown that‘he suggested that the Secretary of State
have, the prospective minister's resignation written out,
dated a year in advance, and signed before the commission
■^•^Link, Wilson, II, 103. See also Coletta, Mid^-Aner.ica
XLVIII, 8.5-.86; Baker, Wilson, IV, 38-39; Ilchman, Professional
Diplomacy,. 119; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 183,;
Spaulding.,. Ambassadors, 9; Kerney, Political Education, 316-17.
^Katherine Crane,-Mr.*,Carr, of State Forty-Seven, Years
in .the Department of State- (NewrYerk: St. Martin's,Press.,
I960), 146-49 „ (Hereinafter referred to as Crane, Carr...)
See also Coletta, Mid-America., XLVIII, 85; Link, Wilson, II,
103; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 119;
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was given.

However, Doc Brown never accepted this type of

offer, but other candidates did.

Fortunately, Bryan's

patronage activities were primarily,limited to ministers.-^
The nature of the use of spoils politics by the Wilson
administration can■graphically be seen in viewing the various
appointments themselves.

Therefore, the remainder of this

chapter will be devoted to a mission-by-mission analysis of
the selections and the qualifications of the chiefs-ofmission for these positions.

Hopefully, this will provide

evidence of the character of the diplomatic corps during
World War I.
WESTERN EUROPE
Since many of the more!important and prestigious
embassies and legations were located in Western Europe,
Wilson made a majority of these appointments himself.
prominent Eondon post went to Walter Hines Page.

The

Born into

a substantial family in North Carolina, he attended RandolphMacon College and Johns Hopkins University, and eventually
sought his fortune in the North as a journalist.. He became,
successful in this field, editing such periodicals as The
Forum, The Atlantic Monthly, and World's Work.

He helped

establish the latter with Frank,Doubleday, who became his
partner, in 1889, in the Doubleday, Page and Company publ?Link, Progressive Era, 27; Ilchman, Professional
Diplomacy, 120, 126; Seymour, House, I, 177-78; Barnes
and Morgan, Foreign Service, l'S’3'J
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lishing house.
On an assignment from the New York World to cover the
Atlanta, Exposition of 1882 , Page had met a young lawyer,
Woodrow Wilson, with whom he established an immediate
rapport.

19

Ross Gregory dramatically summarized the rela

tionship between the two men:

"If Page and Wilson had not

met in 1882 it would have been-another time, for circum
stances destined that their paths frequently would cross.
Both were southerners; both,went to Johns Hopkins, attained
success in,the North, and looked back on,the old area with
hopeful objectivity."

20

after the first meeting.

Their paths did cross repeatedly
By 1885, Page had a New York,

editorial position, and in searching for good manuscripts
oftentimes relied upon Wilson, who was then a college professor.

21

It was not surprising that Page became an early

^ A , Howard Meneely, "Walter Hines Page," in Vol. XIV
of Dictionary of American Biography, ed. by Dumas Malone
(New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 142-44.
(Here
inafter referred, to. as D .A .Bo) See also,Alex Mathew Arnett,
Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1937), 121-22.
(Hereinafter referred to as
Arnett, Kitchin.)
■^Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page. Ambassador to. the
Court of St. James's (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press , 19 70) , 7Z
(Hereinafter referred to as Gregory, Page.)
20 Ibid., 17.
71

Ibid. Gregory also asserted that Page’s position as
a New York editor laid the foundation for a stronger rela
tionship between the two men.

25

■

supporter of Wilson for the presidency in 1912,

22

After Wilson had been elected, it could be assumed that
he would seriously consider his long-time friend for a place
in his administration.

Many of Page's associates urged his

appointment to the Cabinet.

House felt that Page should be

considered, but only after "a few qualified men" could be
placed, and the political spoils had been dispensed.

It

was no secret that Page had wanted to be named Secretary of
Agriculture.

Ironically, the position went to a man he him

self had recommended. ^

He was considered for Secretary of

Interior, but some of the President's advisers believed that
a southerner would be an inappropriate choice to manage the
Civil War veterans' pension system, which the Department of
24
Interior controlled.
By early March, Page was visibly
upset by all the political maneuvering.

In a letter to

"Uncle Henry" Wallace, he said:
Ibid.. , 16-20. Besides helping determine strategy,
Page used World's Work*to promote Wilson's candidacy and
election, .See.also Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters
of Walter Hines Page, Vol.. I (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page. and.Co ., 19 23), 130.
(Hereinafter referred to as
Hendrick, Page, I); H.C.F. Bell, Woodrow.. Wilson. and the People
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1945),
40-41.
^Gregory, Page> 22-23.
^Hendrick stated that Page was an "outspoken enemy"
of the pension program.. See.his Page, I, 118-19. See also
Baker, Governor 1910-1913, Vol. Ill of Wilson, 454; Gregory,
Page, 23-24.
’
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God pity our.new masters!
The President
is all.right,. He's sound, earnest, courageous*
But-his party!
I still have some muscular
strength*
In certain remote regions they still
break stones in the road by hand. Now I'll
break stones, before: I 'd have, a job at Washing
ton now* I spent four days with them lastweekrthe new crowd* They'll try their best.
I think
they'll succeed* But, if they do succeed and
survive, they'll come out of the scrimmage bleed-,
ing and torn* We've got to.stand off and run 'em,
Uncle Henry. That's the only hope I see for the
country.... 25
Although the opportunity for a Cabinet position dimin
ished, Page was offered the ambassadorship to London through
some fortunate circumstances.

Originally, Wilson had asked

the former president of Harvard, Charles W. Eliot, but he
refused primarily for financial reasons.

The President then

turned to Richard Olney, the elderly former Secretary of
State during the administration of Grover Cleveland.
again his offer was'rebuffed.

7

f\

Once

With the advice of House

and,the new Secretary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo,
the President offered the post to Page.

27

After allowing

himself a few days to consider, Page eagerly accepted.

How

ever, he had had some problems to resolve before he made his
decision, such as the education of his daughter, Katherine,
25Page to Henry Wallace, March 11, 1913, in Hendrick,
Page, I , 117.
^Baker , Wilson, IV, 26- 27. Baker stated that Olney
later wrote to Wilgdn expressing regret.for not taking the
post. See 311. See also.. Link, Wilson, II, 99; Ilchman.,
Professional Diplomacy, 121; Gregory, Page, 24; Coletta,
Bryan, 113; No11er, Wilson, 234-35.
22Link, Wilson, II, 99.
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and especially finances,

Page's financial problems were

eventually solved when Wilson persuaded his friend, Cleve
land H. Dodge, a New York millionaire and Princeton trustee,
to subsidize the new ambassador with $25,000 a year over and
above his salary, to help operate the American embassy in
29
London.
In his published letters, Page made no pertinent
references to his appointment.

However, historians have

provided most of the details--he was a southerner, a respected
journalist, a close friend of the President, and a third
choice for the ambassadorship to London.
The Brussels post; although not ranking in prestige with
London, was considered an idyllic assignment■in 1913.

The

reform mayor of Toledo, Brand Whitlock, became the new minis
ter to Belgium.

A novelist, he had experience in journalism,

government work, and law.

Beginning in,1905, he served four

two-year terms as mayor of Toledo, after having been legal'
adviser to. Progressive mayor Samuel "Golden Rule" Jones.
^Gregory, Page, 22-25.
29

Robert L„ Daniel, "The Friendship of Woodrow.Wilson,
and Cleveland H. Dodge," Mid-America, XLIII (July, 19.61.).,
184. See also.Link, Wilson,. II, 99-101; Bell, Woodrow
Wilson and.the People, 19 5; Hendrick, Page, I,.130; Wal
worth, Wilson, I, 3T7-48,
"
■ ^ H a r r is o n
g„ Dwight, "Brand,Whitlock," D„A.B„, XX,
137-38. ..See. also.Neil Alfred Thorburn, "Brand Whitlock,:
An Intellectual Biography,". (Unpublished. Ph.D. dissertationj
Northwestern,University, 1965),.i-ii.
(Hereinafter
referred to as Thorburn, "Whitlock,")
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Whitlock’s biographers summarized the reasons for his
selbctionas minister to Belgium.

Robert M. Crunden stated

that Newton D. Baker, an adviser to Wilson and later his
Secretary of War, gained eminence with the President-elect
after the victory of 1912.

And Baker wanted nothing more

than to place his dear friend, Whitlock, in a diplomatic
post where he could meet interesting pedple~and have plenty
of time to write.

Whitlock, Crunden added, did not want;to

assume the "attitude of an office seeker,” but he knew that
Baker would try to get him a position, and that Governor
James Mo Cox was also favorable. 31

However, he also realized

that: Ohio Democrats were reluctant to recommend an "Inde^pendent" for;a diplomatic post, and some of the "less cerebral"
Southern senators were opposed in principle to intellectuals
in high office.

Therefore, Whitlock did not place all his

trust in others to secure him a nomination, and asked Rutger
B. Jewett, the editor of D. Appleton Company, to obtain anendorsement.from William D. Howells, the literateur and.for
mer ambassador to Italy.

Crunden concluded that Wilson con

firmed the appointment either because of the endorsement of
Howells or Baker.32
^Robert. M. Crunden, A Hero, in Spite of Himself.: Brand
Whitlock in Art> Politics,~and War (New York: Alfred.A.
Knopf, 19 69) , 2297
(Here!nafter referred to as Crunden,, ,
Whitlock.) Whitlock had written to Cox, intimating that he
would like a diplomatic assignment.
32Ibid,, 233-34.
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Jack Tager also believed that:Baker was, vital in acquir
ing a diplomatic post for Whitlock, although he intimated
that Whitlock, on his own volition, initially sought -it,,
During his last years as mayor of Toledo, Whitlock consid
ered his future plans.

Higher public offices, such as the

senatorship, had been denied him, and he concluded that it
was time to commit himself fully to a writing career.

Since

authorship usually provided only a minimal income, a dip
lomatic post became his goal.

Although Cox told Whitlock

to file an official application for the diplomatic corps,
he refused on the grounds that by actively seeking patronage
he would tarnish his reputation as a "devoted public servant."
Thus, he tried to induce his influential friends and asso
ciates to acquire a position for him.

Finally, through his

profession of fidelity to the Democrats and the persuasion
of Baker, Cox, Jewett and Howells, he was sent to Belgium.
Allan Nevins added still another perspective to Whit
lock’s appointment.

He asserted that Republicans as well

as Democrats attempted to secure a diplomatic assignment
for the Toledo mayor.

However, the possibility was not

promising, since Whitlock had not taken an active part in
the Wilson campaign.

In fact, he had hesitated whether to

vote the Democrat or Socialist ticket.

Fortunately, the

33Jack Tager, The Intellectual as. Urban Reformer. Brand
Whitlock and the Progressive Movement (Cleveland: The Press
of Case Western Reserve University, 1968), 148-50.
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efforts of Whitlock's friends produced results, probablybecause Wilson was familiar with the writings of Whitlock
and admired his "progressive temper,"

34

Thus, Whitlock

secured an appointment to Belgium, since the combination
of influential friends and a progressive background seemed
to outweigh the fact that the Toledo mayor was not a
"regular" Democrat.
The selection of James W„ Gerard as ambassador to
Germany was clearly political.

The opulent New Yorker began

his career as a lawyer in 1892* and by 1907 he was an asso
ciate justice of the New York Supreme Court.

In the family

tradition* he became a successful financier, with holdings
35
in,New York and Montana, among others.
Active in politics,
he served as chairman^of the New York Democratic campaign
committee* and reportedly contributed approximately $120,000
•7 (L

in 1912 to various local and national Democratic candidates.
In 1913,- he was appointed ambassador to Germany, after Dean
^Allan Nevins, ed„ , The Letters and Journal of .Brand
Whitlock The. Letters (New York: D. Appleton-CentUry-Co„.,
1936), V j (Hereinafter referred to as Nevins, Whitlock
The Letters.)
*2 r

In 1901, he. married. Mary,A..;Daly , daughter, of. Marcus.
Daly , a powerful, "Copper King".and,ranch-owner in Montana
during the late nineteenth century.
^Henry :White, to Edith B*: Wilson, February 22., 1925,,.
Baker Collection, cited in Link,.Wilson, II, 101 i-. For.
Gerard's ,biography, see. also. National Cyclopaedia,.: of
American Biography,, Vol., XLIX (New York; James 1. White and
Co, , 1966), 124.
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Henry B. Fine, a friend and Princeton associate of Wilson,
declined the offer for personal and financial reasons.
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Completely unabashed, Gerard explained the nature of
his appointment in his memoirs:
It had always been my ambition to be an ambassa
dor, and after the election of President Wilson, in
1912, my desire was realized. President Wilson's
decision to appoint me Ambassador to Germany was
brought about, I think, by the friendly intervention
of a, combination of Tammany, Senator James A.
O ’Gorman of New York, William G. McAdoo, William F„
McCombs, and William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, in
particular, helped me because my father-in-law had
so lavishly supported him in his ’96 campaign.
For.
a while Colonel E. M. House, the Harry Hopkins of
the Wilson administration, very cleverly succeeded
in persuading me that he had been the principal fac
tor in my, appointment, but this conviction wore
off....3*
He went on to say that he was initially offered Spain,
but demurred, although O ’Gorman advised him to take it or
he might get nothing.

However, Gerard wanted an ambassa

dorship, and when 0 ’Gorman convinced him that Madrid was
to be made an embassy, he was ready to accept.

Shortly

after this, he received an offer to go to Germany.

He

said:
Baker,,Wilson, IV, 28. See.also Kerney, Political
Education, 310-11; Notter, Wilson, 234-35. According to
Link, Dodge also offered Fine a.subsidy of $25,000 a year.
See his Wilson, II, 101.
38

James W. Gerard, My First. Eighty-Three Years in
America The. Memoirs of James W. Gerard (Garden City,
New York:. Doubleday.and, Co.., Inc.,, 191)1) , 168.
(Herein
after referred to as Gerard, Eighty-Three. Years.) There
is no mention.of this in his My four. Years in Germany
(New York: George H. Doran Co., 1917).
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I have heard that a number.of gentlemen;.whom
Wilson proposed:to send to Germany were in each
instance, turned.down by the.Kaiser. It is the .
custom, of.course, to appoint a man who is persona
grata to the country to which he is to be sent.
Finally someone.close to.the President said, "Well,
let Gerard go.to.Germany and try his luck with
that hoodoo jobl"-^
He sardonically concluded:
When an ambassador is.appointed, the White
House announcements are unctuously, flattering
and give no. hint, of the pulling.and hauling,
the promises and maneuvering, and the blasted
hopes that have preceded the appointment.
It
is frequently more difficult.to become a
diplomat than it is to be.one.^O
Gerard's explanation of his appointment has generally
been a c c e p t e d , b u t Kerney and-Stuart have drawn different
conclusions.

Kerney believed that Senator William Hughes

of New Jersey, the spokesman of the administration in the
Senate, had some responsibility for the selection of Gerard.
Since Gerard had contributed "on a lavish scale" to the
Wilson election fund, he no doubt had wanted a place in the
Cabinet.

Thus, Kerney continued, an elaborate publicity

campaign was operated through his friends in New York to
obtain a Cabinet post for him.
accept him in this capacity.

However, Wilson would not
Finally at the urging of Hughes,

•^Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, 168.
40Ibid., 167.
41See Coletta, Bryan, II, 113;,Spaulding, Ambassadors,
9-10; Barnes.and Morgan, Foreign. Service, 185-86; Baker,. .
Wilson, IV, 35; Link, Wilson The Diplomatist, 24.
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42
Gerard was assigned to Germany.

Stuart maintained that

Gerard had also been considered for Mexico City, but he was
regarded as persona,non grata because of the reputed.illtreatment accorded the peons on his mining properties in
Mexico.^

No matter who urged his selection or for what

post,, Gerard was1purely a patronage appointment.
The embassy in Paris took inordinately long to fill.
Myron T, Herrick, a Taft appointee, was retained until the
spring of 1914, and hence represented the Wilson administration for more than a year.

Like many of the President's

own, choices for European posts, Herrick was a non-professional
diplomat-.

A former Ohio lawyer, president of a successful

banking organization and director of several railroads and
trust companies, he became active in politics in,1885„

An

important Republican* he was a close associate of Marcus A„
Hainna, and’was an important figure in, the election of McKin*;
ley in 1896, after which he was offered positions'as,ambassa
dor to Italy and Secretary of the Treasury.
both.

He declined

In-190 3; Herrick was elected governor of Ohio, but

failed to be re-elected in 1905.

He remained an active

Republican,, however, and in,1912 accepted Taft’s offer to
^Kerney, Political Education, 309-10.
Walworth, Wilson, I, 347 48.
^ S t u a r t , ,Diplomatic Practice, 211.

See also
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become, ambassador to France.
About his selection, Herrick stated in-his autobio:
graphy:
When,.I was, running,for,..governor: in, 1905,
Taft came ,to Akron.and made a speech. He in
tended to. help, me.,.
.but it had.Just the opposite,
effect.,.... .My friends all. thought that: without
meaning to do so, he contributed,.a certain, amount,
to my defeat.
I have:always,had an idea that-his
regret1over .this occurrence, as much as anything,
else, led .him .to. offer..me., a-.place- in his, cabinet,
when he became President.. There was.also some
talk of my taking a mission:abroad..„.
With.the election of Wilson, Herrick realized that his
continuation at Paris was merely a convenience for the
White

H o us e,
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And while Herrick waited in Paris, the

selection .process continued in Washington,

William F.

McCombs, Wilson'.s campaign manager, was considered, but he
declined.

He was more interested in a Cabinet assignment,

which was never offered him, and he believed the Paris post
A 7

would be too expensive for a man of his means.

Kerney and:

^^DavidJ. Hill, "Myron Timothy Herrick," D.A.B.,
VIII, 587-89.
^^Colonel-T. Bentley Mott, Myron T. Herrick, Friend
of France An,Autobiographical,Biography (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co.. , inc., 1929), 94.
(Hereinafter referred to as Mott, Herrick.)
^^ibid. , 115-16. See. also .Spaulding, Ambassadors,..
9-10; Walter. Millis, Road to War . America 1914-1917
(Cambridge: Riverside Press,.19 35), 20.
4^See Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 323; Mott,
Herrick, 218-21.
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Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson’s private secretary, then
suggested George Harvey, an early Wilson.supporter and
editor of the North American.Review.

However, a few days

before,Harvey's nomination was to go to the Senate, the
disgruntled.editor wrote an untimely "swift blast” against
the President.

This terminated Harvey's ;opportunity for a

. .. 48
mission,
The search for an ambassador to France ended with the
designation of William Graves Sharp in,1914.

An Ohio law

yer, turned manufacturer of pig-iron, chemicals, and charcoal,
Sharp became involved in national politics in,1892* when he
served as a Cleveland elector.

In 1896, he had opposed

Bryan, and free silver, but remained a staunch Democrat.

He

was elected to the House of Representatives in 1908, and soon
became a ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 49
In h?.s memoirs, Sharp made only passing reference to. his
appointment:

"My colleagues from Ohio,

[Senator Atlee

Pomerene and Newton D. Baker] without'my knowledge, had also
recommended my selection to the President, and tjie Senate
had paid me the compliment of confirming my nomination without
^Kerney, Political Education, 315-16. Harvey believed
that his .work.in the campaign.deserved some reward.. When.it
did not,seem,forthcoming, he-became;a.critic of Wilson's,
policies, especially the selection of-diplomatic chiefs-ofmission.
49

Spaulding, "William Graves. Sharp," D.A.B., XYII* 25.
See also;Stuarti Diplomatic Practice, 238-39„

36

the customary referral to a committee."^
ians have given more detailo

But some histor

According to Link, Sharp had

been originally considered for the Petrograd mission,-but,
the Russian ambassador in Washington-hinted that Sharp would
not be welcomed because he had denounced the 1832 RussianAmerican commercial treaty in 1911.'’'*' It is also widely
accepted that Sharp was considered for France because he had
contributed liberally to the 1912 campaign fund, and was an
ardent supporter of the administration.

c2

More political favorites and former associates of Wilson
and Bryan*filled the other Western European embassies and
legations.

For the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Wilson chose

a Pennsylvania Dutchman, Dr. Henry Van Dyke, who was a pro53
lific writer and poet teaching at Princeton University.
Prior to his appointment, a rumor circulated that the New
York Sun was about to publish a letter written by Cleveland
^Warrington;Dawson, ed., The War Memoirs of William
Graves Sharp American,Ambassador to France 1914-1919
(London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1931) , 1„
(Hereinafter
referred to as Dawson, Sharp.)
^Link, Wilson, II, 102. Dawson stated that Sharp was
also considered for Argentina, butiitwas scarcely important
enough for him. See Dawson, Sharp, xviii
^Walworth, Wilson, I, 347-48; Link, Wilson, 11,102;
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign.Service,.185-86; Kerney,:
Political Education^ 315-16.
—
53John. D. Spaeth, "Henry Van Dyke,".D.A.B., XIX,
186-88; Coletta, Bryan, II, 113;- Link, Road to the White
House, Vol. I of Wilson (1947), 48; Barnes and Morgan, .
Foreign Service, 185- 86. -See also Frederick H. Law,
Modern Great Americans (Freeport, New.York: Books.for
Libraries Press, 1969), 248-60.
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to Van- Dyke, severely castigating Wilson-.

However, Van Dyke

refused to give a.copy to the New York, editor.^

This

incident might have had some bearing upon.Van Dyke's nomina
tion, as it certainly would have, helped sustain the friendship between the former Princeton colleagues.
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was appointed in 1913 and remained until 1917b

Van.Dyke
He was.

succeeded by John Work Garrett, a career diplomat who had
S6
been minister to Venezuela and Argentina.
Another friend of Wilson, Pleasant-A. Stovall, was
appointed to Switzerland in 1913.

He and the President

were boyhood friends, who had attended a private boys'
school together in Georgia.

Stovall was. a journalist, and,

in 1891, with David Robinson, established the Savannah
Evening Press, of which he served as editor.

An-active

Democrat, he had been chairman of the Georgia Democratic
Convention, aide-de-camp to two Georgia governors, and a
representative to his state's General Assembly from 1902
to 1906.

c7

Like many of Wilson's friends, he had been a,

•^Link, Wilson. II, 358; Kerney, Political Education.
310-11,
‘’Kerney said that Ellen A. Wilson originally suggested
to her husband.that he send Van.Dyke, to.the Netherlands.
See his Political Education, 310-11.
^ Register of the Department of State 1917 (Washington
D.C.: Government Printing Office,'1918), 96~
(Hereinafter
referred to as Register 1917.)
...
c7
° Irving.L. Thompson, "Pleasant Alexander Stovall,"
D .A .B ., XXI, 675-76; Link, Wilson, 1,4.
Stovall wrote,a
book analyzing the political conditions in Switzerland and
Europe during the war. See his-Switzerland and the World
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devoted supporter in the 19X2 campaign.
Two Virginians, Thomas. Nelson Pag©58 and Joseph Edward
Willard^ were appointed to Rome'and Madrid, respectively.
Page was a romantic Southern novelist and essayist,

A

social acquaintance of Wilson, he.had been chairman1©f the
reception.committee at the inauguration in.1913,

Page was

selected primarily to appease Virginia's two powerful sena-;
59
tors,: Claude A, Swanson and Thomas S, Martin,
The Vir
ginia senators'also supported the nomination of Willard, a
wealthy lawyer, a former member of the Virginia House of
Delegates, and lieutenant governor,^®

Neither Page nor

Willard had any prior experience, in foreign affairs.
In another strictly political maneuver, Thomas‘H„ Birch
was, commissioned as minister to Portugal„

It was at his

home that Wilson and Bryan were first introduced.^

Further

more, Bryan and the New Jersey carriage■manufacturer had been
friends ever since Birch and his>father supported the Secre
tary of State in the 1896 presidential campaign.

He was no

War (Savannah, Georgia: Mason, Inc., 1939),
S^Thomas Nelson Page also wrote,a book assessing European
political conditions during the war. See his Italy and the
World War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 20),
■^Link, Wilson, II, 102, See also RosewelX Page, Thomas
Nelson Page , A Memoir of a Virginia Gentleman .(New York':
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923)',.. 150,
^Link, Wilson, II, 102, See also Spaulding, "Joseph
Edward Willard," DTA.B., XX, 236; Register 1916 (1917), 142.
^Baker, Wilson, III, 209; Link, Wilson,'II, 102,
also;Register■1916, 74.

See
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stranger to the President either, since Wilson, before, he
retired from Trenton^in 1912, named-Birch as an aide on the
governor’s staff.

After the campaign, Birch made known his>

desire to be named minister to Belgium, and Bryan urged his
selection.
instead.
Portugal.

But the President balked, and offered him Russia
When he declined, a compromise was reached'on.

f\ '7

The new minister quickly gained the attention

of the Department of State by ordering stationery embossed
with "American Embassy, Lisbon," instead of "American, Lega?tion, Lisbon.
SCANDINAVIA
Of the three key ministers to Scandinavia, two had some
diplomatic experience.

Wilson personally selected Ira,

Nelson Morris for Sweden.

He had been a businessman for

many years before Bryan,sent him on a, special diplomatic
mission to Italy early in 1913.

He was, appointed minister

to Sweden little more than a year later.^

In his memoirs,

he gave minimal attention to the reasons for his designa^tion, yet.he complained how ludicrous it seemed to use
^2Kerney, Political Education, 163, 315-16.
^ Ibid., 313-15. See also George.Harvey, "The Diplomats
of Democracy," North American Review, CLXXXIX (February,
1914),'183,
!
;
^ Regis ter 1916, 117.
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’personal funds for diplomatic expenses.

He added,

"Throughout Europe certain men are, as it were, born
to diplomacy... In America, however , diplomats like Topsy,
,,66

just grow."

Maurice Francis Egan, originally a Roosevelt appointee,
remained at his post in Denmark during the Wilson adminis
tration.

A Philadelphia connoisseur of "the good life" and

a prominent Catholic, he had been a teacher and journalist
with a desultory interest in law.

He had taught at George

town University, Notre Dame, and the Catholic University of
America, and, in 1888, he became part-owner and editor of
the Freeman's Journal.

Since he was familiar with Europe,

he had been ah unofficial adviser to McKinley and Roosevelt.
The latter appointed him minister to Denmark in 1907.to purr
chase the Danish West Indies and to keep the administration
informed on European affairs.

ft

7

In his memoirs, Egan, discussed his appointments in
detail.

Cleveland had offered him a post, but as he said:

"I had very little respect for our foreign service.

The

65lra Nelson Morris, From an American Legation (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923) , 5.
^ Ibid., 3-4. However, he believed a beginning was.
being made toward, professionalism in the corps, which he
heartily approved.
67Allen Westcott, "Maurice Francis Egan," D.A.B.,
VI, 49.
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tenure was so unstable and the expense for the pleasure of
enjoying a little brief authority so.crushing, that I was
ungrateful enough to refuse.”
post from Roosevelt.

f\ft

He eventually accepted a

As he stated:

...Mr. Roosevelt one day,gently suggested that I
should go to Japan,
1 was horrified.
I knew
nothing of the Eastern situation. While I was no
novice, I had always felt that if a man was unfort
unate enough to be an Ambassador from the United,
States.to any other country, he ought to have
served as'a Minis ter Plenipotentiary for a time,at
least.... Besides this, Mr. O'Brien had been spoken,
of in connection with Tokio.
I considered myself
well out of the diplomatic service. President
Roosevelt said to me, combating one of my object
tions--”Oh, you can manage very well on $10,000a
year. You and Mrs. Egan,will always make a house
so agreeable that everybody will come to you.”
But I knew better than that.
I agreed with him
that Copenhagen.offered.many attractions. It. was,.
what our.State Department has never quite found
out,, the. whispering gallery of Europe, and Presi
dent Roosevelt knew this very well. He said:
"Perhaps Portugal, a Catholic country, would suit
you better.” "No, not at all,” I answered. "I
shall probably meet too many Catholics in the next,
world and.I do not always find them so very amusing
here." I declined to take any post. Then several
members of.the Cabinet spoke to me about i t ; . O n e
day the President sent for me .and,said;
"I am going down.to my little house in Vir
ginia for .about a week. When I return I expect you
to say yes, and I will send you to Copenhagen,
He accepted.
When the Wilson administration took office, Egad paid
a visit to the President.

He said:

^^Egan, ■Recollections of a Happy Life (New York.:
George H. Doran,Co., 19 24j, 181-82.
[Hereinafter referred
to as Egan, Recollections.)
69Ibid., 217.
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...The President was amiable enough to give me
five minutes one day.
I dared not, under the
circumstances, go further than to thank him for
keeping me at my post. "I never make merely
political appointments," he said. "If I find a
man 'in,' who is not of my party and is better
than the man-who is ’out ' and who, wants to get
'in,' I retain the better man."... 0
Egan later met with Bryan:
...I found that he was more interested in filling
the diplomatic places with worthy politicians than
with the expert or experienced. He told me he was
glad there was a Catholic in the diplomatic service,
to which I replied that neither Mr. Roosevelt nor
Mr. Taft nor Mr. Wilson,had appointed me because
I was- a -Catholic; ... I seemed to be looked on as a
political appointee, who'had dropped,from somewhere
into a circle,of white-souled charity and religious
beauty.7^
Egan's perception of the appointment process in Washing
ton during Wilson's administration, and his disdain for being
considered "just another political appointee," were quite re
vealing.

He was one of the few chiefs-of-missiOn with some

experience, and Wilson seemed to retain him for merit, rather
than convenience, unlike Herrick.

This was likely since Wil

son asked Egan to accept the Vienna embassy.

However, Egan

declined for financial reasons, and remained in Copenhagen.7^
In contrast to the more experienced Egan, Albert George
Schmedeman, of Wisconsin, an obscure son of German immigrants,
70Ibid., 295.
71Ibid., 295-96.
322.

7^Baker, Wilson, IV, 32; Stuart, Diplomatic Practice,
'
'
-
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obtained the post in Norway.

Prior to his nomination, he

had been a partner in Winden, Grinde and Schmedeman,, a
prominent clothing firm in Madison.

He also had served as

treasurer of the Guardian Life Insurance Company and the
Bank of Wisconsin,

Active.in Madison civic affairs, he had

been a member of the Common Council of Madison from 1903 to
1907.

From his early years, he was an ardent Democrat, at

one time serving as treasurer of the Wisconsin Democrat
central committee.

73

The reasons for his appointment as an

envoy are unclear,
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
The major appointments to Central and Eastern Europe
were as politically oriented as- any made by the Wilson
administration.

The selection of an ambassador to Russia

was an excellent example, especially.since the administra
tion had such difficulty filling the post,

Sharp had

refused, as has;already been stated, and Charles:R. Crane,
a Chicago.industrialist and Wilson supporter, had also
declined*, ^

With the support of Senator J. Hamilton Lewis

of Illinois; Henry M. Pindell, an editor in, Peoria and a
^ National Cyclopaedia of American, Biography, XXXIII,
440; Register 1916, 128; New York Times, November 27, 1946,
25. After eight years as minister to Norway he returned to
Madison and became mayor. Later h e ,was elected governor of
Wisconsin.
^Coletta, Bryan,, II, 113; Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII,
84; Link, Wilson, II, 102,
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strong Wilson supporter, was appointed.

This proved to be

a fiasco, since a dissatisfied clerk in Lewis’s office stole
letters relating to Pindell’s selection and sold them to
some newspapermen.

In an article which soon appeared,

Wilson and Bryan were said to have agreed to select Pindell
on the condition that he resign by October, 1914,

When the

Russian Foreign Minister learned of this, he immediately
informed the secretary of.the American Embassy that his
government would refuse publicly to.accept Pindell.

This

situation forced the Peoria editor to rescind his accep
tance , and seriously, embarrassed the Wilson administration, ”■ ^
George T, Marye, a Democratic leader of California and a
friend of Bryan, was then selected to replace Pindell,

7 £\

Two years later, Marye resigned and was replaced by
David Rowland Francis, a prosperous former grain.merchant
from,Missouri.

He had a lpng record as a loyal Democrat,

first service as delegate--at-large to the National Demo
cratic Convention of 1884,

He then had been a reform mayor

of St, Louis, governor of Missouri, and Secretary of the
Interior under Cleveland,

Francis's opposition,to Bryan and

free silver had damaged'his political career and, it was
^Link, Wilson, II, 102. See also Coletta, Bryan, II,
113; Coletta, Mid^-America, XLVIII, 83-84 ; Kerney, Political
Education, 312.
7^Coletta, Bryan, II, 113; Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII,
84; Link, Wilson," II, 102.
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not until 1908, when he sought peace with Bryan and advo
cated his nomination in the Democratic National Convention,
that he returned to politics.

77

After an unsuccessful

campaign for the Senate' in 1910, he went behind the scenes
and managed Champ Clark's campaign in Missouri in 1912.
Four years later he was appointed to Russia,

78

Francis's memoirs tell nothing of his nomination, but
there is a passage which characterized his attitude when
he arrived in Russia:
At two o'clock, in the morning on the 28th
of April, 1916, with the grinding of brakes and
the pushing of people toward the doors, the
Stockholm Express came to a stop in the Finland
Station of Petrograd, and I realized that my
duties as Ambassador from- the greatest Republic
of the New World to the Court of the mightiest
Autocracy of the Old had virtually begun.
It
was dark and cold.
I was alone except for my
loyal colored:valet, Philip Jordan.
I had
never been to Russia before. My knowledge of
Russia up to the time of m y appointment had
been that of the average intelligent American
citizen--unhappily slight and vague,..,'®
Many historians agree that Francis's business exper^Walter B. Stevens, "David Rowland Francis," D.A.B.,
VI, 577-78. See also Stevens, "David R. Francis, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to.Russia," Missouri
Historical Review, XIII (April, 1919), 195-225; Charles
Daniel DeYoung, "David Rowland; Francis--American in Russia"
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 19.49),
9-11, 14-18.
(Hereinafter referred to as DeYoung, "Francis.")
^William E. Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work (Garden
City, N.ew York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), 96; Link,
Wilson, I, 410.
^David R. Francis, Russia from the-American Embassy
April 1916-Noyember,! 1918 (New York.:.Charles Scribner.'s.
Sons, 19 21) , T ! (Hereinafter referred to as Francis, Russia.)
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ience was the principal, reason for his appointment.

For

many years, the United States government had been desirous
of negotiating a new commercial treaty with Russia, and in
1916, the Russian Foreign Office had finally shown interest. 80
When Marye tendered his resignation that year, the Wilson
administration naturally sought a man with business exper
ience , and Francis 's name was familiar to the President.

In

1913, Edward F. Goltra, a national Democratic committeeman
from Missouri, had recommended Francis for a diplomatic post,
but nothing had been available.

In 1914, Francis was offered

Argentina, but; declined because of the uncertainty of busi
ness conditions.

When the Petrograd embassy.became avail

able, Wilson immediately turned to Francis.^

Certainly,

Francis's wealth and his loyalty to the Democratic party
were further grounds for his selection.
^Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia RussianAmerican Relations from Early Time to Our Day (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1950) , 2T2; Gilbert C.
Kohlenberg, "David Rowland Francis: American Businessman
in Russia," Mid-America, XL (October, 1958) , 197; William
App1eman Williams, American-Russian Relations 1781-1947
(New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 19 52) , 84; DeYoung,>
"Francis," 9-11. George F. Kennan believed the precise
reasons for the appointment were unclear, but Francis's
extensive business experience certainly was a factor. See
his Russia Leaves the War, Vol. I of Soviet-American Rela
tions 1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1956), 35.
(Hereinafter referred to as Kennan,ISovietAmerican Relations ,. I .)
SlDeYoung, "Francis," 11; Kennan, Soviet-American
Relations, I, 35; Bailey, America Faces Russiaj 22;
Kohlenberg, Mid-America, XL, 197.
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Charles Joseph Vopicka was chosen as minister to
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia,

A Czech, born in Dolni

Hbitz, Bohemia, Vopicka emigrated to America in 1880 and
became a bookkeeper for a truck factory.

In 1881, he

helped organize a real estate and banking concern in
Chicago, and then in 1891, he became a partner i n ,the
Bohemian Brewing Company (later called the Atlas Brewing
Company).

He was a prominent member of the large Bohemian;

community in Chicago and was active in many civic and
OO

political organizations.

Victor S. Mamatey said about

Vopicka's nomination as minister:

"In 1912 he wished to

crown his success in the world of business by the dignity
of public office and ran for Congress as a Democratic can
didate.

He was not elected, but the grateful Democratic

party 'compensated' his services, by securing for him-the
O7
appointment..."
Undoubtedly, Vopicka's nationality as
well as his Democratic affiliation was instrumental in his
selection.
The appointment of Frederick C. Penfield to AustriaHungary came after Egan's refusal to transfer from Copen
hagen to Vienna.

Penfield had some diplomatic experience

during the Cleveland administration as a vice-consul general
in London and a diplomatic agent and consul general in
82Thomson, "Charles Joseph Vopicka," D .A .B ., XXI,
694-95.
Ilchman mistakenly stated Vopicka became minister
to Greece. See his Professional Diplomacy,.122.
07
Mamatey, Central Europe, 122.
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Cairo.

The sixteen years that followed were devoted to

travel and writing.

About Penfield’s qualifications,

Joseph V. Fuller wrote:

"His service under the previous

Democratic administration, his wealthy and his Catholic
faith qualified him: for appointment by President Wilson
O A

as ambassador to Austria-Hungary."

It was his'wealth

which Kerney and Link have emphasized.

Kerney stated that'

Penfield had made a ten thousand dollar contribution to
85
McCombs for the 1912 campaign.
In Link’s account, Penfield
with $120,000 was one of Wilson’s heaviest contributors.

86

The post at Athens went to Garret Droppers, a professor
of political economy and a former president of the University
of South Dakota.

Besides his academic career, he had also
o7

been active in Massachusetts civic organizations.

After

Wilson had appointed him in 1913,.it was learned that he
Og
could not serve until June;
, 1914.
Bryan viewed this as an
opportunity to.place his personal friend, George F. Williams,
^Joseph V. Fuller, "Frederick C. Penfield," D.A.B.,
XIV, 425-26.
o5

Kerney, Political Education, 151.
Wilson, III, 29757“
86Link, Wilson, II, 102; I, 403.
87Register

1916, 87.

88Link, Wilson, I, 380.

See also Baker,
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at the post until Droppers could assume it.

89

This decision

demonstrated a most flagrant use of the spoils system.
AFRICA AND THE EAST
Liberia was one of the few major American missions in
Africa during the Wilson,administration.

Fred R. Moore of

New York was' appointed in March, 1913, but did not go to
90
the post.
He was replaced by George Washington Buckner,
a former public school teacher and doctor from Indiana,:who
91
served for two years in Liberia.
In 1915, James Curtis
was appointed.

He was a lawyer and the only negro to receive

an upper level diplomatic post during the Wilson administra
tion.

The Liberian mission had been offered previously to

the prominent Alexander Walters, head of the National ,
Colored Democratic League and bishop of the African,Methodist
Episcopal Zion Church.

When he declined, he recommended

Curtis, who was then actively working with negro Democrats.
Hence, negro support for the Democrats in 1912 was a major
factor in.the appointment of a negro as a chief-of-mission.
^^Coletta, Mid^America, XLVIII, 86; Baker* Wilson, IV,
40-41.
90Register 1916, 116.^ Register 1914, .62.
^Kathleen Long Wolgemuth, "Woodrow Wilson’s Appoint
ment Policy and the Negro," Journal of Southern History,
XXIV (November, 1954), 466. See also Register 1916, ST.

q2
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In succession, two notable contributors to the Demo
cratic coffers were selected as ambassador to Turkey.

In

the autumn of 1913, Wilson nominated the eminent Jewish
New York financier, Henry Morgenthau.

He had donated four

thousand dollars a month to Wilson's pre-primary campaign.

Q3

During the latter days of the campaign, Wilson,asked him to
head the national Democratic finance committee.

In that

position he was able to acquire sizable contributions, and
94
he dispensed the money wisely.
It is generally accepted
that his financial support in the 1912 campaign was,the
primary reason for his selection as ambassador to Turkey,

95

Morgenthau's Jewish heritage was also a consideration
in his appointment, since Wilson believed a Jew was needed
in.Constantinople in the interest of American Jews in
Palestine.^

However, Morgenthau wanted a cabinet position

^Baker, Wilson, III, 290; Walworth, Wilson, I, 34748; Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People, 70-71. Link said
Morgenthau contributed $5,000 a month,for four months. See
his Wilson, I, 338, 403; II, 102.
^Baker, Wilson, III, 290; Link, Wilson, I, 338;
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 18,4-85.
9^Walworth, Wilson, I, 347-48; Link, Wilson, 1,-328,
403; II, 102; Baker, Wilson, III, 290;.Bell, WoodrOw Wilson
and the People, 70-71; Coletta, Bryan., II, 11?"
“
^^Coletta, Bryan,, II, 114; Kerney, Political Education,
313; Laurence Evans, United States and tFe Partition of
TUrkey 1914-19 24 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, T965),
29. Evans stated that House originally suggested Morgenthau
for Turkey.
(Hereinafter referred to as Evans, Partition of
Turkey.)
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as a reward for his campaign labors, and he was supported
by McCombs.

When he was offered Turkey instead, he hesi

tated, stating a preference f o r a Western European post...
But'Wilson argued that: a Jew was indispensable.for the
Turkish embassy.

Morgenthau contended that many of his

coreligionists urged him to decline the nomination because
they felt it was the only mission open;to Jews in,the dip
lomatic service.

Wilson.was finally able to convince
97
Morgenthau to actept.
When he eventually resigned in
1916, he was. replaced by Abram I. Elkus, a lawyer and another;
wealthy Jew from New York.

98

Elkus had also actively cam

paigned for Wilson and made substantial contributions to
the Democratic party.

99

Bryan was most'influential in the selection of his.
friend, John L. Caldwell, a Kansas lawyer, for the Persian
mission.

Caldwell had no experience in foreign affairs,

and his only public service was three years as a Kansas
* * senator.
*
1°°
state
97Kerney, Political Education, 313.
" Register 1916, 89. He had also been president of the
Hebrew Technical School for Girls, and a regent of the
University of the State of New York.
"Link, Wilson, I, 403; Baker, Wilson, I, 290;
J.C. Long, Bryan The Great Commoner (New York: D. Appleton
and Co., 1928), 268.
1^0Register 1916, 78.
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The search for a minister to China was an arduous'task.
The Peking legation was of considerable importance in Asian
and world affairs, requiring a man of superior ability.
Paul Samuel Reinsch, the eventual choice, was one of the
most highly praised appointments Wilson made.

Like Page,

Gerard, and others, he was not1the first nominee.

The

President once again had turned to Eliot, who declined for
a second time. 101

Wilson’s next choice was John R. Mott,

a leading official in the International Y.M.C.A., who also
declinedil02

Wilson also considered Edward A. Ross, a noted

and controversial professor of sociology at the University
of Wisconsin, who. was endorsed by Crane.

While Wilson was

considering Ross, Joseph E. Davies, the newly appointed
Commisioner.of Corporations, wrote the President advising
him to read Reinsch’s Intellectual and Political Currents
in the Par East.

Davies also praised Reinsch’s qualifica

tions and attacked Ross’s .

Wilsonhad met Reinsch through

lOlgryan was pleased by this, since he believed-an.
orthodox Christian should go to China, and Eliot was. a .
Unitarian.. See Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and' the
Far East The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question '.(New. York:
Thomas Y„ Crowell Co., 195-2), 13-14.
(Hereinafter referred
to as Fifield, Far East). See also Coletta, Bryan, II, 114;
Link, Wilson, II, 98.
102isiQel Harvey Pugach, "Making the Open Door Work:.
Paul S.. Reinsch. in China, 1913-1919," Pacific^Historical
Review, XXXVIII (May, 1969), 157-58; Coletta, Fry an, IT,"
114; Fifield, Far East, 13-14. According to Daniel,. Dodge
was asked-to help induce Mott ,to take .the post in China.
See Daniel, Mid-America, XLIII, 184.
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the American Political, Sciep.ce Association, which both, had
helped organize.

The President had plso been made aware

that the ideas of the Wisconsin professor paralleled his
own thinking.

Finally, Wilson.recommended Reinsch for the

Peking mission, after clearing him with Senator Robert M.
LaFollette, who gave his hearty approval.10^
Although not a,professional,diplomat, Reinsch had a
wide variety of experiences.

A son of a,Wisconsin Lutheran

minister, he practiced law for a short time, but upon
receiving his doctorate in.political science, began an,
academic career.

By 1901, he was a full professor at the

University of Wisconsin.

In 1904, as has been.stated, he

helped organize the American Political Science Association;
he served as vice-president the first year and later was
one of the editors.of the American Political Science Review..
He was’considered one of the few American authorities on the
Far East, and a productive scholar in the areas of world
103pUgach } "Progress, Prosperity and the Open,Door:
The Ideas and Career of Paul-S. Reinsch,” (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1967), 9-11.
(Hereinafter referred to as Pugach, "Reinsch."). Pugach
argued that Reinsch. actively sought a diplomatic post in
the Far East or Latin America.. This was made possible.by
the support of.his influential friends.in,Wisconsin and
Washington D.C. and his academic fame. See 87-91.. See
also Roy.Watson.Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far^Eastern Policy
1913-1921:(New York; Bookman Associates, 1957), 38.
(Here
inafter referred to as Curry, Far Eastern Policy.); Daniel
James Gage, "Paul S. Reinsch and Sino-American Relations.,."
(Unpublished. Ph..D.. dissertation, Stanford University,, 1939) ,
37.
(Hereinafter,referred.to as~Gage,'"Reinsch."); Notter,
Wilson, 207; Fifield, Far East, 13-14.
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organizations and politics.

Reinsch also became active in

civic and political affairs, especially as a major figure in
Governor LaFollette's "brain trust" in Madison.

Roosevelt

and Taft both included Reinsch in the delegations to the
third and fourth Pan-American Conferences and the first
American Science Conference.*^

Furthermore, Reinsch

planned studies for the Carnegie Endowment, and joined
Elihu Root,,Robert Lansing and others in sponsoring a code
of international law.

In the field of business, he was a

consultant and confidential adviser to businessmen and
bankers in Milwaukee and Chicago, and aided in the organiza
tion of the National Chapter of the American Institute of
Banking.

From his scholarly, political and business back

ground, he became a forceful advocate of the Open Door
policy, and appreciated the need for modern financial techniques in national and world affairs.

10 5

It seems clear

that Reinsch came close to fulfilling Wilson's "ideal" dip
lomat;: an intellectual familiar with world affairs, a devoted
l^Grayson c. Kirk, "Paul Samuel Reinsch," D.A.B. ,
XV, 491-92. See also Link, Wilson, III, 273-74.
105pUgach, Pacific Historical Review, XXXVIII, 15 7-58.
See also Pugach, "Reinsch," 17-71; Tien-ryi Li, Woodrow
Wilson1s..China Policy 1913-1917 (New York: University of
Kansas City Press-Twayne Publishers, 1952), 83-84.
(Here
inafter .referred^to.as Li, China,Policy.); Alan E. Kent,
"Down ftom the.Ivory Tower: Paul:Samuel.Reinsch, Minister,
to China," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV (Winter,
1951) , 114.
'
'
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Democrat who favored progressive politics, and a man of
integrity,

But as Alan E. Kent suggested:

’’Reinsch pos

sessed decided knowledge of the Far East as a whole...Of
course his information was gleaned in the scholar’s ivory
tower, not in the rough and tumble diplomatic -service.nl06
It will remain to be. seen if Reinsch persevered under the
rigors of day-to-day diplomacyi
Two Pennsylvania politicians were successively appointed
to the important Tokyo mission during the Wilson adminis
tration.
burg.

The first was George W, Guthrie, a powerful Pitts

lawyer and devoted Democrat; who, like his father, had

served as mayor of Pittsburg.

He also had been secretary for

the National Democratic Convention of 1884,.a delegate from
1904 to 1912, and chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic
Committee.

In 1912, Guthrie and other progressives were

prominent in the -campaign which culminated in the nomination
of Wilson for President.

1 07

With the choice of Guthrie for

Japan, one more,political debt was paid.

On his death, Guthrie

was succeeded by an old associate, Roland Morris, who had
practiced law in Philadelphia, was a director of several
educational and philanthropic institutions in Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV, 114;
lO^joseph H. Frederick, "George W. Guthrie," D„A*B..,
VIII, 60.; Baker, Wilson, III, 285; Link, Wilson, I, 352.
For a laudatory account of Guthrie, see Post Wheeler and
Hallie Erminie Rives, Dome of.Many Colored Glass. (Garden.
City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 195S.),' 548.
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and also had served as chairman of the Pennsylvania Demo
cratic Committee.1^

Like Guthrie, he had actively sup

ported Wilson's nomination for President.1^)®
The Siamese post changed hands three times by 1917.
Fred W. Carpenter, a Taft appointee, was retained until
1915.

A Minnesota lawyer and former confidential secre

tary to Taft before he was President, Carpenter had been
minister to Morocco before being assigned to,Siam;in
1912;

110

Wilson finally replaced him with William Harrison

Hornibrook, who had been a newspaper editor and publisher
in Idaho and Oregon, and an Idaho state senator from 1910
111

to 1912.

Hornibrook served two years in Siam, and was,

followed by George Pratt Ingersoll, a lawyer in Connecticut
and New York.

112

Both of the ministers appointed under

Wilson were novices in. international affairs;
LATIN AMERICA
George Harvey has called Wilson's diplomatic appoint
ments to Latin America a "political debauchery,"113 and
many historians have continued this theme.

While there

108Register 1917, 122.
1Q9Baker, Wilson, III, 202, 285; Link, Wilson, I, 332.
llONew York Times, August 29, 1957, 27.
111Register 1915, 90.
11^Register 1917, 107.
113Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX, 169.
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were some dramatic examples of this "debauchery,” the types
of nominees for the Latin American missions varied little
from their counterparts assigned to Europe, Asia and Africa.
Mexico City was one of the most important posts in
Latin;America, not only for its proximity to.the United
States, but on account of the years of internal strife
it was passing through.

The Wilson administration retained

Henry Lane Wilson,,a Taft appointee, until the autumn of
1913.

Coming from a family of "public servants,” Wilson

had studied law in the office of Benjamin Harrison.

From

1882 to 1885, he was editor and owner of the Lafayette
Journal, an Indiana newspaper.

He moved to Washington

Territory, and for the next eleven years acquired a small
fortune there in real estate, banking, and law.

The panic

of 1893 bankrupted him, and two years later he became active
in the political career of his brother, John L„, a senator
from Washington,

As early as 1889, Harrison offered him a

position as minister to Venezuela, but he declined.

Later,,

he accepted McKinley's offer to become minister to Chile.
After Roosevelt was elected in 1904, Wilson was transferred
to Belgium.

In 1909, Taft sent him to Mexico.

1-^Spaulding, "Henry Lane Wilson," D.A.B., XX, 325;
Eugene Frank Masingill, "The Diplomatic Career of Henry
Lane Wilson in,Latin America," {Unpublished Ph.D. disser
tation, Louisiana State University, 1957), 6-9.
(Herein
after referred to as Masingill, "Henry Lane Wilson.").
For further information about.the appointments of Wilson
to Chile and Belgium, see Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic
Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile. (New York: Doubleday,
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Since Wilson was, ambassador to Mexico during the first
few months of 1913, it should be worthwhile to examine his
appointment there in more detail.

In his memoirs, Wilson,

intimated that his transfer from,Belgium to Mexico in 1909
was somewhat routine.

He further asserted that Taft con

sidered sending him to Russia.

But the expense of maintain

ing the embassy in Petrograd was excessive for Wilson,
which he made known to the President.

As a result, Taft

offered him the ambassadorship to-Mexico, especially because
Root and Henry Cabot Lodge had told the President that a man,
who understood "Latin American psychology" and the Spanish
115
language should be sent there.
The appointment of Wilson to Mexico has inspired a minor
historical controversy.

Peter Calvert stated that Wilson's

transfer from,Belgium to Mexico was said to have been due to
the Guggenheim copper interests as well as his brother’s
political connections and the support of the Secretary of
the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger Jr.

Calvert added that

if this influence meant much to Wilson, he was not likely
to be predisposed to favor the Mexican President, Francisco
Page and Co., 1927), 1-4, 85-86, 93-95, 109-113.
(Herein
after referred to as'Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes.)» See
also Peter Calvert, The Mexican,, Revolution, 1910"-1914
The^; Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, l'9'68) , 38.
(Hereinafter referred
to as Calvert, Mexican Revolution,); Lowell L. Blaisdell,
"Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero," Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly, XL (September, 1962), 127.
HSWilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 158-59.
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Madero, since the Guggenheim interests had been in direct
collusion with those o£ the Madero,family in,the area of
TOrreon,
Eugene Frank Masingill, in a dissertation, defended
the ambassador's own interpretation, and was critical of
the accusations made by other historians that the transfer
entailed some sort of political maneuvering.

Masingill

declared that Wilson's reasons for desiring a transfer were
obvious:

1) to obtain a promotion,from minis ter to ambassa

dor, and 2) to be nearer the United States, because his
117
mother was, sick and his brother was, dying. x
Wilfrid Hardy Callcott compromised between the inter
pretations of Calvert and Masingill.

He asserted that al

though Wilson had wanted to be sent to Mexico, he was not
informed of his selection until October, 1909.

Callcott

also insisted that Taft had sent Wilson,, to Mexico at the
urging of Root and Lodge, because the situation in Mexico
requited a man with some knowledge of the problems.

Con

currently, he stated that Wilson certainly had intimate
connections with wealthy United States corporations doing
business in Mexico, and surrounded himself,with;their agents
H^calvert, Mexican Revolution, 38-39. See also George
M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1935), 306-11.
117Masingill, "Henry Lane Wilson," 60, See also
...
Philip Holt Lowry,,"The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson,"
(Unpublished.Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1949),..
26.
(Hereinafter referred to as Lowry, "Mexican Policy,")
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"in: a most indiscreet fashion.

■

The cojitfoversy concerning Wilson's appointment to
Mexico seems hest resolved by Callcott1s assessment.

How

ever* there.also has been considerable speculation about
the decision of President Wilson to retain Ambassador Wil
son until August, 1913.

In February, 1913, rebels led by

generals Victorian© Huerta and Felix;Diaz overthrew the
Madero government, which resulted in.the accession to power
of Huerta and the execution of Madero.

Soon thereafter,

many American and Mexican, journalists accused Ambassador,
Wilson of being in collusion with the rebels.

President

Wilson became greatly disturbed by these accusations, and,
as historian Kenneth J. Grieb argued, the President would
gladly have dismissed the ambassador, but-for the fact that
sending an official replacement would have constituted
recognition of the de facto Huerta government, which the
American president detested. 119 Also, as Baker suggested,
the President most likely believed that the ambassador,might
cooperate with his administration, and he further realized
that a change-of personnel would be a serious detriment to
H.%.ilfrid..Hardy Callcott., The Caribbean Policy of...the
United States 1890-1920.(Baltimore: .The Johns’Hopkins Press,
1942) , 2 9 $ - 294.
(Hereinafter referred to as Callcott,
Caribbean Policy.)
1-^Kenneth J. Grieb, The.United States and-Huerta
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 75.
[Here
inafter referred to as Grieb, Huerta.)
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a quick solution of, the Mexican problem.

1 20

However, Presi^-

dent Wilson sent a series,of confidential agents to Mexico
to keep him informed of the ambassador1s ■activities.

Finally,

after it seemed that Ambassador Wilson would not cooperate
with the administration, the President called him to Wash-ington "for consultation," and subsequently despatched John
Lind to Mexico as a special -representative of the adminis
tration.

Thus * the retention of Ambassador Wilson was much,

more complex than that of Herrick or Egan.
Two Taft appointees, Edwin Vernop Morgan and Henry P.
Fletcher, were also retained by the Wilson administration.
Morgan had traveled widely, studied in Berlin, and eventually
taught history at Harvard and Western Reserve University.

In

1899, he began a diplomatic career, and by 1905, he was min
ister to Korea.

He later served as minister to Cuba, Uruguay,

Portugal, and finally Brazil under Taft and Wilson.121
Fletcher became a career diplomat, after serving in the
Spanish^American War.

His first important assignment was as

second secretary to the Havana legation.
selected minister to Chile in 1909 ,

12 2

He was eventually
According to Ilchman*

it was,, only through the intervention of. House that Fletcher
120Baker, Wilson, IV, 262-263.
121Thomson,."Edwin•Vernon-Morgan," D.A.B., XXI, 563-64.
12-2-In 1914, the Chile post became an embassy, and thus
Fletcher was promoted to ambassador.
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was retained.

117

When Fletcher was'promoted to the Mexico

City embassy in 1916, he was replaced.by Joseph H. Shea, a
former lawyer, circuit and appellate court judge, and a
Democratic member of the Indiana Senate.*24
The choice of James M. Sullivan for the Dominican
Republic post has been criticized severely.

Sullivan was

a :former prize-fight promoter and.a New York "police court"
lawyer, who had intimate ties to.the underworld and gambling
interests.

He also had been active in Irish ward politics•

in the northeast.

Sullivan had supported Wilson in 1912,

and was endorsed for a diplomatic post by Tumulty, O ’Gorman-,
Governor Simeon E. Baldwin of Connecticut and other "reput
able Democrats."

With some hesitation, Bryan brought

Sullivan's name to, Wilson, and he was subsequently nominated.
Not only did the new minister prove to be an inept diplomat,
but his questionable dealings brought public attention to his
activities.

Link stated that the man who was actually re

sponsible for Sullivan's appointment was Willian C. Beer, a
New York lobbyist and agent for Samuel M. Jarvis and his
Banco Nacional of the Dominican Republic.

Jarvis sought con

trol: of the deposits held by the American receiver-general
of the Dominican customs, and he asked Sullivan to help
transfer the funds.

Not only was Sullivan in,collusion with

i^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121;
Register 1916, 91,
i^Regis ter 1916, 130.

See-also
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Jarvisj but he also had a clandestine financial relationship
with the President of the Dominican Republic; Jose Bordas
Valdes, as well.as with many corrupt concessionaires„

If

that were not enough, his cousin Timothy Sullivan.received
a large share of government construction contracts.

Finally,

the receiver-general, Walter W. Vick, wrote to Wilson, Bryan,
House and Tumulty about Sullivan's activities, but the
President and Secretary of State refused to investigate him.
Vick then resigned and told his story to the New York World, •
which severely criticized Bryan.

Wilson finally instructed

Secretary of Wary Lindley M. Garrison to investigate Vicki
Sullivan was "permitted to resign" in July, 1915.1^5

Robert

Lansing, the new Secretary of State, suggested that William W.
Russell, a professional diplomat who was Sullivan's immediate
predecessor, be sent back to the Dominican Republic to avoid
more scandal.
A career man, Arthur Bailly-Blanchard, was selected for
Haiti i n ;1914, after Madison R. Smith, a lawyer, an editor,'
a former state senator and United States congressman, and a
l^Link, Wilson, II, 107-08, 541-42; Link, The Struggle
for Neutrality, Vol. Ill of Wilson, 499; Progressive Era,
97-98; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service^ 184-85;TColetta,
Bryan, II, 116-17;,Coletta, Mid-Americar~XLVIII, 86-87;
Baker, Wilson, IV, 449-50; Summer Welles, Naboth's Vineyard
The Dominican Republic 1844-19 24, Vol. II (New York: Payson
Clark, Ltd., 1918), 718-19.
-*-^^Barnes-and Morgan, Foreign Service, 184-85. See
also Register 1916, 127;.Link, Wilson, ifT, 541-42; Link,
Professional.Era, 26-27, 98; Coletta, Bryan, 116-17.
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Bryan man, resigned after only, a year's service,,

12 7

Before

joining the Foreign Service Bailly-Blanchard had been an
associate editor of Le Courier de la Louisiana,and Le Petit
Journal and an aide-de-camp to the Louisiana governor.

In

188 5, he became active in the diplomatic corps, and by 1914
he was made minister to Haiti. 128-. n chman believed that
Bailly-Blanchard's appointment was made because of the in-creasing pressure on the administration to nominate more
career diplomats for the upper positions in,the diplomatic
,
129
service.
The selection of Boaz Walton Long, as minister to El
Salvador could be called an appointment of a,professional.
only,in the broadest sense.

He had managed a commission com

pany in, San Francisco and finally became,the proprietor of
one with offices in San Francisco, Chicago, and Mexico City.
In 1913, Bryan chose him as Chief of the Division of Latin
American Affairs and, i n .1914, as minister to El Salvador.
An experienced diplomat was appointed to Columbia, but•^■^^See James A. Padgett, "Diplomats to, Haiti and Their
Diplomacy," The Journal of Negro History, XXV (July,'1940),
307-08. Smith's appointment broke a long tradition of
having negroes serve as ministers to Haiti.
^Register 1916, 71; Padgett, The Journal of Negro,.
History, t x V , 309; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service,
184-85.
■■■^Piichman, Professional Diplomacy, 126.
■^®Register 1916,.llOrlll;, Stuart, Diplomatic Practice,
226; Link, Wilson, III, 498-99.)
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not until Wilson's second term.

The original selection was

Thaddeus A. Thomson, a rancher from Austin, Texas, and a
131
friend of House.
He was replaced in 1917 by Hoffman
Philip, a law graduate, who joined,the diplomatic corps in1901v

In 1908, he became minister resident and consul

general to Abyssinia; in 1909, secretary to the legation in
Rio; in 1910^ secretary in Constantinople; in ,1912^ Chief of
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs; and finally minister
132
to Colombia.
He was as experienced as any of the selec-.
tions of the Wilson., administration.
A North Carolinan and ex-Confederate, Edward Joseph
Hale, was,,editor of the Fayetteville Observer until his
selection,as minister to Costa Ric$ in 1913.

He had had

some consular;experience'in Manchester, England, in 1885.
After his term as-consul, the North of England-Trust Com
pany commissioned him- to deal with problems connected with
the indigo crop in India.

He was offered a permanent

position wiph the company, but? refused in order to retain
his American citizenship.

In 1890, he was vice-president

of the International Congress on Navigation and, in the
same year,-declined a nomination as. American envoy to
■ ^ Register 1916, 136. -Harvey,mistakenly called .Thom
son. '’ThomaS~T7~Tusten." See .Harvey, North,American. Review,
CLXXXXIX, 171.
!
--------- 13^Register 1917, 128; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign
Service, 185-86.
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Turkey.

He was-very, interested in.shipping and navigation,

and was, the founder of the National Rivers and Harbors
Congress.

He also took a vital interest in politics as a

delegate to the Democratic Conventions of 1884, 1896, and
1 9 1 2 In the pre-nomination campaign, Hale was an,active
supporter of Wilson.13^

This partisanship and Hale’s .in

ternational commercial•experience appear to have been factors
in his appointment.

However, as one contemporary observer

noted, the new minister's experience "...belongs to the last
generation and was acquired practically everywhere except in
I
Latin America."
The remaining major appointments to Latin America were,
strictly political in nature.

Frederic Jesup Stimson, a

Massachusetts lawyer, businessman, and professor of political
science at Harvard,;was the new ambassador to Argentina in1914.

He had also served on the United States Industrial
1

/r

Cominission and various Massachusetts legal committees.
Stimson,was almost alone in discussing his nomination to the
Argentine ,pos t..

He said in his memoirs :

G.-deR. Hamilton, "Edward Joseph Hale," D.A.B.,
VIII, 100-01.
——
^•3^Link, Wilson, II, 107; Link, Progressive Era, 26-27.
135,,The Last Refuge of the Spoilsman," Atlantic Monthly,
CXIII (April, 1914), 441.
136^egis ter 1916, 134.
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...he [Walter Hines Page] told me that they had
fixed on me to go to Argentina as the 1st am
bassador, but that it was..a month that the
State Department had been trying vainly to find
where I was; I was still reputed as being "lost
in Germany."
But I was absorbed in.the war; and felt
that BUenos Aires was too far. to go. Moreover,
a South American post had hitherto beOn regarded
as the pis aller of a,diplomatic career, and I
had no disposition to abandon fox it my work,in
teaching the United States Constitution to our
future leading citizens at Harvard.. Mr. Page
told me that I was'quite wrong, and earnestly
urged me to accept.... 137
Page was able to convince Stimson to accept.
Other appointments to Latin America included an assort
ment of novices.

William HayneLeavell of Texas, an ordained

minister with a law degree , was., sent to Guatemala. He was
]70
a friend of House.
John Ewing of Alabama went to Honduras.
He had been, at various times * a lawyer, a newspaperman, a
customs clerk, a land agent, and a road observer^

He was.

also an ardent Wilson supporter in New Orleans. 1 3 9

For

Nicaragua, Benjamin:Lafayette Jefferson was chosen.
been a doctor turned politician;and a Bryan
Charles S. Hartman-was appointed to Ecuador.

e

l

e
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He-had
.

- ^ 0

He had been a

probate judge in Gallatin■County, Montana, a delegate to the
137prede ric.Jesup Stimson, My United States (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), 265-66,
”
^•— Register 1916, 109. Harvey misspelled Leavell's name
"Lovell.". See Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX, 171.
•^-^Register 1916, 89.
1.71.

l^Oj^id^, io4; Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX,
'
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Montana Constitutional Conventionrof 1888, and a former
United States congressman,,

He also had been a free silver

man-and a supporter of Bryan, for President./*-4*
McMillin was commissioned to Peru.

Benton

The Tennesseean had been

a lawyer, a circuit judge, a member of the Tennessee House,
a United States -congressman, and governor of his state.
Harvey characterized him as the "Democratic War Horse of
Tennessee."

At the time of his appointment, he was,selling

insurance in Nashville.*4^

Preston B. McCoodwin, an Okla

homa journalist, was selected for Venezuela.*4^
Jennings Price was sent to Panama.

William

He had practiced law*

and had been a member of the law faculty of Central Univer^sity in Kentucky.144

John O'Rear, a former school teacher,

a lawyer, and a city councilman of Mexico, Missouri, was
nomihated for the Bolivian post.

145

William Elliott

Gonzales, a moderate Democrat and editor of the Columbia
State (a South, Carolina,newspaper) went to Cuba.

He had

introduced Wilson to all the leading editors.and prominent
141££ gister 1916, 98; Harvey, North American Review,
CLXXXXIX, 170.
“
1
^•^^Daniel M. Robison, "Benton McMillip," D.A.B. ,
XXI, 533-34; Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX, 171,*
145Register 1917, 117.
*44Ibid., 1916, 123- 24; Harvey,.North American Review,
CLXXXXIXj 170.
’
*45Register 1916, 120; Harvey, North American Review,
CLXXXXIX, 170.

69

politicians of South Carolina.

146

Daniel F. Mooney, a

lawyer, an Ohio state senator, and a former city solicitor
147
of St. Marys, Ohio, was appointed to the Paraguay legation.
John L. De Saules of Pennsylvania served in Uruguay.

He was

replaced in 1915 by Robert E. Jeffery, a.lawyer, a,circuit
148
judge, and a state legislator from Arkansas.
From the previous lengthy discussion of the various
diplomatic appointments, it is not-difficult to understand
why,, his torians, former diplomats, and journalists differed
in their evaluation of the diplomatic service during the
Wilson administration.

Those,who approved of Wilson's

chiefs-of-mission, with the prevalent exception of the Latin
American group, usually claimed that many of the nominees
were eminently qualified, and while they lacked practical
experience, they proved their abilities after they assumed
their missions.

For instance, William E. Dodd, a former

ambassador to Germany and a historian, stated apologetically:
A great deal has been said, both in-bitter
anger and in friendly remonstrance, about the
character of the men.whom Wilson sent abroad, to
carry out his new policy. But men have forgotten
in,the presence of a great world war that the
diplomats of the Wilson Administration were
appointed when there was no thought of war or
the complications that followed. Still, one
146Reglster 1916, 94; Link, Wilson, I, 327.
44^Register 1916 , 116.
148Ibid., 104.
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might'read much American history without.find
ing better men in foreign courts than;Walter
' Hines Page...James W» Gerard...and Henry Morgen
thau... These were new men, to be sure. Wilson
would not retain the older diplomats and expect
a satisfactory execution of his’plans. But new
or old, these men have never been accused of
want of ability or devotion to the cause of
their country.„..149
On the other extreme, those who. censured the choice of
the new ministers and ambassadors frequently cited.their
inexperience in foreign •affairs as the major shortcoming of.
the diplomatic service under Wilson.

An excellent example

was the criticism by Walter Mi11is --here referring to Walter
Hines Page:

"Unfortunately, Mr. Page, like the other repre

sentatives whom Mr. Wilson had scattered through Eruope-.like mest American diplomats, indeed, in the opening years
of the twentieth century--knew almost nothing about European
diplomacy." 1 ^
A larger group of historians, who presented more
moderate interpretations of the diplomats, were often
excessive in their praise of Wilson,and severe in their
criticism of Bryan.

Most prominent here is Link.

He

supported the statement of one editor who said that'many of.
Wilson's.own appointments in the ministerial category were
l^Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, 129-30.
also Notter, Wilson, 234-35.

See.

15GMillis, Road to War, 20. See also Walworth, I,
348; Mamatey, Central Europe, 85,
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’the peers, if not-the superiors,. o£ their-predecessors.'
Link had a different opinion of Bryan.:

I CI

"Because of his

tenderness for 'deserving Democrats,' especially for veterans
of the campaign of 1896, Bryan made many unfortunate appointi
ments on. the ministerial level-.

Most of them were mere

incompetents, not s c o u n d r e l s . L i n k also stated that;
in the "greatest debauchery of the Foreign Service in the
twentieth century," Bryan dismissed all the ministers who
had earned their posts by merit and training and installed
1 r?

"an aggregation of friends and party hacks."
A few evaluations emphasized the'effect of World War I
upon the appointment of diplomats from late:1914 to the end
of'the war.

For example, Ilchman believed that the nation's

view of the "causes," conduct, and consequences" of the war
required a re-evaluation of professional diplomacy as well.
The Department of State, particularly under Lansing, increas
ingly recognized the value of professional diplomacy.
Ilchman added;;that;pressure- for change in the process of
154
selecting, diplomats was- developing even-under Bryan.
■*-^Link, Wilson, II, 106.
•^^Link, Progressive Era, 97-98.
•*-^L,ink, Wilson,'II, 106 . See also Coletta, Bryan,
II, 112.-15; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121; Spaulding,
Ambassadors, 9-11.
^■^llchman, Prof ess ional;Diplomacy, 126, 132- 37. See'
also,Coletta, Bryan, II, 119; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign
Service, 18 5.
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A number of pertinent questions arise from these
various assessments of the diplomatic service under Wilson.
The ability of the new chiefs-of-mission to perform well is
the salient issue, but it requires further scrutiny, and
shall be examined in the following chapters.

However, there

are three points that should be considered here:

1) was

Link correct in assuming that Wilson*s,appointments were
superior to Bryan's?

2) was therea substantial•disparity

in the type of envoy selected for the various posts, i.e.,
was. Latin America the scene.of "political debauchery?" and
3) did World War I have some positive effects,upon pro
fessionalizing the upper positions of the diplomatic ser
vice, as Ilchman; suggested?

Based on the material;presented,

it would be impossible to make many qualitative judgments
about these questions.-

Hence, this evaluation will emphasize

some statistical observations about, the selections.
The indictment of Bryan as primarily responsible-for
the rampant use of spoils politics in.the diplomatic service
is unfounded.

As has previously been stated, Wilson.was

skeptical, o f ’career diplomats, and was .inclined to favor non
professionals for the ministerial and ambassadorial positions„
Also, the President was immediately responsible for the
appointment of ambassadors, and rarely left this task to the
Department of State.

In 1913,.there,were twelve ambassador

ships , with an additional embassy created in Argentina in
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1914.^^

Wilson retained four of Taft's ambassadors, one

of whom,.Herrick, remained-only until a suitable replacement
could be found.

Of the remainder, only Penfield had any

diplomatic experience, and there was a gap of sixteen years
before his nomination to the Vienna post.

The men Wilson

selected were, heavy campaign contributors, political assoc
iates, andfriendsi

It cannot be denied that Bryan, certainly

had’influence in some of these selections, especially in the
case of Birch, but Wilson was, directly responsible for these
top appointments.
In the ministerial choices, Wilson's influence could
also be recognized.

Of twelve ministers appointed to

European posts, including two replacements, Van\Dyke, and
Stovall were his personal friends, Birch was a former
associate in New Jersey, Egan was retained at'the President's
request,, and Whitlock was personally designated.

Wilson was,

also directly responsible for Reinsch and Curtis, two of the
five ministers selected for Asian,and African posts.

The

President seemed to havethe least,direct influence in the
nominations for Latin American missions.

However,, he had

had political associations with Hale, Ewing, and Gonzales.
Of the remaining eighteen Latin American nominees, four were
career men, and two were the choices of House.

Thus, while

it,is justified by all-evidence to criticize the appointment
155By the end of the war, Brussels was raised to an
embassy, but' Wilson merely promoted Whitlock from minister
to ambassador.
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policy of Bryan, the role,of Wilson in the issuance of
spoils was, marked.

Furthermore, even if the President was

not directly responsible for every selection, he was
officially responsible for all of them.
The criticism of the appointments to Latin America as
the most wanton application of the spoils system is also
unjustified.

Twenty new chiefs-of-mission were sent to

Latin America early in the Wilson.administration.

Of these,

five had some diplomatic experience in the broadest sense.
Five replacements later were selected, three of whom were
career men.

Only one of the initial;seven appointments to

Africa and Asia had any diplomatic background, and he was
replaced by a novice in 1915.

Five replacements had to be,

made during the war; none of these was taken.from the ranks
of the diplomatic corps.

In Europe, the situation was

similar, since:only four of eighteen envoys had some dip
lomatic -experience.
overs.

Of these, Herrick and Egan were hold

Morris had had one special assignment, and Penfield

had been out of the diplomatic service for sixteen years.
Two appointments were made during the war; one was a pror
fessional.

As a whole, the European, Asian, African, and

Latin American ministers and ambassadors were overwhelmingly
inexperienced.

Also, and quite interestingly, the type of

selections did not seriously vary from one location to the
other.
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The contention that the war professionalised the dip
lomatic corps did not apply to the chiefs-of-mission in
any great degree.

Of the two appointments made to Europe

during the war, one was a career man; of the five made in
Latin America, three were professional; of the five made in
Asia and Africa, none were career men.

Therefore, only

four of twelve replacements were experienced diplomats.
Although even this intimates a minor re-direction for the
diplomatic service, some further qualifications must be made.
One of the four professionals, Russell, was chosen to save
face, not appointed as a result of the war.

And Bailly-

Blanchard's nomination came early•in 1914, before the exact
nature of the war became evident..

Therefore, with some

speculation, the remaining two career men, Garrett and Philip,
might be considered products of the changing attitude about,
the diplomatic service.

However, this is hardly a trend.

Unquestionably, the appointment of the chiefs-of-mission
during the Wilson administration demonstrated the blatant
use of the spoils system.

The resulting ministers, and

ambassadors'were a conglomeration, lacking experience in
international affairs and often unfamiliar with the intri
cacies of American, domestic matters.

It was no wonder that

they were ill-prepared to face the trials of a major war.

CHAPTER I I I

PERFORMANCE:

NEGOTIATING, REPORTING,

AND CEREMONIAL DUTIES

A majority of the chiefs-of-mission of the Wilson ad
ministration were;confronted with the responsibilities of
the diplomat inthe field for the first time when they
arrived at their posts.

A few of the ministers and ambassa

dors retained from the administration of Taft had also begun
their service without'professional diplomatic training.

How

these amateurs performed is the subject of this chapter„
Thirteen chiefs-of-mission have been selected as
examples, since they have written (and published) memoirs
or abundant letters describing their experiences as American
envoys, and since they have been, for the most,part, studied
by historians.

All of these men were non-professionals,:

i.e., they did.not rise from the ranks of the-Foreign Service;
and all but four had no previous diplomatic experience.
Since the duties of the diplomat in the field are
diverse and complex, each envoy will be evaluated in terms
of:

1) negotiating--the execution of business at the foreign

post; 2) reporting--informing his government of his activities
and foreign.developments; and 3) ceremonial duty--attendance
at social or ritualistic functions in the host country.
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WALTER HINES PAGE
Page was well-known for his Anglophilism, and his
negotiations and reports demonstrated his penchant of
favoring British policy over American,,

In 1913, he was

optimistic over the prospect of strengthening AngloAmerican bondso

Attempting to convince Wilson,, he

argued:
We are in the international:game^--not in
its Old World intrigues and burdens and sorrows
and melancholy, but in the inevitable way to.
leadership and to cheerful mastery in,the future;
and everybody knows that we are in it but u s „ It.
is sheer blind habit that causes us to continue
to try to think of ourselves as aloof„1
Page had also urged House to persuade Wilson to come to
England as a gesture of the solid relationship between the
two countries.

Page hoped that this might initiate what

he later called a "real world-alliance."

2

Before the summer of 1914, Page usually discharged
his instructions as the Wilson administration prescribed.
In his first diplomatic task, Page was able to. persuade
Great Britain to withdraw its recognition of Huerta in
Mexico, and this aided the United States in bringing about
the downfall of that'Mexican President.

In a .letter to

Wilson, Page reported:
-*-Page to Wilson, October 25, 1913, in Hendrick, Page,
I, 150-51.
2Page to House, August 25, 1913, in ibid„, 275-76.
See also 282-83.
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I have been trying to find a way to help this
Government to wake up. to, the effect of its proHuerta :position;and to give them a chance to re
frain from repeating that mistake--and to save
their faces; and I have telegraphed one plan to
Mr. Bryan to-day.
I think they ought now to be
forced to show.their hand without the possibility
of evasion, They will not risk losing our good
will- -if it seem wise to you to put them to a
square test.-5
After the British acceptance of the American position, Page
wrote ,to Doubleday and others:
As I look back over these six or seven months,,
from the pause that has come this week, I’m bound
to say (being frank, not to say vain) that I had
the good fortune to do one piece of work that wasworth the effort and worth coming to do--about the
infernal Mexican situation. An abler man would have,
done it better; but, as it was, I did it, and I.
have the most appreciative letter about, it from the
President.4
Gregory attributed little significance to this negotia
tion.

He asserted that the Mexican situation was never a

critical issue between, the United States and Great Britain,
since it did not threaten England's influence- in European
affairs.

And, although Page explained "Wilsonian diplomacy"

to the Foreign Office, it was the desire of Foreign Minister
Edward Grey to maintain amicable American-British relations,
that was. most instrumental; in effecting a solution.5
3Page to Wilson,. October 2.4, 1913, in ibid. , 184-85.
See also 183.
^Page to Doubleday and others, December 28, 1913, in
ibid., 166-67.
^Gregory, Page, 33-38,
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The advent of war created difficult and complex prob
lems for Page.

Increasingly, he saw the need for strong

ties between Great Britain and the United States, and this
became, the ultimate goal of his performance as ambassador.
Late in 1914, he wrote to House:
Sir Edward [Grey] values American friendship
more than anything else of that kind. He is not
going to endanger it. To this day, he hasn’t con
fiscated a single American cargo, tho' there are
many that he might have confiscated within his
rights. Our continued good relations[hip] is the
only thing that now holds the world together.
That's the big fact. A cargo of copper, I grant
you, may be important; but it can't be as important
as our friendship of the Kingdom and our Republic
will be the most important political fact in the
world.--Have stiff controversies? Yes; I'm for
them whole-heartedly, when we have a good reason.
But there's no reason now; and, if there were,
this is the time to be patient. They'll be plenty,
of time left to quarrel when this dire period is
past.... 6
The controversy over the Declaration of London clearly
demonstrated Page's pro-British sentiments.

Drafted by the

British in 1909, the Declaration of London was an unratified
code for maritime warfare.

When war erupted, the Wilson

administration was anxious to have it validated, because it
included a lenient neutral rights clause.
refused to adhere to it.

But the British

Convinced that the Declaration

would only be an obstacle, to the British war effort, Page
urged the President and the Department of State to refrain
from forcing England into the restrictive situation the code
6Page to House, November 9, 1914, in Seymour, House, I,
309-10,
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demanded.

In a letter to Wilson, he argued:

Let us take a little farther view into
the future.
If Germany win, will ■it make any
difference what position Great Britain took on
the,Declaration of London? The Monroe Doctrine
will be shot.through. We will have to have a
great army and a great navy. But suppose that
England win. We shall then have an ugly aca
demic dispute with her because of this control
versy. Moreover, we shall not hold a good
position for helping to compose the quarrelor for any other service.
He continued:
So far as our neutrality obligations,are
concerned, I do not believe that they require
us to demand that Great Britain should adopt
for our benefit the Declaration of London.
Great Britain has never ratified it, nor have
any other nations except the United States.
In its applications1to.the.situation pre
sented by this.war it is altogether to the
advantage of G e r m a n y . .
I have delayed to write you this way too
long.
I have:feared that I might possibly
seem to be influenced by sympathy with England
and by the atmosphere here* But I write of
course solely with reference to our own country’s
interest and its position after the reorganization
of Europe.'
Hendrick stated that this letter plainly demonstrated
Page's "larger view" of the war, which prescribed-standards
to guide American,policy in Europe.

He also asserted that

Page was able, to arrange a compromise on the controversy
over the Declaration of London, which permitted the British
to issue a proclamation expressing a more liberal view of
maritime rights to which the United States would not offer
7Page to Wilson, October, 15, 1914, in Hendrick,.Page,
I, 371-73. See also,.Page to House, October- 22, 1914, in
Seymour, House, I, 380-84.
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any objection.

Page subsequently informed the Department

of State that if he was instructed to reopen negotiations
on,.this issue, he would resign.

After this ultimatum, the

Department withdrew its demands and accepted Page's proposal.
Hendrick believed that Page's action, with the cooperation
of Grey, averted a crisis between the United States and
Great Britain, and was a defeat for Lansing and the Depart
ment of State o®
Richard W. Van Alstyne discounted Hendrick's interpre
tation.

He insisted that the "naive ambassador" was unable

to comprehend the value of the American plan proposed by
Lahsing, and failed to take the opportunity to provide both
governments with a way to escape embarrassment over the
issue.®

Agreeing, Daniel M. Smith claimed that Page did

more harm than good, since he either presented the American
case ineffectively or never presented it at all.

Smith

speculated that Page would have been dismissed for his
actions if he had not been a personal friend of the President and if the recall would not have encouraged the Germans.

10

^Hendrick, Page, I, 370-85.
®Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The Policy of the United States
Regarding ,the Declaration of London, at the Outbreak of the
Great War," Journal of Modern History, VII (December, 1935),
445.
•^Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutral
ity .1914-191? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958),
28-29. See also Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World
War- (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 19 34), 55-56„
(Here
inafter referred to as Seymour, World War.); Seymour, House,
I, 304-306.
'
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Gregory added that Page's.threat to resign was not only an
unlikely reason for the American acceptance of the com
promise, but probably of minor significance, since he had
tried to resign before.

In any case, the compromise was
11

inconclusive and ambiguous.

By 1915, Page had become adamant that the American
government totally support the Allied cause.

He reminded

House that the British were losing respect for the United
States, and were apprehensive of the President's inaction.
By 1916, he told Wilson that the United States should break
relations with Germany.

17

He wrote to House:

...The English do not see how there can be any
mediation, nor (I confess) do I see. German
militarism must be put down.
I don't mean that
the German people should be thrashed to a frazzle
nor thrashed at all.
I find no spirit of revenge,
in the English. But-this- German military caste
caused all the trouble and there can be no security
in Europe as long as it lives in authority. That's
the English view.
It raped nuns in Belgium, it
took food from the people, it even now levies in
demnities on all towns, it planned the destruction
of the "Lusitania," and it now coos like a sucking
dove in the United States.. It'll do anything. Now,
since it has become evident that it is going to be
beaten, it wants peace--on terms which will give it
a continued lease on life....13
■^Gregory, Page, 63-74.
■^Page to House, September 8, 1915, in Hendrick, Page,
II, 37-38; Page to Wilson, February 15, 1916, in ibid., Si-52.
1^
XJPage to House, May 23, 19X6,.m Seymour, House, II,
256. For earlier anti-German statements see Foreign Rela
tions of the United States Supplement 1914 (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1928), 87.
(Hereinafter referred
to as Foreign Relations Supplement 1914..) ; Page to House,
October 11, 1914 j in Hendrick, Page^
340.
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The "Dacia" affair, in early 1915, was another conspic
uous example of Page's negotiations.on behalf of British in
terests.

The "Dacia," a Hamburg-America liner, was sold to

an,American,firm which planned to use it to deliver cotton
to Rotterdam.

The British had announced their unwillingness

to recognize any transfer of German, vessels.

Yet the Ameri

can government upheld the legality of the sale, and asked
that the ship be allowed to pass through the British block
a d e . ^ ’ The situation was tense;,if the British seized the
ship, American-British relations would certainly suffer.
According to Hendrick, Page recommended to Grey that the
French seize the "Dacia," thus relieving England of any
15
responsibility.
Hendrick's conclusion was accepted by historians for
many.years,^

but new evidence uncovered by Gregory has

allowed for reevaluation.

He demonstrated that Page was not

the only person, and perhaps not even the first, to suggest
that the French seize the "Dacia."

As the records of the

British Foreign Office show, at least ten othbrs suggested
14-See May, The World War and American Isolation 19141917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 3TT- 32.
(Hereinafter referred to as May, American Isolation.)
1^Hendrick, Page, I, 392-95.

See also III, 222-28.

■^See Stuart, Diplomatic.Practice, 241; C. Hartley .
Grattan, Why.We Fought (New York: TheVanguard Press, 1929),
80; Armin.-.Rappapori^. The British Press and Wilsonian Neu
trality (Palo Alto j California: Stanford University.Press,
19 51), 25.
(Hereinafter referred to as Rappaport,'British
Press.).
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the same plan.

Accordingly, the affair would have ended

as it did if Page had never made the suggestion.

Further

more, Grey did not conspire with the French, because he
surmised American protests were not serious enough to
warrant it.

He decided to let the matter take its natural

course, and thus the British were.fully prepared to stop
the vessel and escort it to Liverpool.

This eventually did

not occur, since the "Dacia” sailed into the French patrol
zone.

17

Thus, in the cases of the,Declaration of London

and the "Dacia," Page’s attempts at supporting British policy,
seemed ineffective.
Gregory clearly summarized Page’s role as a reporter
and a negotiator.

He stated that the tragedy of the war

overwhelmed Page.

Thus his earliest despatches reflected

his relief that the United States was not involved;.

But'

eventually he saw the war as a remarkable opportunity which
could make America an-international leader.

Prior to Ameri

can intervention, he tried to maintain the policy of neutral
ity of his country, and was under an obligation to at least
manifest impartiality.

But he certainly was not unbiased.

In his■correspondence, he sought to portray Great Britain.as
a peace-loving "defender.of democracy and decency," and
Germany as a nation determined to use any•measure,.however
^ Gregory, Page, 83-88;'Gregory, "A Look at the Case
of the Dacia," Journal of American History, Ly (September,
1968), 292-96.
!
”
' '
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inhumane, to conquer the world.

Gregory recognized Page's

disregard for the Department of State and the special rela
tionship he enjoyed with the President, which at times
allowed him to bypass the Department,

He stated that Wilson,

at first, seemed understanding and helpful, writing to Page
as often,as he found time, and expressing in every letter
delight with the work of the ambassador.

As the war devel

oped, Page continued to write often, but the President
almost, never replied■and,,like House, he became increasingly
skeptical of the reports and ideas of the ambassador.

1R

Gregory was also dubious of Page's correspondence as
an:influence on the Wilson.administration.

It was astounding,

he asserted, that Page expected to sway the President with
messages that did little more than paraphrase British senti
ments . And although Page said he,was giving British,
opinion, there was little doubt that these attitudes guided
19
his own thoughts.
Similarly, other historians have tried
to assess the effects of Page's reports on the administration^
Hendrick stated that during the war Page wrote frank letters
revealing British displeasure with American inaction, and
■^Gregory,
Page, 47, 53-54, 59, 107, 128. See also
Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston: Little,
Brown and Co., 1938) , 160; Seymour, House, ~1, 456; Barbara.W.
Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York; The Viking
Press, 1958), 122-23.
“

•^Gregory, Page, 128. S e e a l s o H . C . Allen, Great,
Britain and the.United States A History of Ang1o-Amerxcan
Relations.1 (1783-19 52) (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.,

lTSt77'~'6T0.

86

German, confidence that the United States government would
do little more, than talk.

These letters, he said, brought

the most perfunctory acknowledgement from the White House.
But Page continued to warn Washington of the British and
Germansopinions of America, suggesting that severance of
diplomatic relations with Germany in 1915 or 1916 would,
in itself, bring theEuropean war to a conclusion.

With

time, Page became convinced that American intervention
was, necessary because German atrocities were a menaee:to
world peace, and that-the United States owed it to demo
cracy to take up arms against-the imperialistic leaders of
Gbrmany, who were the enemies of freedom.

Hendrick pointed

out that it was Page's rationale for war, with Germany that
Wilson employed in his war message to. Congress,

Thus-, Page's

correspondence, irritating in.its later phases as it might
have been, strongly influenced Wilson in his determination
to declare war,.
Page's captivation.with England, his amiable relations
with Grey, and his commitment to an,Anglo-American rap
prochement., influenced his performance in formal circles as,
much as it did in his negotiations and;reporting„

The

ceremonial aspects of his position intrigued him.

In a

letter to Wilson in the spring of 1914 (during the "Season")
^Hendrick, Page,.II, 41-44, 50, 195-96, See also
Baker, Wilson, V, 282, 3 70; Tans ill, America Goes to War,
133; Seymour, World War, 8 2ff.
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he claimed, "I hear more gossip, get more points of view,
see more people, get closer to my colleagues, than at-any
other time of year.

I dine with■everybody from the king

down--this whole Babylon goes on a tearful

Hendrick

insisted that Page had- little inclination for "society,"

7 7

Gregory generally,agreed with this conclusion, but.indicated
that Page had some.happy moments traveling in,England before
the war, and that he entertained in the manner of most am
bassadors in London.

When he met royalty, he took it in

stride, although he found the protocol and the ritual
"amazing sights."

He did have some trying moments while

learning the social and diplomatic ritual.

On one. occasion,

he became absorbed in a ;discussion, unaware that the other
guests could not leave until the ambassador had left.

At

another gathering, he overlooked a member of royalty, moved
too quickly, and left the royal person "without, an ambassa2^
dorial,conversation." J

Page’s difficulty in adapting to

the formality of the London.post was minimal, however, since
his social graces and vibrant personality usually allowed
him to fare well.

His social experiences certainly must haye

been an influence in his Anglophilism.
^Page to Wilson, May 21, 1914,,in Hendrick, Page, IIIi
47.
^ Ibjd. , II, 312. But Spaulding said that Page..did
like the ambassadorial uniform. See his Ambassadors, 18-19.
2^Gregory, Page, 27-28.
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BRAND WHITLOCK
In contrast to the embassy in London, the American
legation in Brussels in 1913 and early in 1914 was tranquil,
Whitlock’s diplomatic duties in Belgium during this period
were few, and only the continual social events interrupted
his writing schedule.

A. letter to Rutger B. Jewett exem

plified his attitude prior to the outbreak of war:
Thus far:I haven‘t had much chance to do any
work,; the social duties here have been very onerous,
but luckily the season will be over shortly, and
we hope to go to the seaside...I hope that I shall
be all the richer for this experience, for it is a
very interesting one, full of all sorts of life and
color, and perhaps all this will show in my work
in due time.24
The eruption of hostilities among the major European
powers especially surprised Whitlock.

Neil Alfred Thorburn

stated, in a doctoral dissertation, that Whitlock admitted
a lack of knowledge about international events since his
Toledo years had not -required attention to world problems.
He had never heard of Sarajevo, but read the newspapers
more carefully after the assassination.

He confidently

expected the problem would be "smothered by diplomatic'
notes," because war seemed impossible in "beautiful and
placid Belgium."25
24whitlock;.to Jewett, April 9, 1914, in Nevins,
Whitlock The Letters, 179.
^Thorburn, "Whitlock," 126. See; also Whitlock., Bel gium Under the German.Occupation, A Personal Narrative
(London: William Heinemann, 1919.) ,. Vol. 1 , 27- 29. ’""[Here
inafter referred to as Whitlock, Belgium.)
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However, Belgium was soon to be engulfed by Germany,
On the eve of the German advance, he notified the Depart
ment of State that there was great uncertainty and timidity
in, financial circlesiin Brussels, but he was not sure what
26
27
it meant.
The next day h e ,reported the German invasion.
At that time Whitlock decided to remain in Brussels and not
leave with-the Belgian,court.

As Millis stated, this

decision left a minister in,occupied territory who was
wholly in sympathy with the Belgian government, and who
inevitably became a,"representative of Belgian and Allied
interests behind the German lines.
His obvious antirGerman sentiments, although not ex
pressed publicly, were duly recorded in his memoirs and
journal;

For example, he said:

Somehow, I do not,know exactly how, the very
air is poisoned with militarism, one has a con
stant sense of personal discomfort, one is every
where ill at ease, one cannot.voice one's own
thoughts. There is a menace,everywhere, and in
this poisoned atmosphere one suffocates. Oh! for
a breath of free air again-. ^
But in a different context, he stated;
Cable from Department asking for.a full
report on the German,atrocities in Belgium..„
^ Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 30.
27Ibid., 35.
^Millis; Road to War, 54.
9q
Nevins, Whitlock The Journal, January 7, 1915,
84-85. See also 40, 5T, .350; Whitlock, Belgium, II, 415,
443-44; Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 735b
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Gerard has his book out, and going strong,
divulging state secrets right and left, as
tounding and appalling the world and para
lyzing mankind.
I've been hanging back,
from a feeling, outworn in these times, that
a diplomatist should not go about like a
peddler of sensations, nor make any money by
patriotic officiousness--and now, the Depart
ment wants my story, and will give it to the
newspapers, and maybe kill it for me. But no,
that is gratuitous bitterness; that is best
which wears best in the long run, after all.
So let Gerard record the secrets the Kaiser
told him, and prove the Kaiser a liar, and
so on; which he is, of course,,for his empire
is founded on a lie. But the persistent, mor
bid interest in America in the German atroc
ities is’saddening, because it shows how piti
fully small and feable imagination is, and how
little conception there is of principles. As
though the justice of our cause depended on
whether Germans killed babies in Belgium, or
not.30
Not only was the war perplexing for Whitlock, but.it
*7 "I

radically altered his role as minister to Belgium.

Sym

pathetically, Nevins asserted that the minister became a
"tower of refuge" and a "pillar of support" to the Belgians.

32

More,realistically, Crunden argued that Whitlock was•as con
fused about'the war as anyone else, and he felt helpless to
do a little more than aid the people supposedly under his
protection. 33

For example, on the eve of the German occupa-

3°Nevins, Whitlock

The Journal, August 7, 1917, 439-40.

■^See Tager, Whitlock, 150-51.
■^Nevins, Whitlock
"Whitlock," 1137"

The Letters, lvi.

33Crunden, Whitlock, 249, 261, 346.

See also Thorburn,
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tion, large numbers of Americans began pouring into the
legation.

And with each day, Whitlock became increasingly

fatigued, if not irritated;
The fleeing Americans continued to crowd the-.
Legation; all day., and we were busy trying to re
assure and comfort them--a. terrible task. They
all think that I have some.supernatural power,
that. I can evoke ships, money, care, comfort
for them: predict the cause of the war, tell
them where they will be safe, and how long the
war will last,...and-so .on. It is maddening, but
as Carlyle used to say, "Courage and shuffle
the cards."34Other duties involved the protection of Belgian citizens.
He strove to acquire the release-of officials and others
who had been wrongly imprisoned.

When the Germans began

the deportation of Belgian citizens to work camps, he
attempted to do what he could to stop it.

However, Whit

lock was powerless , since the Wilson administration only
issued formal protests.

In a futile effort, he did try to

organize a bureau of repatriations.

*2 C

In a few instances,

Whitlock was associated with successful negotiations to
save the lives of certain individuals.

For example, he and

Persian minister Mahmoud Khan, through a requite en grace
signed by all the diplomats in Belgium, were able to get
the death;sentence of Belgian senator Hal^t commuted.^
S^Nevins, Whitlock

The Journal, August 3, ,1914 , 3»

•^Whitlock, Belgium, II, 261-367.
Ironically, the De^
partment of State had communicated a request to Whitlock to
save monuments from destruction in Antwerp. See ibid., I,
213.
—
56Ibid., II, 181-82.
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In the much-publicized case of Edith Cavell, an alleged
British spy, the protests of Whitlock, and other diplomats
37
were in vain, and she was executed.
After the occupation, most of Whitlock's time was
spent with the Commission.for the Relief in Belgium, an
organization established predominantly by Americans to
feed the starving Belgians cut off by the British blockade.
The spearhead of the group was Herbert Hoover, who, adminis
tered the operation from England.

Whitlock and Marquis de

Viliaiobar, the Spanish minister, helped coordinate it in
Belgium,

Whitlock's memoirs, journal and letters were

filled with discussions of the relief project.

He habitually

complained of German pressure to subvert the commission's
activities and the immeasurable negotiations to maintain
*2 O

it.

He considered himself an integral part of the work of

the commission, and was fearful for its fate:if he left Belgium. 39
•^Nevins, Whitlock The Journal, 217-18; Whitlock,
Belgium, II, 49-51. TKorburn has demonstrated that WhitI o c k ’s account of the execution of Cavell was1largely
secondhand. The minister had been ill during the tragedy,
and Hugh Gibson, the secretary of the legation, had done
most of the investigating and made most of the protests.
See his "Whitlock," 126.
lock

38Nevins, Whitlock The Journal, 90-137, 225-55; Whit
The Letters, 216-18; Whitlock, Belgium, I, 72-77.
39

For example, see Nevins, Whitlock
217-18. The group was formally abandoned
when they entered the war. See Whitlock,
396-457.

The Letters,
by the Americans
Belgium, I,
“
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Historians have presented various interpretations of
Whitlock's performance with the relief commission.
lauded the;minis ter' s activities:

Nevins

"With the C.R.B. offi

cials, with his legation staff, Whitlock spent two and a
half years of toil, anxiety, and ever-haunting apprehensions;
years in which the character of the Middle Western idealist
was- not so much deepened as utterly transformed."4®

Tager

remarked that the necessity for Whitlock to use skillful
diplomacy was acute because of the continued clash of per
sonalities in the relief organization,

Besides the problems

inherent in relief work, he was continually confronted with
petty jealousies, especially,from Viliaiobar and the German
bureaucrats.

Also, his relationship with Hugh Gibson, the

secretary of the legation, was cool,

Whitlock considered

Gibson "swashbuckling," and the secretary believed his
superior weak.41

Crunden also believed that discord among

the commission.members was rampant, and questioned why
Whitlock'did not include these events in his memoirs,42
Thorburn added that while the American minister could be
tactful, he gave his associates the impression that he lacked
the strength to deal with critical problems.
40^evinS, Whitlock
Road to War, 74.

The Letters, lix.

4lTager, Whitlock, 151-53.
4^crunden, Whitlock, 274.

Hoover, specifSee also Millis,
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ically, believed Whitlock acted only when shown the way,
but nonetheless placed tremendous responsibility on.him.^
Whitlock had little difficulty with his ceremonial
responsibilities.

Before the war, there had been consid

erable opportunity for protocol and ceremony in Belgium.
As Whitlock.stated in the letter to Jewett, the social
duties, abundant as they were, became trying.
general, he,found pleasure in them.^

But, in

Tager stated that

the minister’s fluency in French and his "gentle refine
ment" made him compatible with the atmosphere of the Belgian
court.

He took full advantage of his;ability in French to

please the Belgians.

At one banquet in his honor, Whitlock

not only responded in.French, but slipped into Belgian,
vernacular and a few words of Brussels slang, and received
a tremendous o v a t i o n . T h o r b u r n emphasized the,transition
Whitlock needed to make in order to become comfortable in
Belgian society.

He explained that the minister lived

simply, but admired graciousness.

He had impeccable taste,

a loVe for elegance and beauty, and preferred the company of
wealthy and sophisticated people.

Whitlock found this kind

^^Thorburn, "Whitlock," 120-21. He further stated that
Whitlock gave substantial credit for the success of the
relief commission to Hoover, which seemed fair because the
minister's performance did not.match.Hoover's . Also, Whit
lock’s account of the relief work often was too general,
and emphasized the failures and.not the strengths of the
program. See ibid,, 120-21, 126.
^^whitlock, Belgium, I, 3-11.
^Tager, Whitlock, 151.
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of life in Belgium, but brought,with him little savoir
faire.

Protocol and the conventions of social life in a

European capital were strange.

He adapted well, however,

because of his personality and taste, and delighted in
the congenial’atmosphere of Belgium.^

It would have been,

unfortunate for Whitlock if\he had been minister to Belgium at a more tranquil time in Europe.

Social graces

alone were not sufficient to prepare him for the European
war.
JAMES W. GERARD
Gerard was in the most volatile post in Europe.

Before

the war> Gerard was, equivocal about the European situation.
On July 27, 1914, he optimistically reported, "I have reason
to believe matters will be arranged.without general European
war-.

Approximately at this time, he believed one of his

’’delicate diplomatic duties” was to persuade the German
48
government to sign Bryan’s peace treaties.
These negotia
tions failed, and by July 30 he wrote:

"Think Germany's

efforts toward peace fruitless and general European war^Thorburn, "Whitlock," ii, 112.
Whitlock, 239.
A 7

See also Crunden,

Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 16.

^ I n :case. of a major dispute, they provided for a .
negotiating period of a year.before resorting to war. See
Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, 187.
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certain."

AQ

When the war broke out, Gerard was immediately faced
with the protection of the rights of American neutral
shipping.

In his memoirs and despatches, he stated that

the German government resented American, shipments of arms
to the Allies.

He repeatedly cited the Hague Convention

of 1907 to the Germans, arguing that the unilateral
alteration of international law was, unthinkable.^

In a

letter to House he expressed the belief that: the Germans
would never be satisfied unless the United States actually
joined them in. war.

However, Gerard remained hopeful

that an early peace could be attained, and he sent.numerous
requests to Housfe, the President, and the Department of
State to encourage the United States and Britain to initiate
some positive action.

In one. of his despatches of February,

1915, he said:
...It-is my belief that if you seize the present
opportunity you will be the instrument of bring
ing about the greatest peace which has ever been
signed, but it will be fatal to. hesitate or wait
a moment: success is dependent upon immediate
action.
^ Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 21.
Gerard, My Four Years in Germany , 131- 32.

See also

50See Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 226-27.
^Gerard to House, January 20, 1915, in Seymour,
House, 1,345.
32xbid.
(1928) ,T53.

See also Foreign Relations Supplement 1915
“

^^Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 9-10.
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Ironically, he sent many reports to the Department of State
describing what he called the German "hate campaigns" against
C A

American shipment of arms to the Allies.
With the sinking of the "Lusitania" the relations'
between the United States and Germany were sorely strained,
and the ambassador and the German government leveled threats
55
and counterthreats.
GerardTs anti-Germanism was 5becoming
more evident.

On June 1, 1915, he asserted, "It is the

German hope to keep the "Lusitania" matter 'jollied along'
until the American,people get excited about baseball or a
new scandal and forget.

Meantime the hate of America grows

d a i l y . A n d while he tried to pacify the Kaiser and the
German government in Berlin concerning the munitions ship-,
ments, he was still smoldering.

In a letter to House, he

said:
...Perhaps it is worth a war to have it decided
that the United States of America is not to be'
run from Berlin. The people here are firmly
convinced that we can. be slapped, insulted, and
murdered with absolute impunity, and refer to
our notes as things worse than waste paper.
I hear this is said by persons in very exalted
stations. They feel that:our ’New Freedom1 is
against their ideas and ideals, and they hate
President Wilson because he embodies peace and
learning rather than caste and war...
54Ibid., 103, 104, 138, 402.
^ S e e Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 227-36.
^Gerard to House, June 1, 1915, in Seymour, House,
I, 454-55.

I hope the President never gives in on the
arms [export] question; if.he ever gives in on
that, we might as well hoist the German. Eagle
on the capital,5'
The submarine issue most provoked the American am
bassador.

From 1915 to 1917 the issue of the unrestricted

use of submarines raged.

For a.time, Gerard believed Ger

many would hold to its various pledges to refrain from
torpedoing neutral ships.

By early 1916, he was convinced

that "ruthless" submarine warfare would commence if peace
was not quickly secured.

Realizing that the military was,

responsible for much of the policy being made in Germany,
he,suggested to Chancellor Theobold Theodor Friedrich Alfred
von Bethmann Hollweg that;a meeting be arranged for him with
generals Erich von Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg.
request was denied.

This

When unrestricted submarine warfare,

commenced, Gerard's forebodings about German sincerity for
peace were confirmed.

After the United States declared war,

he concluded, "The choice lies with the German people.

And

how admirably has our great President shown that people that
we war, not with them but with the autocracy which has led
them into the shambles of dishonor ."58
Gerard's ability as a diplomat has garnered praise
from some historians.

Armin Rappaport, for one, suggested

57cerard to House, July 20, .1915* in ibid. , II, 23.

58Qerard, My Four Years in.Germany, 346-55, 358-59,
368-73, 402.
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that the ambassador had a reputation as a shrewd observer.59
Seymour believed that Gerard was "... excelled by none in
the dignity and capacity with which he maintained the most
trying diplomatic situation of the war zone."

He added that

the ambassador’s letters to House were "pungent and pro
phetic," and that through them the President was kept
informed of the complicated forces that governed Germany.60
These favorable evaluations have been challenged.

Link

argued that in early 1915, when the issue of the submarine
was vital, the President and his advisers were not aware of
the division of opinion in-the German government or its •
outcome.

All that they knew came from Gerard, who was so

highly excitable and gullible that he did not and could not
distinguish between gossip and truth.

He missed what any

envoy witji the right connections would have discovered--the
impact of the policy of his government upon the men who were
making the crucial decisions in the country to which he was
accredited.

Instead of reporting what was necessary•for his

superiors to know, he "bombarded" the Department of State,
with telegrams describing the "hate campaign."61

Similarly,

59Rappaport, British Press, 38.
^Seymour, House, I, 185.
^Link, Wilson, III, 331-32. See.also,May,.American
Isolation, 396. Tansill stated that although Gerard sent
some alarming and anti-German despatches, House had great
confidence in Gerard's remarks, because he had little
patience with the Germans himself.
See his America Goes
to War, 358,366, 394.
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Walworth characterized Gerard as Wilson’s "bumptious am
bassador at Berlin."62
Probably Karl E. Birnbaum has presented the best treat
ment of Gerard's activities, especially with respect to
neutral rights^

He stated that in 1916, Bethmann Hollweg

was preparing the way- in neutral countries for unrestricted
submarine warfare, and the German Foreign Office actively
tried to prevent the American government from taking any
"radical steps" in case Germany initiated such actions.
They first endeavored to persuade the American;Congress and
public opinion that1Britain’s illegal .methods of warfare,
i.e., the blockade, had placed Germany in a critical position.
This failed because it came too late to influence Wilson’s
debate with Congress on the issue of warning American citizens
against traveling on armed merchantmen;

Gerard, under the

presumption that the German propaganda campaign in America
was an effort to maintain peace between the two countries,
assured the Chancellor that the campaign had exerted a posi
tive effect.

Birnbaum argued that Gerard's evaluation was,

certainly not true in respect to Wilson and Lansing.

f\

^

^Walworth, Wilson, II, 22.
63Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves a.nd the U-Boat Warfare
A Study of Imperial Germany’s Folicy Towards the United
States April 18, 1916-January 9, 1917 (Stockholm: Almquist
and Wilesell, 19 58), 64-65.
(Hereinafter referred to as
Birnbaum, U-Boat.) See also Link, Progressive Era, 208-14.
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Later, Birnbaum continued, Gerard indirectly invited
the Chancellor to make use of his services to bring about
peace negotiations between the belligerents.

The manager

of the German-American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin learned
of this offer and asked Hans Kramer, a German financier,
to relay it to the German authorities.

In his report,

Kramer had stated that;Gerard believed Germany could not
be defeated and that October, 1916, seemed an appropriate'
time for mediation.

Kramer said Gerard emphasized that he

and President Wilson would act as the arbitrators, since no
official American authorities would offer their-services,on
account of the rejection of previous American peace notes by
the German'parliament.

This proposal was, likewise rejected.

By early 1917 Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Office
believed that the United States was. still interested in its;
efforts for peace.

Nevertheless, they were evasive, due in

part to their previous unpleasant experiences with Gerard,
who had been indiscreet in presenting confidential messages
to Washington.

A,case in point occurred in October, 1916,

The American ambassador was to return to America for a brief
visit.

The Chancellor had a peace message to present to

Wilson, but he did not trust Gerard to deliver it.

The

Kaiser thought this was too cautious, but Bethmann Hollweg
insisted and gave it to Johann H. von,Bernstorff, German
ambassador to the United States, for transmittal.

Mean

while, on the ship to America, Gerard gave an impolitic
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interview to Herbert G. Swope of the New York World;

He

stated that he was bringing no peace message, and would tell
the President that Germany would begin unrestricted submarine
warfare after the 1916 election unless the unexpected hap
pened and peace occurred,,

When. Gerard met with Wilson, he

related what he had told Swope, and possibly mo r e . ^

Birn

baum concluded that the causes of the eventual collapse of
American-German relations involved a lack of viable communi
cations as well as actions by both sides not conducive to
peace.

He said about Gerard's performance:

...These shortcomings were not compensated by Ameri
can diplomacy. The United States Ambassador in
Berlin was a rather incompetent diplomatist, and
neither the German Government nor President Wilson
had any real confidence in him. His indiscretions
during the autumn of 1916:apparently deprived the
officials at Wilhelmstrasse of all inclination to
employ him as a confidential channel between Berlin
and Washington. On the other hand. Gerard was, owing
to the absence of .fundamental> general instructions
in American diplomatic practice, and on account of
Wilson's critical opinionof.him, insufficiently
informed of the Presidents intentions and plans
during decisive periods.65
In his ceremonial role Gerard, although obligated to
But in keeping with his personal pledge, the Presi
dent would not make peace overtures until after the elec
tion. See Birnbaum, U-Boat, 153-65, 293-94. See also
Link, Wilson> V, 173-75; Tans ill, America Goes to War,
597; Notter, Wilson, 557.
^Birnbaum, U-Boat, 337-38. For additional discussions
of Gerard, see Grattan, Why We Fought, 148-49, 397-98; Alice
M. Morrissey, The American,Defense of Neutral Rights 19141917 (Cambridge: Harvard -University Press, 1939), 70"! [Here
inafter referred, to.as Morrissey, Neutral Rights.); Tuchmau,
Zimmermann Telegram, 101; May, American Isolation, 251,
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attend many social functions, did not thrive on protocol„
Upon his introduction to the Kaiser he decided to abandon
the "fancy diplomatic uniform" and return to the "demo
cratic, if unattractive and uncomfortable, dress suit,"
because American newspapers and certain congressmen had a
most extraordinary prejudice against American diplomats
wearing diplomatic uniforms.^

He characterized the court

life as "frivolous" and "far away,,"

Stuart acknowledged

Gerard's contention that!court life was pretentious.^

But

Millis, who disliked the ambassador,, believed that Gerard
actually enjoyed,himself at ceremonial functions in the
"heavy brillance" of the Potsdam coupt, and began to
realize the complexity and difference of European society,,

f\R

Gerard came to realize that an ambassador was compelled
to become part'of this system and that he could gather the
69
most useful information at-social functions.
He.also,
discovered that these occasions could be exploited for what
he considered American advantage:
1 was informed through various channels... of
the imminence of a return to merciless submarine
warfare.
I .knew of this-on the night of a great
banquet given to me in Berlin at which I said in
a speech that the relations between Germany and
the United States.had never been better. Both the
^Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 22-23.
67stuart,: Diplomatic Practice, 228, 337.
^^Millis, Road to War, 21.
^Gerard, My. Four. Years in Germany, 31.
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President and .Colonel,,House: had:.urged me to show
myself exceptionally,, frieudly. .to. the Germans .
Knowing .that-,the break would .soon come, I was
delighted to follow these.orders * I knew that if
I showed myself excessively friendly, criticism
of the Wilson,adminis tration- by the great mass
of German-Americans would be blunted when rela
tions were finally broken.
Tuchman stated that Arthur von,Zimmermann, foreign minister
of Germany, and Gerard each engaged in lulling the other,
and "outdid each other in purring."

71

These social engage-,

ments., to Gerard as well as the German officials, seemed
to be extensions of the cat-and-mouse negotiations between
Germany and the United States.
MYRON T. HERRICK
Herrick's performance•as a negotiator and reporter in.
1913 to early 1914 was quite limited.

In his>autobiography,

he asserted that: he made concerted efforts to protect Ameri
can, citizens stranded in France,during the early stages.of
the war-.

To do this he organized a committee to develop gold

credits, established a fund to aid destitute Americans,
obtained rail and ship passage for those desiring to return
home, and employed other means to protect .American life and
property.
France

He also helped establish an American hospital in

'

70cerard, Eighty-Three Years, 244-45.
^Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 144.
^Mott, Herrick, 127-35.
Practice, 270-71.

See also Stuart, Diplomatic
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His despatches during 1913 and 1914 were not enlight
ening or numerous until the weeks preceding the war.

He

was'best noted for his July 28, 1914, telegram in which he
predicted the coming of hostilities:
Situation in Europe is regarded here as the
gravest in history.
It is apprehended that civil
ization is threatened by demoralization which would
follow a general conflagration. Demonstrations
made against war here last night by laboring classes;
it is said to be the first instance of its kind in
France.
It is felt that if Germany once mobilizes
no backward step will be taken. France has strong
reliance on her army but it is not giving away to
undue excitement....73
Herrick asserted that Bryan did not answer or acknowledge
this message, and that it was not shown to the President.
Thus, the ambassador was perturbed that his forewarnings
74
were not heeded.
Herrick's activities in France during the early days
of the Wilson administration have notvbeen carefully
analyzed.

However, the telegram of July 28 interested' a

few historians.

For example, Millis recognized the note as

the earliest official suggestion of the war arriving at the
Department of State.

He further contended that even during

those first days, mediation in Herrick's "excited mind" was
being altered into a proposal for American intervention to
^ Foreign Relations Supplement 1914,,18-19.
Mott, Herrick, 118-19.
74Mott, Herrick, 199-200.

See also
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halt Germany.

75

Although Herrick's diplomatic activities were limited
in 1913 and 1914, he flourished in the social and ceremoni
al

environment of Paris.

During his tenure in France he

attended innumerable gatherings, and became widely known
for the July 4 celebrations he gave.

As a result, he became

popular with many of the French dignitaries.7^

His cere

monial activity also seemed to contribute to the ambassador's
assiduous Francophilism.
WILLIAM GRAVES SHARP
Little of significance is known,about Sharp’s negotia
ting ability.

In his memoirs, Sharp discussed his assistance

with relief programs and his special interest in the treatment of Allied prisoners of war. 77 Sharp also maintained
that he kept abreast of all Allied armistice and peace:pro
posals, because he desired "...the promptest possible cessa
tion to this prolonged slaughter of the world's best young
manhood," and wanted ” ... a peaceful future safeguarded against
further unprovoked onslaughts of militaristic imperialism."78
However, he never referred to his involvement, if any, in
75Millis* Road to War, 49. See also Grattan, Why We
Fought, 30; Link, Wilson, III, 5.
7^See Mott, Herrick, 94-115. Of course ceremonial
occasions were more infrequent during the war. See also
Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 276.
77Pawson, Sharp, 68.
78Ibid., 347-49.
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negotiations to bring the war to an end.

Spaulding argued

that since the French ambassador to the United States, Jules
Jusserand, was of such an impressive stature that many dip
lomatic problems were often settled in Washington rather than
through Sharp.79
As a reporter, Sharp was more business-like than Herrick
and less prone to dramatics.

Most of his despatches con

cerned neutral shipping rights and violations, giving full
accounts of such cases as the "Dacia," "Lusitania," and
"Sussex."80

Sharp gave little attention to the continental

aspects of the war, although when America intervened he sent
Wilson a list of observations.
his attitude during this period.

These gave some insight into
He believed that French

morale was better than expected, although German advances
were steady.

He conjectured that the internal problems of

the French government, especially Socialist agitation, could
disturb the military confidence of France and retard its
prosecution of the war.

In association with this, he further

believed a radical change in the upper echelon of the govern
ment was imminent.
prolonged by:

The war in Europe, he argued, was being

1) the equality of men and resources on both

sides, 2) trench fighting, and 3) the airplane.

He saw an

79Spaulding, D.A.B., XVII, 25.
80See Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 340, 508;
1916, 107-23,“218.
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indication of change since American troops were beginning
to redress the balance, and German supplies were rapidly
diminishing.81

All in all his reports were informative, if

a little clinical.
MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN
Egan had been in Denmark seven years when Wilson took
office.

In this time he came to consider Copenhagen a

strategic post.

He was sympathetic:

"For myself, when I

had studied the history of Denmark, I could imagine no
people with a more glorious past or a more pathetic present,
except Ireland or Poland."8^

He also feared the aggression

of Germany and was concerned about the preservation of an
independent Denmark.

83

And he became disgruntled when he

felt the United States would not give Denmark the attention
he thought it deserved.8^
As World War I developed, Egan found it difficult to
remain neutral, but he earnestly attempted to perform his
duties without a hint of his partiality.

Concurrently, he

was occupied with attempts to

purchase the Danish West

Indies for the United States,

a project to which he hadbeen

81Sharp to Wilson, August 24, 1917, in Dawson, Sharp,
195-201.
8^Egan, Recollections, 218.
8^See Egan, Ten Years Near the German Frontier, A
Retrospect and a Warning (New
York: George H. Doran, HT19),
231. (Hereinafter referred to as Egan, Ten Years.)
8^Egan, Recollections, 225.
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devoted since 1907.8^

It was not until 1916 that this

transaction was completed.
In his memoirs, Egan stated that the purchase was one
of Wilson's dreams and, although he had a carte blanche on
the timing of the negotiations, he proceeded carefully:
I knew very well that if I could strike
President Wilson at the psychological moment with
precision and directness, he would trust me to do
the job.
I must say the chance, until 1916,
seemed rather remote. The state of political
parties in Denmark was what may be called
"incoherent" and confused.... I knew very well
that for the Minister of a great country like
the United States to hint at any bargain for the
islands that might irritate the national pride of
the Danes would be fatal. 86In his despatches to the Department of State, at that time,
he sought encouragement to begin negotiations, and simulta
neously warned of the possibility of the subjugation of
Denmark and its possessions by Germany.

87

Subsequent des

patches revealed Lansing's acknowledgement to begin negotiaD O

tions and the specific nature of the American proposal„Q
Egan credited Lansing with taking the steps necessary to
on

complete the transaction,

while noting his own role in the

88The American interest in these islands was derived
from their strategic importance to the Panama Canal.
8^Egan, Recollections, 285-86.
8^For example, see Foreign Relations 1917, (1926),
557, 564, 588-90.
88Ibid., 592-706.
8^Egan, Recollections, 286.
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negotiations.
By the time the United States declared war on Germany,
Egan had completed his major objective.as minister to Den
mark,

His active period as a negotiator was nearly ended.

He then focused attention upon the prosecution of the war.
American intervention relieved himt
The wretched days of neutrality were over; the
voice of the eagle was heard in the land, and
there was no more need of feeling apologetic, even
when one put on a bold front and pretended to be
too "proud to fight." But the day had gone by
when anybody who could watch the course of govern
ment intelligently, really believed that we were
fighting to make the world safe.for democracy.
England and France were, fighting; for their lives
and we were fighting because the American, sense of
honor had not yet perished,"0.
Tansill was one of the few historians who analyzed
the diplomatic performance of Egan, especially those activ
ities concerning the purchase of the islands.0*

He stated

that while Egan's attempts to secure the islands were
persistent, the Danes' impression of the United States as a
violent, imperialistic nation which hanged negroes, made his
chore difficult.

Egan finally was able to convince the Danes

that he was far different from what they imagined his country90Egan, Recollections, 335.
9*Both Link and Notter mentioned Egan in their studies
of Wilson, but they only emphasized that the minister
utilized the threat of German encroachment in Denmark as
a major reason to negotiate for the islands during the
Wilson administration. See Link, Wilson, II, 81; Notter,
Wilson, 421.
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men, to be, and thus gained their confidence*

In June,

1915, Lansing authorized Egan to negotiate formally for the
islands.

But, Tansill asserted, Egan delayed for two

months, probably because the governor of the Danish West
Indies, Christen Helweg-Larsen, opposed the transaction.
Surprisingly, Egan made no reference to this delay in his
memoirs.

Also the instructions from Lansing to begin nego

tiations referred to a "plan" to be.presented to the Danes,
This "plan" was not the direct,purchase of the Danish West
Indies, as Egan intimated in his memoirs, but a proposal he
suggested as early as September, 1910, for the exchange of
Mindanao for Greenland.

Tansill further alleged that Egan

was never aware of the pressures which Lansing placed on
the Danish government, and thus inadvertently his reports
and memoirs usually made his own negotiations seem more
92
important.
In spite of Egan's concern for the purchase of the Danish
West Indies and the prosecution of the war, he was quite active in endless ceremonial duties.

Q^

His long service in

Denmark certainly made him familiar with many of the impor
tant personages, and this was a great advantage to a diplomat
who was trying to persuade his host country to sell a piece
of property.
^^Tansill, The Purchase of the Danish_West Indies (Balti
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932), 456-57, 470-73, 50 8.
(Hereinafter referred to as Tansill, Danish West Indies.)
93See ibid., 289ff.
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IRA NELSON MORRIS
Before the American intervention in World War I, Morris
felt overwhelmed by his duties as a neutral minister in
Sweden.

He not only was responsible for German and Austro-

Hungarian prisoners of war, but negotiated diplomatic
matters which the Central Powers wished to transact with
Russia.
The geographic position of Sweden made Morris's post
an important location from which to view German and Russian
activities.

An especially significant task was keeping the

Wilson administration informed of all trade going through
the Kattegat and Skagerrak.

However, in a report.to the

Department of State in,1915, Morris told the Secretary of
State that compelling Sweden to discontinue all exports to
95
Germany would incite Germany to retaliate in kind.
As
1917 approached, he took heed of all aliens going to America
96
and the increasing German espionage in Sweden.
American intervention prompted new activity for the
minister.

Aside from some commercial negotiations between

Sweden and the United States,®'7 he gave full attention to
®^Morris, From an. American.Legation, 33.
®^Ibid., 76. See also Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of
the United- States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 [Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 156.
(Hereinafter referred to
as Bailey, Neutrals.)
Q6

Morris, From an American Legation, 122-23.:

9^See Bailey, Neutrals, 151-53.
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aiding in,the defeat of Germany.

Since the ambassador to

Russia, Francis, was often incommunicado, Morris provided a
vital service by reporting activities in Russia to the
Department of State, especially during 1917 and 1918.
Morris believed that the events during the summer of 1917
indicated,the eventual withdrawal of Russia from the war.
Upon the Bolshevik rise to power, he recommended that the
Allies cooperate, in some way, with Lenin’s government to
prevent the utter disintegration of the Russian participa
tion in the war.

To compliment this, he advocated a

counter-propaganda campaign against :Germany.

Of course, he

was disappointed that'his suggestion was not employed.

In

order to further improve his understanding of the activites
in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, he established a
"Russian Bureau" with men of various political persuasions,
who would keep him informed of the intricate problems
there.98
In other legation business, Morris aided in a propa
ganda campaign against,Germany.

He-concluded, "I claim for

our propaganda work some share in bringing about what was,
in effect, a veiled offer of peace from Germany early in
1918.""

However, this "veiled offer" had come from a

Socialist member of the Reichstag, who had no authority or
"Morris, From an American Legation, 73, 156-67.
also Foreign Relations Russia 1918, I, [1931), 96.
"ibid. , 132-33.

See
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power to negotiate peace and, under, proper diplomatic pro
cedures, should not have been received by Morris.

In this

case, the minister clearly overestimated his responsibil
ities as a diplomat.1^0
CHARLES JOSEPH VOPICKA
What is known about Vopicka’s. performance as minister
to Bulgaria, Rumania:and Serbia,was derived primarily from
his memoirs and correspondence... And although his diplo
matic duties were varied and often conflicting, his antiCentral Power sentiments and his paternalistic attitude
toward the Balkan countries were always evident.

In the

forward to his memoirs, he wrote:
A blow struck in the Balkans, as of steel
upon flint; a spark, a flame--and then, the
holocaust of the world!
But the blow came from without; the hand of
tyranny was raised against a people whose freedom
had been bought with their own blood.
The World War began in the.Balkans, yet its
origin,was in the hearts of,the unscrupulous
autocrats whose ruthless ambition knew neither
justice nor limit; who counted the subjections
of a people merely as the first move in the game
to win commercial and political supremacy, and
in the end, to dominate the world. Serbia was
only a power to be swept aside as the first
obstacle in the path of world conquest.101
lOOworris's ceremonial performance was difficult to
determine.
l^Charles Joseph Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans:
Seven Years of a Diplomatist!s Life in the Storm Centre
of Europe (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1921) , v.
(Hereinafter referred to as Vopicka, Balkans.)

115

However, Vopicka considered his activities in the
Balkans during the period of American neutrality in keeping
with the principles and policies.of the Wilson administra
tion,

For example, an American, who. had been doing business

in Austria and Hungary, tried to make a lucrative deal with
the minister.

Vopicka was to convince the Rumanian govern

ment to allow Germany to send trainloads of food, secretly
hiding ammunition, to Constantinople.

The American minis

ter refused, stating he was from a.neutral country and would
not-aid belligerents in any way.

In another episode, he had

asked for the resignation of an. American consular agent in
Bulgaria, who had written a book, which asserted that Bulgaria
should side against Russia in the developing conflict.
Much of Vopicka's work prior, to. 1917 was typical of many
ministers from neutral countries.

He was responsible for

various groups of prisoners of war., and was asked to head an
international committee to investigate the treatment of
prisoners in S e r b i a . H e

also.took.charge of the interests

of eight countries, including. Germany.

However, his suspi

cion of the Central Powers made. him .dubious of their activ
ities in the Balkan countries,..Vopicka was fearful of
espionage and propaganda, believing

that the German and

Austro-Hungarian governments employed spies in Bucharest to
observe the American legation.

In one case, he said, a

102Ibid., 35-40, 42-43, 50, 270.
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beautiful woman spy was assigned to.obtain information from
him.

He was able to expose her because she had begun a

discussion with him without being.properly introduced, which
was contrary to diplomatic protocol.(!).

He later dis1 A 7

covered she was a prominent Austrian.agent.
While Vopicka’s despatches during the period of Ameri
can neutrality clearly reflected.his_biases, they also were
a primary source of information about the Balkan situation.
His war correspondence was most.abundant from mid-1914 to
late 1915, because of the crucial nature of Bulgarian and
Rumanian neutrality.

He reported-the. Bulgarian decision in

October, 1915, to ally with the Central Powers, which he
considered surprising not only to the Entente, Rumania, and
Serbia, but also to. the Bulgarian people.10^

In this report

he referred to his previous statement of November 30, 1914,
10 s
which had predicted this event.
His anti-Germanism
especially can be seen in his skepticism of Rumania’s polit
ical intentions before they joined the Allies:

"From my

despatches the Department will..see. that I never placed much
confidence in Roumania because the king is a member of the
Hohenzollern family and the present administration under
Mr.

[Ionel] Bratianu always acts according to his wishes."106
103Ibid., 82-83.
10^Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 70-71.
105Ibid., 1914, 155.
106Ibid-. , 1915, 71.

117

Also, his paternalistic attitude toward the Balkan countries
was evident in his despatches.

For instance, in support of

Serbia he exhorted the Department of State to persuade
Britain to withdraw its opposition to the Red Cross shipment
107
of flour to that country.
The culmination of his distrust of the Germans occurred
in January, 1917.

General August von Mackensen, the occupa

tion governor in Bucharest, forced Vopicka and his staff to
leave.

On their way through Berlin, the American minister

talked with an official in the German.Foreign Office, who
told him the affair had been a mistake, and that he had not
been recalled.

Vopicka answered, "I am sorry, but you must

settle the matter with my government.
than kidnapping and a casus belli.

This is nothing less
^

When he finally returned to Rumania and set up the lega
tion in Jassy, its temporary capital, he continued business
as usual.

When the United States finally entered the war,

his bias against the Central Powers continued relentlessly.
In fact, he had recommended a declaration of war against
Austria-Hungary as well as Germany, although his suggestion
was discounted by the administration.^^
1Q7Ibid., 1916, 921.

He also continually

See also 40, 46.

lO^Vopicka, Balkans, 125.
IQ^Ibid. f 128, 246; Foreign Relations Supplement 1918,
I; Mamatey, Central Europe, 12 2.
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expressed his hatred of Bolshevism.

He believed it had to

be eradicated, since, among other things, it forced Russia
out of the war .
Vopicka’s biases even found expression in his cere
monial duties.

For example:

In Sofia I was received by Czar Ferdinand
of Bulgaria, being presented by Prime Minister
Genadieff....On the following day, the newspaper
"Mir" printed an interview with me in which I
expressed a favorable impression of the czar,
stating truthfully my belief that he was a
good monarch as he had labored twenty-seven
years for the education of-the Bulgarians.
This evidently pleased the czar, as there
after he was very friendly, and always gave
me prompt audience whenever I came to Sofia,
an honor not granted to all my colleagues,
some of whom, I understood, being unable to
see him even once a y e a r . m
Mamatey was extremely critical of Vopicka1s prejudice
against the Central Powers.

For example, he said that the

American minister gave the Rumanian prime minister the mis
taken impression that his prejudice against Germany and
Austria-Hungary were felt by many Americans.

Mamatey further

stated that Vopicka demonstrated open hostility to his
Austrian counterpart in Bucharest, and created such rancor
against the Central Powers that they often attempted to recall
him.

However, even though he became a minor legend for his

"hilarious social gaffes" in the "gossipy and tight little
ll^See Vopicka, Balkans, 143-45.
111Ibid., 22-23.
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world of international diplomats," his activities endeared
him to the Rumanians and provided some valuable services
to the Allied cause.
DAVID ROWLAND FRANCIS
Although Francis was sent to Russia to improve commer
cial relations between that country and the United States,
World War I made the task of the ambassador difficult, and
broadened his responsibilities.

On his arrival, he was

immediately given the duty of representing German and AustroHungarian interests.

According to Francis, there were

approximately one and one-quarter million Austrian prisoners,
one-quarter million German prisoners, ttyo hundred thousand
interned German civilians, and fifty thousand interned
Austrian civilians.

11 71

In spite of this newly acquired

responsibility, he was still determined to attain a commer
cial treaty with Russia.

In his first meeting with Foreign

Minister Serge Sazonoff, he was told that no treaty was
possible until all the Allies developed some definite
economic policies.

Francis was disappointed.

The various interpretations of Francis's commercial
negotiations are scarcely in harmony.

Charles Daniel

H M a m a t e y , Central Europe, 121-23. For a more sym
pathetic view, see Thomson, "Charles Joseph Vopicka,"
D.A.B., XXI, 695.
USprancis, Russia, 4.
•^-^see Francis's letter to his son, Perry, in ibid. , 8.
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DeYoung asserted that Sazanoff was willing to negotiate a
commercial treaty in,the spring of 1916, but unknown to the
Department of State, the Czarist government had inaugurated
a policy of refusing to enact trade agreements until the
commercial programs of the Allies were clarified.

Francis

then turned to advancing trade without a treaty, although
that was hardly his responsibility.

Lansing attempted to

restrain the ambassador's vigor, but Francis persisted.
However, DeYoung added, the relations of Francis with the
Czarist government were not close, and he was eternally
suspicious of its activities.

Williams argued that, in

the ambassador's view, his failure to establish more favor
able commercial relations with Russia occurred, in large
part, because of the decision of J.P, Morgan to handle
Russian loans through his British office.

This policy made

it difficult for American exporters to arrange satisfactory
American credits for Russia, and increased England's in
fluence at P e t r o g r a d . K o h l e n b e r g added that Francis
also realized the necessity of placating American Jewry in
order to conduct commercial negotiations compatible with
their political interests.

Soon Francis was aware that the

Russian government had no intention of altering its dis
criminatory policies against Jews, and this was a detriment
115DeYoung, "Francis," 23-24, 27.
116Will iams, American-Russian Relations, 84;
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to his negotiations.I17
Although Francis was wary of the political unrest in
Russia in 1916 and early 1917, he had new hope for a commer
cial treaty with the coming to power of the Provisional
Government.

In the absence of instructions from Washing

ton, he quickly tried to associate himself with the new
government, and was soon able to acquire United States
recognition of it.

119

Unfamiliar with Russia, Francis

characterized the rise of the Provisional Government in
terms of American political goals.

For example, in May,

1917 he observed:
An immense crowd of enthusiastic Russians
have just left Embassy where they came to ex
tend salutation from free Russia to free America
and at their earnest and repeated request, I
am now expressing their greetings to their
brother freemen in the United States.... 120
But Francis also began to discern that the Russians desired
a separate peace with Germany, and he continually exhorted
the new government to continue the war in order to keep
pressure on the German east flank.

He stated:

This situation, in my opinion, not only jus
tified but demanded activities on my part to
assist the Russian Government to keep the Russian
armies fighting which under ordinary circumstances
would have been not only unusual but improper for
an Ambassador to undertake.
H^Kohienberg, Mid-America, XL, 204-12.
H^Francis, Russia, 22-23; Kohlenberg, Mid-America,
XL, 213.
1 1 Q

See Francis, Russia, 82; Kennan, Russia, I, 17.
120See Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I, 1-12.
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He evaluated this step as helping to determine the future
of the United States * Russia, all international relations,
and society itself!121

a resuit, he regularly sought

American financial support for the new government.

12 2

Before the accession to power of the Bolsheviks,
Francis held firmly to the conviction that the Russian people
should support the Provisional Government, and he decried
” ... the anarchistic dictums which had been preached from
every street corner by an extreme Socialist named Lenin and
his followers," who he believed were in the pay of Germany,
With the Bolshevik revolution, Francis’s anticipation of
improved commercial relations between the United States and
Russia, and the continuation of Russia in the war faded.123
When the Bolsheviks came to power, the ambassador made no
recommendation for recognition, nor did he receive instruc
tions to do. so.

At first he did establish what he called a

"quasi-business" relation with them.

However, after the

signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, he became an enemy of
Bolshevism, and raised the ire of the German, government as
well for inciting the Russian people to continue the pros121prancis, Russia, 125.
122For example, see Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I,
1-12, 90-94, 150.
123pranciS} Russia, 112-13; Foreign Relations Russia,
1918, I, 40.
!

123

ecution of the war.424
Francis was undaunted.

More than ever he harangued

the Bolsheviks and the Germans. And although he had been
initially opposed to it, he finally advocated Allied mili
tary intervention in Russia to extirpate German influence,
and ultimately to topple the Bolshevik government.125

^e

stated, "I advocated the eradication of Bolshevism in
Russia because it is a blot on the civilization of the
Twentieth Century, and for the additional reason that it is
our interest, to exterminate it in the land of its birth."126
Historians have given substantial attention to Francis's
activities in Russia during the revolutionary period.
Kohlenberg commented that-Washington was pleased to do all
it could to aid any individual or group whose aim was the
destruction of the Bolshevik regime, and Francis,■in agree
ment, was unwilling to pursue his plans for a commercial
treaty or any other intercourse.427

Conversely, Williams

124Francis, Russia, 132, 173-77, 189-212, 231-37. See
also Foreign Relations Russia, 1918,1, 521. He eventually
moved his staff to Vologda.
42^Francis, Russia, 288-309; Foreign Relations Russia,
1918, I, 387, 519; il, 55, 126, 178- 80, 51T-70,' 526-27:
126Francis, Russia, 307.

See also 340.

127Kohlenberg, Mid-America, XL, 24. See also Albert N.
Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations 1918-1922: The Struggle
Over Recognition ^Washington D.C.: The Catholic University
of America Press, 1965), 36-39; Foster Rhea Dulles, The
Road to Teheran The Story of Russia and America 1781-1943
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 127-31;
~
DeYoung, "Francis," 43, 48, 53-55, 61-74; Stuart, Diplomatic
Practice, 232, 264.
„

viewed Francis’s actions as "open threats" to reactivate
the Russian Army, and silence Lenin and Trotsky.

He added

that Francis did not seem to understand that the Russian
people had little inclination,to continue the war.*28
Historians have generally agreed that Francis's reports
gave little insight into the problem facing Russia in 1917.
Kennan stated that the events in Petrograd seriously con
fused Francis, and his despatches gave Washington only a dim
and "not wholly intelligible" impression of what was happen
ing.

On the other hand, the Wilson administration did not

keep its ambassador well-informed e i t h e r . F o s t e r Rhea
Dulles concurred, and added that although despatches from
the American consuls in Petrograd and Moscow gave some idea
of the growing influence of Bolshevism, the Department of
State built its policy on the interpretation of Francis, who
had continually dismissed the threat of Bolshevism to the
stability of the Provisional Government.

Also, the ambassa

dor failed to realize that while Lenin and Trotsky received
aid from Germany to get to Russia, they were not paid
agents.130
128winiams, American-Russian Relations, 92.
l^Kennan,
Russia, I, 242-43. See also Christopher
Lasch, "American Intervention In Siberia: A Reinterpretation,
Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII ( J u n e , 1962), 209-23.

l^Dulles, Road to Teheran, 104. See also DeYoung,
"Francis," 35-41; John Albert White, The Siberian Inter
vention (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 73.
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An example of Francis's distrust of Bolshevism was his
acceptance of the validity of the Sisson documents.
explained:

Kennan

"In the winter of 1917-18 the Committee on

Public Information, which was the official American propa
ganda agency of World War I, stationed in Petrograd a special
representative, Edgar Sisson, formerly an editor of Cosmo
politan Magazine.

In February and March 1918, Sisson pur

chased and removed from Russia a:.number of documents and
photographs of documents purporting to prove that the leaders
of the Bolshevik government were paid agents of the German
General Staff."
Francis.-1-31

Eventually Sisson showed these documents to

Dulles stated that Francis utilized these as

conclusive proof of his conviction that Lenin and Trotsky
were in the pay of Germany.

In time the documents would be

discredited, and Francis's basic assumptions would prove to
be unwarranted.

But his opinion was almost universally

accepted in those decisive days.1^2
Betty Miller Unterberger presented a clear evaluation
of Francis's activities concerning intervention in Russia.
She stated that there was a growing unanimity among Ameri
can representatives in Europe and Asia in favor of interven
tion.

The consuls in Russia urged it, and Reinsch in China

131Kennan, "The Sisson Documents," Journal of Modern
History, XXVIII (March, 1956), 130.
132Dulles* Road to Teheran, 122-23. See also Brenda
Kurtz Shelton, "President Wilson and the Russian Revolution,"
University of Buffalo Studies, XXIII (March, 1957), 118.
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believed that the Russians would welcome Allied interven
tion, if Japan was not allowed to enter unilaterally.
Francis became more vehement, and advocated immediate occupa
tion of Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Archangel.

And, like

Reinsch, he was opposed to the unilateral intervention of
J ap an.^^^
Since the political unrest in Russia was almost con
tinuous during his time in Russia, Francis's ceremonial
activities were limited.

Before the Provisional Govern

ment came to power, the Russian court was considered the
most lavish and ritualistic in Europe.

Francis's association

with the Czar was cordial, but not i n t i m a t e . A c c o r d i n g
to Kennan, Francis lived quietly in his embassy apartment,
confining his social life largely to the American colony,
and taking little part in the gatherings in high Petrograd
society.

Kennan further asserted that Francis seemed to

find no easy approach to his colleagues; he was ignored or
was the subject of amusement and condescension.

His rare

diplomatic dinners, which were "...marked by a squeaky
gramophone playing behind a screen in the dining room, and
Philip [Jordan] interrupting the service at the table from
133getty Miller Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedi
tion, 1918-1920 A Study of National Policy [Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 19 56), 28-29, 47-48, 60-61,
141. See also her article, "President Wilson and the
Decision to Send American Troops to Siberia," Pacific
Historical Review, XXIV (February, 1955) , 63-7TT See also
DeYoung, "Francis," 74b-75b.
13 4

For example, see Francis, Russia, 12-16.
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time to time to crank it," were not up to the standard of
Russian society.*35

He attended some social gatherings

with members of the Provisional Government., including
Alexander Kerensky, and his relations with them were
friendly.

But he never lost his apprehension of the

Bolsheviks, and imperial protocol.was certainly not part
of Russian society then.
HENRY MORGENTHAU
Morgenthau1s reluctance to accept the Turkish assign
ment was not evident in his performance as ambassador.

On

his arrival to Constantinople, he quickly determined to
take charge of his embassy:
Soon after my arrival I observed a curious
phenomenon concerning the position.of an ambassa
dor. The instinctive ambition of the attaches
led them to try to keep the Ambassador from taking
an active hand in the work.of the Chancery.
It was
explained to me with great solemnity, that-.the
business office of the Embassy-was not like other
business offices; that its operations were so in
volved in delicacies of diplomatic usage that none
but old hands, trained in all their niceties were
competent to handle the transaction of its intri
cate affairs.... I made short work of this mysterious
nonsense... Therefore, I promptly acquainted myself
with the records of the Embassy for several years
preceding, and took absolute charge.of its func
tions, as I was duty bound to do. The mysteries
faded instantly. Common sense, judgment, and
energy are the desiderata of all business rela
tionships, and I found no barrier in these affairs,
because of their so-called diplomatic nature.136
l^Kennan, Russia, I, 38.
^ % e n r y Morgenthau, All in a Lifetime (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922) , 178-79.
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However, he also viewed his post in more ideal terms:
"America's true mission in Turkey,.I felt, was to foster
the permanent civilizing work of the Christian missions,
which so gloriously exemplified the American spirit at its
best."1^

This was quite a remark for a.Jew, but Morgen

thau disapproved of Zionism in association with Judaism,
believing it was the "most stupendous fallacy of Jewish
history."

Instead, America was his Zion.138

His diplomatic tasks soon became more immediate and
concrete with the war.

Turkish neutrality was vital.

He

employed loans to Turkey as an expression of American
friendship and as an inducement, to remain aloof from the
conflict.

In his reports, he strongly urged increased

Allied demonstrations of friendship for the Turks in order
to counteract the mounting German influence.139

Finally,

Turkey demonstrated its partisanship towards the Central
Powers, and closed the Dardanelles, cutting off the Allies
from Russia.

Morgenthau recalled:

The Grand Vizier came out in answer to my re
quest. He presented a pitiable sight. He was in
title at least, the most important official of the
Turkish Government, the mouthpiece of the Sultan
himself, yet now he presented a picture of abject
157Ibid., 203.
■^•^See ibid. , 348, 401.
139Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 19 2 9 ) 3 7 - 4 1 ,
43-46.
(Hereinafter referred to as Morgenthau, Morgen
thau 's Story.) See also Foreign Relations Supplement
1915, 980, 982-83.
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helplessness and fear. His face was blanched and
he was trembling from head-to foot. He was so
overcome by his emotions that he could hardly speak;
when I asked him whether the,news was true that the
Dardanelles had been closed, he.finally stammered
out that it was.
"You know, this means war," I said,
and I protested as strongly as I could in the name
of the United States.140
Historians have been especially interested in Morgen
thau1s negotiations concerning Turkish neutrality, and the
strong presentation of his position.

Grattan stated that

it was not surprising that Turkey joined the Central Powers,
since they had every reason to doubt the sincerity of the
proposal of the Entente to observe the integrity of Turkey
if she remained neutral.

Although a treaty of alliance

between Turkey and Germany had been signed on August 2, 1914,
the Turks continued negotiations with the Entente as simply
a smoke screen to hide their preparation for war.

Morgenthau

was as much in the dark, Grattan argued, as the Entente
statesmen during the period between the signing of the treaty
and the Turkish declaration of

w

a

r

.

441

as Laurence Evans

and John A. DeNovo asserted, Morgenthau was anxious to make a
strong presentation to the Turks to demonstrate the illogic
of their defying the Entente.

His plan was discouraged by

the Secretary of State, who instructed him that, under no
circumstances was he to offer suggestions, officially or
unofficially.

Only if the Turks asked, was he to inform

140ibid., 106.
^Grattan, Why We Fought, 249-50.
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them that the United States preferred them to remain neu
tral. -*-42

However, Grattan, unlike Evans and DeNovo, noted

that Morgenthau recorded in his memoirs that he had approval
from the Department of State to act unofficially„143
Morgenthau's desire to keep Turkey netural can be
attributed, in part, to his suspicion of the Central Powers.
He was certain that' they had:premeditated the war, waiting
for an opportune casus b e l l i . A f t e r his attempts to per
suade Turkey to remain neutral failed, he turned much of
his energy to relief work.

He contended that there was

nothing between the foreign nationals under his protection
and destruction except the American flag.

From the begin

ning, he realized that his task would be a difficult one.
His memoirs abound with examples of his relief efforts.

One

curious example involved the white slave trade:in Constanti
nople.

Morgenthau had told Bedir Bey, Prefect of Police,

that he would some day write a book on his stay in Turkey,
and thought Bey's performance of his duties should improve,
so he would not be cast as a villain.

According to the

142Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the
Partition of Turkey 1914-1924 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, i965)"7 TS~.
[Hereinafter referred to as
Evans, Partition of Turkey.); John A. DeNovo, American
Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), 90.
(Hereinafter referred to as DeNovo, Middle East.)
l^Grattan, Why We Fought, 150-51.
144por example, see Morgenthau, Morgenthau* s Story, 89.
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ambassador, Bey then made a concerted effort to curtail the
slave trade.

During the Allied bombardment of the Turkish

capital, Morgenthau remained in the city to "forestall
massacres and the destruction .of the, city," and was able
to establish safety zones with the approval of the Department
of State.

At that time, he also had "a most significant

meeting" with Enver Pasha, Minister of War.

The Turkish

government had been incensed by the Allied bombardment of
civilian targets, and decided to take hostages from the
ranks of the foreign nationals.

After considerable dis

cussion, Morgenthau convinced the Turks to take only fifty
hostages, and soon thereafter obtained their release. 1-45
Morgenthau was not as fortunate with his protests
against the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey.

He was

greatly disturbed by the annihilation, but felt helpless to
interfere in Turkish internal matters.

Therefore, he began

a widespread propaganda campaign in Europe and America.

He

even proposed a large-scale evacuation of Armenians to
America, but the project was considered impractical.146
various activities produced no substantial results.

Conse

quently, he became frustrated with his failure to stop "the
145Ibid., 54-56, 130, 200, 244-47.
•^^See Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 988. A
committee, proposed by Morgenthau, was formed to raise funds
and provide means to save the Armenians. Some of the
prominent members were Cleveland Dodge, Charles Crane, John.
R. Mott and Stephen Wise. This group believed the largescale emigration of Armenians to America was impractical.
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destruction of the Armenians," which made Turkey "a place
of horror" for

h i m ,

147

The ambassador left Turkey in 1916,

believing there was nothing more he could do, and he de
cided to return to his former business and political activ
ities.

He felt he could best serve his country by helping

to reelect Wilson.148,
Historians have generally recognized Morgenthau’s
efforts on behalf of foreign nationals, and especially
Armenians.149

Grattan argued that while Morgenthau could

hardly be reproached for his publicity campaign to save
the Armenians, he played into the hands of Allied propa
gandists who used the massacres to prepare the public for
any measures of severity,toward Turkey they might institute
after the war, i.e., the division of spoils as established
in their secret t r e a t i e s . R o b e r t L. Daniel supported
his thesis, stating that although Morgenthau helped organize
relief committees for the Armenians, he too exploited latent
animosity toward the Turks and resorted to name-calling.

The

ruthless Turk, Morgenthau said, was "psychologically primi
tive" and a "bully and a coward."151
14^Morgenthau, Morgenthau’s Story, 385.
148Ibid.
149por example, see DeNovo, Middle East, 79, 101.
l^^Grattan, Why We Fought, 251.
l^lRobert L. Daniel, "The Armenian Question and
American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1927" Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XLVI (September, 1959)', 2 53- 54. See
also Morgenthau, Morgenthau’s Story, 236, 275.
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The ambassador's ceremonial role was more difficult
to discern than his performance as a negotiator and a
reporter.

He was friendly with many Turkish officials,

often socializing with them, but maintaining a condescend
ing air. 152

jn h-[s associations with his diplomatic

colleagues, he was superficially cordial and always imperious.
For instance, on his arrival to Turkey, instead of the cus
tomary

visitation required of an ambassador, he remained

at the American Embassy and waited for the other envoys to
come.to him.

He told Dr. Paul Weitz, an unofficial attache"

and a "secret German agent," that he never made the first
advances.

The other diplomats should decide whether they

wished a relationship based on formal diplomatic exchange
or a frank informal friendship.

If they preferred the latter,

he would be delighted to meet them halfway, but they must
cover the first half.153

jn addition, he was often on guard

at social events for hints of important diplomatic secrets.
At a dinner at which he was host, the American ambassador
noted that the special emissary of the Kaiser was offended
by his table placement.

He said, "I reported this dinner

incident to my government as indicating Germany's growing
ascendancy in Turkey...," and presumed all other envoys at
the affair did the

s

a

m

e

.

154

j^s flair for the dramatic was

152por example, see Morgenthau, All in a Lifetime, 202.
153ibid., 180-81. Morgenthau said that the German and
Austro-Hungarian ambassadors were delighted.
*^Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 43-46.
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most evident here,,
PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH
The duties at the Peking legation were complex and
varied in 1913, but Reinsch chose, to interpret most of them
in terms of economic activities.

As he said:

I had long discarded any narrow interpretation
of diplomacy, but even if I had adhered to the prin
ciple that the diplomat must busy himself only with
political matters, I should have had to admit that
in China political matters included commerce, finance,
and industry.
I did not, of course, intend that the
Legation should enter into a scramble for concessions,
but it was my purpose that it shall maintain sym
pathetic contact with Americans active in the economiclife of China, and should see.to it that the desire
of the Chinese to give them fair treatment should not
be defeated from any o t h e r s o u r c e .-'-55
Reinsch did become involved in maintaining and securing
concessions for American businessmen, as in the case of the
Hwai River conservancy project:

."I thought it essential to

propose only such relationships as would help develop some
American interests already established in China.

I was

attracted by this plan, sound, useful, and meritorious, to
redeem the Hwai River region."156

jn another case, Japan

disputed some oil rights in northern China which the Standard
Oil Company had developed.

Reinsch quickly informed Stan

dard Oil's -headquarters that its interests were endangered,
155paul Samuel Reinsch, An American,Diplomat in China
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922),
64.
(Hereinafter referred to as Reinsch, China.)
IS^Ibid., 80-81. See also Foreign Relations 1914,
107, 111, 113, 114; also 1917.
’

and coaxed the Chinese into re-affirming the American claim.
But in his plan for economic development in China, he re
ceived little cooperation from the uninterested financiers
in the United States.

He was frustrated by their lack of

concern for China and their overt attention to Europe.
Japanese aid to China also vexed him, since he assumed that
it would reduce active American business activity in China,
The Lansing-Ishii notes were the coup de gr&ce, because,
among other things, the United States officially recognized
Japan’s economic interests in China.157
Those historians who evaluated Reinsch’s ability to
negotiate economic issues generally applauded his efforts,
but indicated his failures.

Pugach stated that Reinsch

believed Wilson wished to assist in the development of
China, strengthen the independent position of the United
States in the Orient, and protect its national interest, as
opposed to "facilitating the marketing of portfolio invest
ments."

The minister of China, Pugach continued, felt he

was executing the foreign policy of the President, even when
he exceeded "the letter of his.instructions„"

Pugach also

suggested that Reinsch had a modicum of success, especially
when he visited the United States in 1918 to stir American,
business interest in China.

By the next year, however, the

Japanese-American rapprochement made it impossible for him
157Reinsch, China, 82-88, 304-07, 328, 353-58, 382.
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to continue his

w o r k .

158

Gage was in basic agreement, but

emphasized the practical political motives of Reinsch's
economic policy.

The Sino-Japanese negotiations in early

1915, having shifted the balance of power in the Far East,
forced Reinsch to conclude that:American capital interests
in China should be strengthened to stave off Japanese
economic advances, and eventually political incursions.

The

minister also saw the necessity of weaning Britain away from
Japan, and influencing its diplomats to follow an American
lead which would include a new interpretation of special
interests in the Orient.
ulate

Internally, Reinsch wanted to manip

Chinese policy to bring about a closer relationship

between his country and China by keeping in office an
amenable group of Chinese statesmen.

Unfortunately, Gage

asserted, Reinsch’s program failed, for a number of reasons,
including:

1) European countries, even.with the war in

progress, were unwilling to abandon their spheres of in
fluence and special interests; 2) the Japanese were able to
discourage American capital investments in China; 3) Reinsch's
attempts to manipulate Chinese officialdom split it into
factions relying on outside support to gain power; and 4) the
Lansing-Ishii notes.

After the failure of his program, Gage

concluded, Reinsch just marked time.159
158pUgacj1> Pacific Historical Review, XXXVIII, 169-71.
See also Pugach, "Reinsch,'* 108-13.
159Gage, "Reinsch," 97-98, 101-02, 135, 189-92, 427-29.
See also Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest
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The problems of the war and Japanese political and
military encroachment in China were issues of major signi
ficance with which Reinsch was compelled to deal.

The

Chinese government asked for his advice when Japan,pre
sented the ignominious Twenty-One Demands to them.

Realiz

ing the devastating effect of such ultimata, he recommended
that detailed negotiations on each demand be carried out in
order to stall for time and arouse the interest of other
nations.

Beyond this, Reinsch felt helpless, and believed

he could only watch the course of events and give sym
pathetic hearings to the Chinese of f icials.^ 0
As the war intensified, Reinsch flooded Washington with
despatches urging close association with China to keep her
neutral.

He stated in his memoirs:

We built up our solution of unity for China.
In carefully weighed dispatches I sent it to the
American Government, and cabled the President a
statement of China's vital relation to future
peace.
I was constrained to condemn Japan's policy,
quite deliberately, summing up the evidence
accumulated in the course of five years. I had
come to the Far East admiring the Japanese, friendly
to them--my published writings show this abundantly.
I did not lose my earnest goodwill toward the Japa
nese people but I could not shut my eyes to Japanese
imperialist politics with its.unconscionably ruthless
and underhanded actions and its fundamental lack of
every idea of fair play. The continuance of such
methods could only bring disaster; their abandonment
An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York:
MacMillan Co., 1934), 186-91.
(Hereinafter referred to as
Beard, National Interest.); Li, China Policy, 164; Notter,
Wilson, "275- 76 .
l60Reinsch, China, 125-28, 130-37, 143-44, 149. See
also Foreign Relations 1914, 182-205; Supplement 1915, 83.
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is a condition of peace and real welf are....161
But although Reinsch tried to persuade the tenacious Chinese
officials to keep their country neutral, they were bent on
belligerency.

Reinsch stated:

In their ignorance of these secret arrangements
[between France, Britain, Italy, and Japan, as
suring non-interference with Japan's China aims]
the Chinese thought that association with the war
powers would put them on the.footing of an ally.
...For my part, I allowed the Chinese to feel that
the American government, desiring them to decide
this question according to their own best judge
ment, hoped that a way might be found to bring
the war situation into harmony with justice to
China.162
/

Reinsch believed that if China became a belligerent she
should be entitled to assurances.from the powers guarantee
ing her political and administrative.integrity in terms not
easily avoided in the future.

But China became involved in

long discussions with the Allies instead, and her financial
situation constantly weakened.

Throughout these negotia

tions Reinsch desired to give "the best form of American
assistance."

Above all, he had in mind "steering China

beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were luring her
upon the Japanese rocks."163
A number of historians recognized Reinsch's awareness
of Japanese encroachment in China as a fundamental problem
16lReinsch, China , 334-35.
Supplement 1917, I, 402, 412.

162Reinsch, China, 286-87.
l65Ibid., 296.

See also Foreign Relations

See also 241-54,
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with or without war.

The Twenty-One Demands were the most

graphic example of Japanese incursion.

Pugach asserted that

the American minister realized that the United States could
and would do little to stop Japan at that time, since not
even the British would act.
achieving three things:

Reinsch thus concentrated on

1) to. focus attention on the

duplicity of Japan--to arouse American public opinion and
awaken the administration to Japan1s intentions; 2) to
disassociate the United States from acquiescence to the
demands; and 3) to "hammer away", at those sections which
proved the greatest menace to American interests.
areas Reinsch had some
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In these

According to Gage, as

the war developed, the American minister advocated stronger
political and international measures, to discourage Japanese
advances in the Far East.

When.he resigned* Reinsch recom

mended direct action against the Japanese to "call her
bluff," since he realized diplomatic representations were
no longer efficacious.165

Bailey.added that Reinsch's

increasing militancy towards Japan somewhat embarrassed
the Department of State.

He had made certain informal

commitments to the Chinese on his.own.responsibility in.
1917, which were partially the cause for Chinese protests
164pUgach, "Reinsch," 213-15.
^^^Gage, "Reinsch," 242-43, 556. See also Reinsch,
China, 241-59; Bailey, Neutrals, 23-24; Thomas Edward
LaFargue, China and the World War (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Pres s', 1937), £6-115; Curry, Far Eastern Policy,
112-18, 120-21.
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against Germany,

As a result, Lansing reprimanded Reinsch

and ordered him to make no further unauthorized prom
ises .^66
Thus, Reinsch had difficulty enacting his program for
China.

And when he attempted to make firm recriminations

against Japan, his own.government, had to make sure he did
not overstep his authority,
Reinsch’s awareness of the importance of the Far East
in the foreign policy of the United States was exemplified
in his ceremonial performance.

An educated, well-informed

scholar of Asian affairs, he realized the necessity for
cordial relations with the Chinese.167
strong affection for them.

Besides, he had a

He was able to maintain his

favorable relationship with the.Chinese government even in
the most critical periods of the continual internal turmoil.
It was no wonder that he was asked to become a personal ad
viser to that government after his resignation from the
diplomatic corps.
HENRY LANE .WILSON
The interference in the internal affairs of Mexico by
the contentious ambassador Wilson best illustrated why he
was so controversial.

It was well known that Wilson detested

^^Bailey, Neutrals, 23-24. For a more sympathetic
view, see Li, China Policy, 106; Fifield, Far East, 69.
167por example, see Reinsch, China, 188.
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the Francisco Madero regime.

On its inception, he said:

The revolution of Madero sprang unarmed and
motley from the national discontent with the
system and administration, of. the Diaz regime.
This discontent it neither represented nor
organized. Madero was a.comparatively unknown
person who appeared at a psychological moment
and reaped a harvest which, might.have gone to
stronger and abler men had any such been then
prominent in the public eye....Nevertheless,
the character of the revolution.inaugurated by
him was from its inception formidable neither
in numbers nor organization....-^8
Throughout Madero's rule, the ambassador decried the Mexican
President and predicted his ultimate failure.169
the threat of revolution arose against Madero.

Eventually,
Wilson was

deeply concerned about the safety of American and other
foreign nationals in Mexico, and he protested to the Mexican
President-and the rebels.

He even advocated that the United

States use forceful action if protection was not extended to
American life and property.I?9

In the interest of peace, he

said, the whole diplomatic corps tried to persuade Madero to
relinquish his position to the Mexican. Congress.

Madero was

incensed by this demand and sent a note to Washington blam
ing Wilson for inciting action against him.171
As the revolution persisted, Wilson felt impelled to
168wiison, Diplomatic Episodes, 20 5.
169Ibid., 226; Foreign Relations 1913, (1920), 935.
l^Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 234-35, 255-60;
Foreign Relations 1915^ 704.
*^Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 263. Wilson stated
that Madero later apologized for his accusation.

restore:order to Mexico, and decided to ask generals Victoriano Huerta and Felix Diaz, the-leaders of the rebellion,
to come to the American Embassy for consultation.

His

object, Wilson asserted, was to have the two generals enter
into an agreement for the suspension of hostilities and for
joint submission to the Federal congress .-*-72

Madero's

overthrow followed, and Huerta was installed as provisional
President.

Within a short time Madero was killed.

Huerta

claimed that assassins had murdered him while he was being
escorted to prison.

Wilson said'he.was shocked, having

received assurances from the general that Madero would not
be harmed.

However, the ambassador did not blame the new

government for the deed.-*-73
Wilson spent the remaining days of the Taft adminis
tration and the first year of the Woodrow Wilson adminis
tration attempting to obtain American recognition of the
Huerta government.I74

During the Democratic administration,

Ambassador Wilson believed his despatches were being ignored
since he disagreed with the President's policy of de jure
recognition.

The ambassador was also aware that the Presi

dent believed he had been in collusion with Huerta and Diaz
during the revolt.

In a lengthy telegram, Ambassador Wilson,

17^Ibid. , 279. Wilson claimed to have no prior meet
ing with Huerta. See 274-75.
173Ibid., 283-88.
■*-7^For example, see Foreign Relations 1913, 725.
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had explained the situation during the.revolution, as he
viewed it, and exonerated himself ,of all blame.

This

had little effect, and his frustration was clearly demon
strated in his memoirs.

He stated.*..

The anomalous situation, resulting from the
attitude of the government in Washington I was
obliged to endure in silence as there seemed to be
no cure for it. The reports and recommendations
which it was my duty to.make.I made and then waited
patiently, trusting that a certain amount of exper
ience would teach the administration the course
which it ought to pursue in the interest of the
welfare of the Mexican nation and for the good of
our people living in Mexico .-*-7.6
The ambassador's version of his performance during the
revolutionary period has been severely criticized and sym
pathetically defended.

Callcott asserted that Wilson had

indeed taken an active part in the. overthrow of Madero.

He

had given substantial advice to the rebels, and arranged
the meeting at the embassy to unite them.

When Huerta was

securely in office, Wilson sought his recognition so Mexico
could return to the "... good old conservative days of Diaz
when property rights were secured, the classes were supreme
and only the people were suffering."

Callcott concluded

that Wilson's activities were hopelessly out of step with
Washington and he knew it.

Thus, his recall by President

Wilson was no surprise.177

Blaisdell, while critical of

l75Ibid., 768-776.
176wflson, Diplomatic Episodes , 300-01.

See also 308.

^ ^Callcott, Caribbean Policy, 301ff. See also Grieb,
The United States and Huerta, 16-17; P. Edward Haley,
Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and
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the ambassador's interference in internal Mexican affairs,
argued that his actions were not necessarily "out of step"
with Washington.

Taft and Secretary of State Philander C.

Knox were willing to give Madero-a chance, but when the
revolution broke out they were.reluctant to take definite
steps.

Blaisdell asserted that their.caution rose from

their preeminent concern with the three-sided American
presidential election of 1912.

Thus,Ambassador Wilson, and

his conservative ally in the Department of State, F.M.
Huntington Wilson, were able to. harass the Madero regime
which they both disliked.

Wilson, Blaisdell said, gave way

to his "penchant for meddling," and. accepted the cause of
the rebels as a way to restore order in Mexico.

Blaisdell

contended that although the ambassador.had no direct part
in the murder of Madero, "...the world awakened on the morn
ing of February 23 [1913] to find that the climax to the
ambassador's statesmanship had been the assassination of
Madero,

[and] Wilson's diminishing, reputation sank to the

vanishing point."

The event prompted an investigation of

the ambassador's conduct by the new.Democratic administra
tion, and led to his eventual dismissal.I?8
Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press,
1970), 16, 32, 56, 62-72.
[Hereinafter referred to as
Haley, Revolution and Intervention.); Stanley R. Ross,
Francisco I. Madero Apostle of Mexican Democracy.(New
York: Columbia University Press, 1955) , 238-39 , 293-311.
(Hereinafter referred to as Ross, Madero.); Calvert,
Mexican Revolution, 87; Notter, Wilson, 214.
178Blaisdell, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
XL, 118-25.
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Link outlined the ambassador's antagonism to the Wilson
administration in more detail.

Because the Taft adminis

tration was reaching the conclusion, of its tenure when
Huerta rose to power, the President and his advisers decided
to leave the question of recognition to the new administra
tion.

The ambassador's despatches had become increasingly

dramatic by then, and this made President Wilson dubious of
the credibility of the ambassador's reports.

By March, 1913,

when the New York World began a. fierce campaign to discredit
the ambassador, the confidence of the Wilson administration
in its envoy had faded.

The President was prepared to

recall him, but if he did, a new envoy would have to be
appointed, and this would constitue a recognition of Huerta's
regime.

In an evasive move, the ambassador was called to

Washington for "consultation."
post.179

He was never returned to his

Grieb went a step further and argued that Ambassa

dor Wilson's despatches did not only pique the Wilson admin
istration, but strengthened its resolve to depose
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Masingill contradicted the critical interpretations of
Wilson, and defended his actions.

Masingill insisted that,

in general, the ambassador did not stray from his instructions,
since in 1911 Knox had authorized him to use his own discre179Link, Wilson, II, 348-56; Link, Progressive Era,
111-12, See alsoCalvert, Mexican Revolution, 135.
i

I80grieb, The United States and Huerta, 70, 85. For
a less critical account, see Baker, Wilson, IV, 238-39.
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tion in cases of emergency.

By 1912, the Taft administra

tion was increasingly leaving the Mexican question in Wilson's
hands, although the ambassador did not initiate a policy
anathema to the American government.

Masingill accepted

the ambassador's own conclusions about the overthrow of
Madero.

And while the death of the ex-President of Mexico

shocked Ambassador Wilson, it had hardly been possible for
him to have, prevented it.

Besides., the ambassador, with

the support of the Department of State, accepted the Presi
dency of Huerta as a fait accompli, and he became more con
cerned with the new regime than with the fate of the deposed
officials.

The failure to accept Huerta's explanation of

the death of Madero, Masingill argued, would have been an,
admission that the new Mexican government had acted in a
criminal manner.

The recall of Wilson, he went on, was

based on political reasons,

A campaign of persecution was

waged against the ambassador, because his policy of recogni
tion differed from the President's..

A stream of "amateur

sleuths" constantly embarrassed Ambassador Wilson and finally,
in a "humiliating public way," he was dismissed.181

1 8 3 - M a s i n g i l l , "Henry Lane Wilson," 68, 94-107, 130,
183-84, 209--21Q, 227. For other sympathetic treatments
of Ambassador Wilson, see Lowry "Mexican Policy," 26,
34-35; James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in
Mexican Relations (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1932J,
215-17.
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FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON
Historians have overlooked-the performance of Stimson
as ambassador to Argentina.

Of course, the relative unim

portance of Latin American countries during World War I and
the priority given the war policy by the Wilson administra
tion justified this.

But, even in his memoirs, Stimson

discussed few substantive issues.

He asserted that it was

indiscreet to record details of confidential negotiations
between the United States and Argentina.

And, he warned,

quite facetiously it is hoped, that his memoirs might
include fictitious elements to mask state

s e c r e t s .

On account of his attitude, only a few examples of the
performance of Stimson are available.

He attended a consid

erable number of conferences in Latin America, including the
Pan-American Conference of 1915 and the Tacna-Arica arbitra
tion.

In both instances, he blamed the Department of State,

in part, for their failure.

He credited himself, however,

with salvaging hope for a resolution of the Argentine-Chile
border dispute in 1917, by convincing the contending parties
to accept mediation by the United States and Uruguay.

He

later stated that the Department never sent him any reply to
this
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in other activities, he sought a marine,

telegraph cable between the eastern United States and Argen■^^Stimson, My United States, 278-79.
ia5Ibid., 350-56.
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tina, which, was accomplished after settling a conflict with
the British monopoly.184
In one of his few contacts with the problems created by
the war, he was instrumental in bringing about a wheat con
vention between the Allies and Argentina.

According to the

subsequent treaty, Argentina would extend credit to England
and France to buy wheat.

However, Stimson was slightly dis

turbed that he had taken part in such: an unneutral act.185
The ambassador's despatches were scarce, mostly con
cerned with local conditions and commercial relations.

How

ever, his attitude toward the Department of State was blunt
and critical:
The first thing a diplomatic secretary is
taught to do is never, in his dispatches, "to put
the department in the wrong." But the difference
between an undersecretary in the department and
the minister at the post is as an assistant secre
tary of state more lucidly explained to me, that
"The department thinks the fellow on, the job is a
d----d fool but the fellow on the job knows the
department is."186
He added that he was inclined to think the Department was
right about half the time, which was a liberal concession.
It (and he called the Department "it") was a "singularly
bad" correspondent, published the most confidential des
patches in the newspapers, and lacked manners--his most
184Ibid», 401.
l85Ibid., 415-17.
186Ibid., 294.
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serious charge of all.

He would have liked reasons for

the Department's instructions, believing he could then act
more intelligently.

He also criticized the Department for

never acknowledging which of his suggestions were carried
out, since "it" alone could give instructions„

His solution

to these problems was to give all important despatches to
the Associated Press.

He insisted that, if nothing else,

he caught the attention of the Department of State and got
results,!87

Stimson, in a radical way, suggested a common

problem that many American, diplomats complained about--poor
communications with Washington,

It was questionable, however,

if his solution was in the best interests of the United States.
The analyses in this chapter illustrated some, of the
basic characteristics of the performances of these diplo
mats.

However, such studies are of little value unless they

are accompanied by synthesis and reflection.

In the next

chapter, an attempt will be made to develop some overall
evaluations of these envoys.
•®-^Ibid. , 294-99.
tice, 77-Tff..

See also Stuart, Diplomatic Prac

CHAPTER IV

PERFORMANCE:

EVALUATIONS

A diplomat not only can be evaluated by comparing his
performance to some ideal standards, but by analyzing the
manner in which he executes his duties and the results he
attains.

In the case of the chiefs-of-mission under Wil

son, the complexity and variety of the tasks they per
formed must be taken into account.

Therefore, in order to

have the broadest possible perspective of these diplomats,
self-appraisals as well as scholarly interpretations will
be presented.

These evaluations should then provide the

basis for an.overview of the performance of each diplomat.
WALTER HINES PAGE
Pervading almost every letter and despatch Page wrote
was his conviction that an Anglo-American detente was
necessary.

In 1914, he wrote to Wilson:

...Of course, what some of the American newspapers
said is true--that I am too free and too untrained
to be a great Ambassador. But the conventional
type of Ambassador would not be worth his salt.to
represent the United States here now, when they
[Britain] were eager to work with us for the peace
of the world, if they are convinced of our honour
and right-mindedness and the genuineness of our
friendship.-*■
Ipage to Wilson, March 18, 1914, in Hendrick, Page,
I, 261.
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In a more general sense, he reflected:

"Is an Ambassador

a man sent to keep another Government friendly and in good
humor with your Government so that you can get and give all
sorts of friendly services and make the world better?

Or,

is his business to snap and snarl and play 'smart* and keep
'em irritated--damn 'em!--get:and give nothing?"^

Because

of his pro-British sentiments, Page revealed which type he
considered himself to be.
Historians have used Page’s Anglophilism as the basis
of their analyses of the,ambassador's performance.

Hen

drick believed that Page's pro-British sentiments and his
anti-Germanism aided in explaining his performance as
a
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However, Hendrick often defended Page's ac

tions instead of evaluating them.

For example, he said:

And so for five busy and devastating years Page
did his work. The stupidities of Washington might
drive him to desperation, ill-health might increase
his periods of despondency, the misunderstandings
that he occasionally had with the British Govern
ment might add to his discouragements, but a natural
ly optimistic and humorous temperament overcame all
obstacles, and did its part in bringing about that
united effort which ended in victory. And that it
was. a great part, the story of his Ambassadorship
abundantly proves.... But history will indeed be un
grateful if it ever forget the gaunt and pensive
figure, clad in a dressing gown, sitting long into
the morning before the smoldering fire at 6 Grosvenor Square, seeking to find some way to persuade
a reluctant and hesitating President to lead his
country in the defense of liberty and determined
that, so far as he could accomplish it, the nation
^Seymour, House, I, 312.
^Hendrick, Page, I, 325.
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should play a part in the great assize that was in
keeping with its traditions and its instincts,4
Countering Hendrick's contentions, historians critical of
Page asserted that the ambassador's pro-British sentiments
were so extreme that he acted at the expense of his own
country.5
Gregory examined the character of the ambassador and
evaluated.his performance with better perspective than
either Hendrick or the severe critics.

Page, he argued,

proved to be a more enthusiastic exponent of "idealistic
missionary, nationalism" than Wilson.^

And, like many

nationalists and expansionists, Page believed American
greatness was linked to kinship with Britain, as a racial
as well as a political union.7

Therefore, Page did not

hesitate to invite Britain to join in his scheme for remak
ing the world.

But he was extremely idealistic, partly

because the United States had not been involved in.the arma4Ibid., II, 319-20, See also I, 360; II, 20, 229. For
other favorable, yet not as sympathetic views, see Bell,
Woodrow Wilson and the People, 145-46; Link, Wilson the
Diplomatist, 26; Walworth, Wilson, II, 4; II, C- Alien, Great
Britain and the United States^ 6T8, 640-42.
^For example, see Arthur Willert, The Road to Safety
A Study in Anglo-American Relations (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 19 53), 58; Arnett, Kitchin, 121-22; Grattan, Why
We Fought, 183; C» H, Cramer, Newton D. Baker A Biography
(Cleveland: The World Publishers Co., 196l), 87^ 89.
6Gregory, Page, 35.
7
Gregory insisted that this was not an extreme sort of
racism, but a virtual Social Darwinism expressed as the
Anglo-Saxon example for the world in terms of individual
liberty and democracy. See ibid., 127-28.

153

merits race or the balance of power of Europe.

Coming from

a prosperous country, he did not believe Europe could solve
its own problems without American assistance in the form of
an Anglo-American alliance.

Gregory added that Page, like

other men cast into new positions of prestige and importance,
had boundless enthusiasm to do a great deal in a short time
and to simplify solutions to complicated, problems,8
The outbreak of war in Europe and the declaration of
American neutrality most conspicuously demonstrated Page's
Anglophilism, Gregory asserted.

For example, in 1915, Page

"... favored nothing that would force Britain.to alter its
policy and show respect for American neutral rights--little
less than, placing American commerce under British control."
Unfortunately, the ambassador's activites were, often con
trary to the.policies of his government.^

Consequently, by

1917, Anglo-American relations were not what Page desired.
The impact of Page upon American-British relations,
Gregory continued, was not as notable as the ambassador and
some historians have assumed.

If he had any influence in

Washington, it was only during the first few months of the
war.

By 1915, he was so hopelessly Anglophile that the
8Ibid., 35-36, 44, 48.

^Gregory speculated that if the American government had
been as clearly in favor of the Allies as its ambassador to
England, it would be difficult to imagine Germany exercising
the restraint it showed prior to 1917. See ibid., 130-31.
See also Tansill, America Goes to War, 138.
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administration usually treated his messages with indiffer
ence or apprehension.

And, in London, his influence with

the Foreign Office was not significant, as demonstrated by
the "Dacia" affair and the controversy over the Declaration
of London.

Furthermore, Grey, often neglecting Page, listened

to and received information from House, Lansing, and Cecil
Spring-Rice, British ambassador to the United States.

In fact,

when House was in London, Page faded into the background,^
Gregory also surmised that not only Page’s Anglophilism,
but his inexperience reduced his effectiveness as an ambassa
dor.

His freshness and willingness to explore new ideas were

commendable, but as an amateur diplomat, he was unable to
understand typical diplomatic frustrations.

Also, he did not

realize that his proximity to the diplomatic activities of
London and.Europe could be deceiving as well as enlightening.
While he knew that he was sent to his post to manipulate the
foreign government, he did not realize that the foreign
government would try to manipulate h i m . ^
Although Gregory's analysis of Page was the most thorough
since Hendrick's, and surely the best balanced, a further
observation about the performance of Page should be made-Page's pro-British sentiments went through a metamorphosis,
■^Gregory, Page, 197-98, 211, 214.
iilbid., 215-17. See also Gregory's article, "The
Superfluous Ambassador: Walter Hines Page's Return to
Washington.1916," The Historian, XXVIII (May, 1966), 389,
403-04. See also Seymour, House, I, 304.
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At the beginning of his service in England, they were, in
large measure, a means to an end,-since he was looking to
ward the emergence of the United States as a potent world
power.

He then deemed it necessary to ally with the other

great Anglo-Saxon nation.

However, the longer Page remained

in England, the more his pro-British sentiments became an
end in themselves, and he began to defend British policy at
every turn.

Page's outlook at this stage directed his

energies to the prosecution of the war, which he viewed as
a struggle, between freedom and tyranny.

This, of course,

reaffirmed his desire for an Anglo-American alliance, but
also inspired him to enter upon a dramatic crusade against
"the Teuton lords."

Whatever idealistic plans Page had for

the world, they were put further out of:reach by the broad
ening of his pro-British sentiments into Anglophilism and
anti-Germanism.
BRAND WHITLOCK
The war overwhelmed Whitlock.

His memoirs and letters

demonstrated how frustrated he became and how helpless he
felt to cope with the German occupation of Belgium.

He said:

It was a constant source of poignant and un
availing regret with me that I could not perform
the prodigies that those poor harried folk so
touchingly expected; such as the unlimited con
fidence in the great Republic across the sea.
Sometimes I had the uncomfortable feeling of
being a kind of impostor, the pitiably little I
could accomplish being so very small in com
parison with all that I should have liked to dp,
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to help them in their sorrow and.their

pain.

Of course, he insinuated that he had done his best.

He

wrote Newton D. Baker in 1917:
My experience in Belgium--perhaps I have
told you this before--took something out of me
that can never be replaced, did something to me
that can never be repaired. I seem to have given
all my youth, all my energy, all my freshness to
the task, and it has left me limp with the pale
constitution of the valetudinarian. Ah mell^
However, he took solace in his popularity with the Belgian
people, asserting that he had received unimaginable grati
tude

when he left, which had been somewhat embarrassing.

Heeven noted that

Baron von der Lancken, head of the

Political Section in Brussels, had. told, him at their farewell meeting, "Peut-etre au congres de la paix," as if to
imply "when we meet again."14
The biographers of Whitlock have generally acknowledged
the predictment in which the war had placed the minister,
but they gave.minimal attention to an evaluation of his
performance in light of it,

Tager’s assessment of Whitlock

was superficial, and virtually ignored his diplomatic duties.
He described Whitlock as a champion of virtue and justice,
who probably felt a renewed sense of mission in his associa
tion with the Belgian relief program because of its humanil^whitlock, Belgium, II, 189.
■^Whitlock to Newton D. Baker, December 12, 1917, in
Nevins, Whitlock The Letters, -250.
^Whitlock, Belgium, II, 455.
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tarian aspects, and who further believed he was doing
everything in his power to destroy the authoritarian German
state.

Tager added that the conflict against German domina

tion was apparently a resumption of the. minis ter's old
battle against:corrupt forces in domestic politics.

And

although Whitlock had considered himself a pacifist, his
experience, in.Belgium changed him.

In fact, his activities

as a war minister purportedly increased, his stature in
America, which he relished.

However, by the end of his

service in Belgium, he had lost all sense of mission.

The

war and political and social developments in America, i.e.,
the passage of Prohibition and the rejection of the
Versailles treaty, disenchanted him.

He became bitter and

"turned .his back on the world.
ThorbUrn's analysis was similar to that of Tager, but
it emphasized the character of the minister in more detail.
He considered Whitlock's major attributes to be his- alert
intelligence, his eagerness to learn, and his peculiar will
ingness to accept new ideas.

Never an original thinker, the

minister gleaned his ideas from others, and then expressed
them in his own way.

Thorburn added that, as a diplomat,

Whitlock freely admitted his lack of knowledge about .inter
national events, but,he rose "splendidly" to the occasion
when war broke out.

Like Tager, Thorburn noted Whitlock's

-^Tager, Whitlock, 153-64.
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disillusionment.

He argued that the minister had been

beset throughout his public career by an inability to learn
what bothered him.

Hence, Whitlock never really knew what

his goals in life were,^
Crunden evaluated Whitlock in much the same manner as
Tager and Thorburn,

He stated that the minister arrived.in

Belgium as a "sensitive libertarian” .and artist.

Having

experienced little horror in his life,, the war shocked him,
especially after his tour of the front.. As the occupation
progressed., Crunden asserted, Whitlock’s nerves all but dis
abled him.

He was not physically or emotionally strong,

quite out of his element in the war. zone, and it was sur
prising he did his job as well as he.did.

As the war

persisted,.his initially buoyant and optimistic nature became
increasingly pessimistic.

Crunden concluded that although

Whitlock died "overwhelmed by a sense of failure," he
actually deserved to be a hero.
Essentially, all three interpretations were identical.
They avoided, however, the obvious conclusions about Whit
lock's performance.

Given his background and personality,

the minister was unfit for his position.

He had been sent

to the idyllic Belgian post as a personal favor to some
Wilson supporters, especially Newton D. Baker, in order to
16Thorburn, "Whitlock," ii, 113,.127, 133, 174-76.
l^Crunden, Whitlock, 302, 343, 387, 399, 427.
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allow him time to write novels--hardly a sound reason for
an appointment to a diplomatic post.

The war not only

shocked Whitlock, but destroyed the tranquil environment he
had desired.

Therefore, his inexperience was compounded

by his unusual unpreparedness for the war.

Contrary to

Tager, Thorburn and Crunden, it must be argued that Whitlock
failed as. a war diplomat.

His reports.lacked analysis of

the events.he observed and most often emphasized the Belgian
relief work, something he could comprehend through his
humanitarian instincts.

But although.the relief program was

his major, concern, most of his colleagues did not credit him
with doing an equitable portion of the work.

Thus, Whitlock

appeared to.be a man of words not. action, frustrated and
shocked out of his ideals by the realities of war and its
aftermath..

One can sympathize with his. predicament, but,one

can hardly ignore his inability to cope with it.

He was a

classic example of a political appointee placed in a situation
that even an experienced diplomat would have found difficult.
JAMES W. GERARD
In his memoirs, Gerard declared that he left Germany
with a "clear conscience" and the knowledge that he had
done everything possible to keep the peace.

Concerning his

relations with the Germans, he said;
I was credited by the Germans with having
hood-winked and jollied the Foreign Office and
the Government into refraining for two years from
using illegally their most effective weapon.
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This, of course, is not so. I always told
the Foreign Office the plain simple truth and the
event showed that I correctly predicted the
attitude of America.
Our American national game, poker, has given
us abroad an unfair reputation. We are always
supposed to be bluffing,...
I only regret that those high in authority
in Germany should have preferred.to listen to
pro-German correspondents who posed as amateur
super-Ambassadors rather than to the authorized
representatives of America.... 18
Gerard's self-appraisal was more of a vindication than
an assessment of his performance as ambassador to Germany,
Similarly, many historians who lauded Gerard neglected to
examine his ability as a diplomat.

For example, Seymour

applauded:Gerard's "dignity" and the skill with which he
maintained.cordial relations with Germany in the most try
ing post in the war zone.

However, he said little more.l^

Some critics of Gerard did attempt to determine the nature
of the ambassador's performance, but their discussions often
degenerated into denunciations.

For instance, Link charac

terized Gerard as a "former dilettante in Tammany politics"
who was an,"authentic international catastrophe."

He added

that at a. time when circumstances demanded tact, understand
ing, and wisdom, Gerard could offer only ineptitude, ignorance
and folly.

Thus, both American and German authorities began

to rely on Joseph C. Grew, a young career diplomat at the
l^Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 429.

See also 430,

19Seymour, House, I, 185. For another favorable, but
less sympathetic account, see Arnett, Kitchin, 123.
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embassy-

Link further stated that "...during a period of

extreme tension in German-American relations Wilson had as
his spokesman in Berlin a man for whom he had no respect
and not a little contempt."

The President's opinion of

Gerard was pungently revealed in comments that he penciled
on copies.of despatches from the ambassador.
ber 10, 1915, Wilson wrote:

"Ordinarily an Ambassador ought

to be backed up as of course, but--this ass?
take it-seriously."
fathom this?

On Septem

It is hard to

On the next day, he added:

"Who can

I wish they would hand this idiot his pass

port !" 20
Although.Birnbaum echoes many of. Link's contentions,
he was a more objective critic, realizing that Washington
had not given Gerard adequate instructions.

However, it

must be recognized that since Gerard felt duped by the
Germans and.deluded about German peace offers, he became
increasingly anti-German, and was a detriment to his gov
ernment in.a period of tenuous relations with Germany.
Obviously., more diplomatic experience and a keener aware
ness of European conditions would have made him a more
valuable representative, but additional experience might
not have been able to counter his natural impetuousness.

^Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 25-26. See also Link,
Wilson, III, 311; Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 121.
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MYRON T. HERRICK
Herrick made it evident in his autobiography that he
deemed his amicable relationship with the French the out
standing achievement of his service as ambassador.

He

said:
I am told that I have really won, the love of
France.
If that be true, I am blessed beyond the
measure of good fortune, for the things I have
done which have brought me this sentiment are
also the very things that have won the confidence
and approval of the people of my own country,
whose love for France was never stronger than it
is to-day....21
However, Herrick not only neglected to evaluate his per
formance of diplomatic duties, but dismissed his tenure
under Wilson as an anticlimatic period of his service.

He

stated:
As I look back on it, I realize that I never
had such a carefree time in my, life as during
those first seventeen months as Ambassador under
the Wilson Administration.
I had no responsibility
other than carrying out my instructions; I was
staying on at the President's request, yet realizing
it was only temporary; and I knew that any time I
wanted to leave I could say so and start home....22
Mott's evaluation of Herrick was, hardly more enlight
ening than the ambassador's own account.

He praised him

as a ''pioneer in diplomacy" who was willing to take chances
rather than to be stagnated by convention.

Furthermore,

Mott re-emphasized the admiration of the French for Herrick,
2lMott, Herrick, 261.
22Ibid., 117.
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and insisted that although the ambassador had to his credit
no peace confirmed or war. avoided, he left a legacy to his
countrymen chiefly in the example of.his;character.23
Some.critics of Herrick condemned.his Francophilism.
Millis, in a severe attack, asserted that the ambassador
demonstrated his sympathy in many ''grossly indiscreet ways."
For example, Herrick's decision to. remain in Paris after the
French government retreated to Bordeaux.was reckless.

Millis

contended.that the event made a hero.of-Herrick in France and
the United. States, but impaired American neutrality.

In

another instance, a group of young American men- came to the
American Embassy in Paris, early in the war, to inquire about
enlisting, in. the French army.

The "foolish old man," Millis

said, explained the laws of neutrality to
encouraged them to enlist.

the group, but then

Many of these young men-died in

combat.24
Without question, the ambassador's diplomatic activities
were limited and his reports infrequent during this period.
His only significant accomplishment after the commencement
of hostilities in 1914 was relief work.

Aside from this, his

major concern was maintaining amicable relations with the
French.

This overemphasis, however, crippled Herrick^s

efficiency as an American representative.

The equally potent

23Ibid., vi, 221-22, 258, 375-76.

7 A Millis, Road to War, 74.

For a less severe criticism,
see Grattan, Why We Fought, 73-76.
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anti-Germanism that his pro-Freneh sentiments produced made
him an unreliable source of information for the Wilson ad
ministration.

Of course, his clear support of the French

cause in the war made him even more popular in France, but
further detached him from his responsibility as an envoy
from a neutral-country.

In addition, he.did not realize

that popularity is a superficial way to build good rela
tions between countries.

Thus, having, "won the love of

France" was a minor diplomatic achievement for Herrick.

It

represented, a. personal accomplishment, not a substantial
improvement of Franco-American relations.
WILLIAM GRAVES SHARP
It is.difficult to determine exactly how Sharp analyzed
his performance in France, since he made few pertinent
comments in his memoirs.

However, he continually emphasized

his attempts, to keep his diplomatic activities in alignment
with the foreign policy of the Wilson administration.

His

torians hnve added little of significance to Sharp's remarks.
The sympathetic Beckles Willson lauded, the ambassador with
out measure, but introduced nothing of.critical value.

Sey

mour, one of the few historians to evaluate Sharp at all,
claimed that, the ambassador was a reliable source of informa
tion whom. House admired for his exemplary conduct throughout
the war.

Seymour concluded that House often turned to Sharp

16S

for advice.
The few statements of Sharp and Seymour are hardly
adequate to. judge the ambassador's ability as a diplomat.
However, a. few observations can be.made..

Since Sharp, a

political, appointee with no diplomatic experience, genu
inely accepted. Wilson's "New Freedom" and "New Diplomacy,"
he allowed.the. administration to guide his actions, and
possibly his. thoughts.

Good examples, were his reports and

despatches, which were informative, but rarely critical of
his instructions or American policy.

Viewed from the ex

tremes, Sharp might be considered a. blind follower, on the
one hand, or an effective instrument of the Wilson adminis
tration, on the other.

However, given,the colorless nature

of his reports, the limitations of his.negotiations, and
the lack of.attention from historians,.he was most likely
only a faithful servant of the Wilson administration.
MAURICE .FRANCIS EGAN
Egan considered the purchase of the Danish West Indies
his crowning achievement, believing
the negotiations.

he had a major part in

In his memoirs he asserted that Wilson

and Lansing highly praised him, as.did the Danes, who had
never before given such accolades to an American.

However,

Tansill .stressed, that Egan's participation in the negotia
tions for the purchase of the islands was important, but
2^Seymour, House, II, 226.

166

not as significant as the minister intimated.

Nonetheless,

Tansill was quite sympathetic to the minister, who he
believed was. an "eminent American man of letters",and an
able diplomat.26
Tansill's analysis of Egan's performance concerning
the purchase appears to be quite accurate.

However, Egan's

activities as minister after this transaction were unin
spiring.

He had completed the task for.which he had been

sent to Denmark, and became more interested in maintaining
his long-time pleasant relationship with the Danes,

He had

found a comfortable niche in the world, and was content to
pursue a life uncluttered by superfluous diplomatic activ
ities .
IRA NELSON MORRIS
Morris believed his immediate goals as minister to
Sweden were, to improve Swedish-Ameiican political and eco
nomic relations and, when war broke out, to keep his govern
ment well-informed of the activities of Germany and Russia,
He never clearly stated whether he felt he had accomplished
the former,.but he intimated his reports were important
aids to his government.

Morris said, "What I was trying to

get at all these years, and what, I hope, I shall always be
trying to get at, is the truth."2?

His observations of

^Tansill, Danish West Indies, 450.
27^orris, From an American Legation, 167,
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prison camps, his role as liaison between the Central Powers
and Russia, his few economic negotiations with Sweden, and
his propaganda campaigns against Germany, were all discussed
in his memoirs, and he considered them, important„

And al

though the Wilson administration frequently neglected
Morris's advice in his despatches as substance for policy,
his reporting,appeared to be his most significant function,
especially because he displayed a clear understanding of
the influence of German militarism and the Russian revolu
tion on Europe during the war.

Yet, his. effectiveness as a

reporter was somewhat limited by his anti-German sentiments
which often colored his conclusions,
CHARLES JOSEPH VOPICKA
Unquestionably, Vopicka regarded.his performance as
minister to. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia* as successful
and righteous.

His conspicuous mention, in his memoirs,

of a number of medals conferred upon him by the Balkan
countries exemplified this feeling.

He. increasingly had

become convinced that he not only represented American
interests, but Balkan interests as well.

Hence, he could

justify his potent anti-Central Powers sentiments as a
legitimate reaction to the crucial situation in East
Central Europe.
Since the minister was certainly self-deluded, naive,
and excitable, Mamatey's criticism of him seemed justifiable.
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Vopicka's bias against Germany and. Austria-Hungary was ob
vious from the beginning of his service--not only as a
response to the hostilities in Europe, but most likely as,
a deep sympathy for his former countrymen and a hatred of
foreign imperialism.

Therefore, his actions in the Balkans

could almost be predicted.

His lack of diplomatic exper

ience and his frequent disregard for the practicalities of
foreign relations were evident in his interference in Bul
garian, Rumanian and Serbian affairs, in his prejudiced
despatches, and in his continual antagonizing and suspicion
of the envoys of the Central Powers in.the Balkan countries.
Since Vopicka was one of the few chiefs-of-mission near the
hostilities in Europe, he especially needed prudence and
objectivity.

Unfortunately, these characteristics were non^

existent in him.

It must be admitted that the complexity

of the situation in, the Balkans would have been difficult
for any diplomat to comprehend.

Nonetheless, a more unsuit

able choice for the ministerial post in the Balkans could
not have been appointed,
DAVID ROWLAND FRANCIS
Francis found little in his own performance to crit
icize, sincerely believing he had done what was correct.
He remained an. idealist to the end of his service, 28
although he admitted his inexperience and lack of know28por example, see Francis, Russia, 349.

169

ledge about Russia, he never questioned the quality of his
negotiations or his ability to report.
Most historians understood the shortcomings of Francis,
but some apologized for them.

Kennan argued that it was

easy for the members of the American community and the dip
lomatic corps in Russia to ridicule Francis and deprecate
his ability, but in sending him to the Petrograd post,
Wilson had.done an undeserved injustice to him.

While

Francis, at his age and with his experience and temperament,
had not been well-equipped for the post, he made do with the
qualities he possessed, and performed with "courage and
enthusiasm.
Kohlenberg evaluated Francis's commercial and economic
activities in Russia, emphasizing the strengths and limita
tions of the ambassador's performance.

He stated that al

though Francis failed to satisfy his insatiable desire to
promote closer economic ties between Russia and the United
States, any lesser man would have yielded long before
Francis.

Kohlenberg concluded that Francis was primarily

a charming old gentleman, who had proved himself in the
business world and, as Lansing aptly appraised, the am
bassador was a man with too keen a scent for trade to be
an ideal diplomat.^®
^ K e n n a n ,

Russia, I, 40-41.

■^Kohlenberg, Mid-America, XL, 216-17.
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Many historians were severely critical of Francis's
inexperience, as a diplomat.

Walworth contended that-

Francis naively pictured the revolution in Petrograd as a
practical realization of American principles of government.
But more than that, the appointment of Francis demonstrated
that Wilson was to pay dearly for his. tendency (and House's)
to give.attention to political expediency in choosing envoys
for Russia.

Unfortunately, Walworth added, American policy

towards Russia, after the downfall of the Czar, was based
on Francis's unwarranted faith in the.Provisional Government
and his disdain for the Bolsheviks.
even more, explicit■than Walworth.

7. I

. Philip C. Jessup was

He argued that Francis

was unable to. perceive the events in;Russia as they unfolded
during the revolutionary period.

To the ambassador, the

great issue was whether the Russian people would adopt a
constitutional monarchy or a representative form of govern
ment, not envisioning that a social revolution would follow
the political revolution.

For example,.he had called Lenin

an "extreme socialist or anarchist" who was stirring up a
little minor trouble, and later Francis accepted the rumor
that Lenin was a
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Jessup further stated that

Francis also did not realize that the Provisional Government
•^Walworth, Wilson, II, 93, 137. See also Daniel M.
Smith, The Great Departure The United States and World
War I 1914-1920 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., T965),

T T T W .------

•^See Foreign Relations Russia 1918, I, 27.
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was wholly dependent for its actual power upon the Soviet
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, who exercised what little
control ^anyone had over the army ,,33
similarly critical of the ambassador.

Max M. Laserson was
He asserted that

Francis's utterly irresponsible evaluation of Lenin was an
example-of the ambassador's total ignorance of the political
map of Russia.

He did not know the difference between

"radical-socialists"anarchists," "maximalists," and
"bolsheviks," and he did not really know who was fighting
whom during, the.revolutionary period.

The ambassador's

description of events in Russia, was a model of "illiterate
political reporting."

Laserson did concede that, despite

the ambassador's ineptness, he took certain practical steps
on his own initiative or on instruction from Washington that
were sound., such as requesting that a railroad commission be
sent to Russia and that credit be extended to the Pro
visional Government.3^
Most historians, whether sympathetic or critical of
Francis's performance, agreed that the ambassador lacked the
qualifications and experience to deal with the diplomatic
problems imposed by the revolution in

Russia. Thus,

it was

33 Philip. C. Jessup, Elihu Root 1905-1937, Vol.
II
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 19 38), 354-55, See also
Dulles, The Road to Teheran, 101.

3% a x M.. Laserson, The American Impact on Russia-Diplomatic and Ideological-^-1784-1917 (New York: MacMi 11 an
Co.," 1950), 408-410.' For a more speculative criticism of
Francis, see DeYoung, "Francis," 96-97.
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no surprise that he was unable to comprehend and report
clearly the events that occurred from 1916 to the end of
the war.. .That he also interfered in internal affairs in
Russia made it clear that the United States could not
afford to. have such a novice in Russia during a crucial
period of history.
HENRY MORGENTHAU
When. Morgenthau acknowledged his. inability to impede
the Armenian genocide, it appeared that*he was admitting
failure as.a diplomat.

This is unlikely.

In his memoirs,

the ambassador constantly referred to his relief work and
his relationship with the Turkish government, intimating
he was an. energetic envoy who tried his best,.35

Although

Morgenthau's assessment of his performance lacked sub
stance, his.memoirs demonstrated many aspects of his per
sonality and character which were of vital significance in
determining his prowess as a diplomat.

And these aspects

have been,generally neglected by historians.
Morgenthau was a fascinating combination of business
practicality and Wilsonian idealism.

He could be imperious,

haughty, and condescending towards the Turkish ministers;
blunt and earthy with his diplomatic colleagues; strongwilled within his own embassy; and emphatic and persuasive
35f o t example, see Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story,
82-86, 401-02.
'
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with the Department of State.

Concurrently, he was altruis

tic about.the work of the Christian missionaries in Turkey,
and empathetic about the plight of destitute foreign nation
als and Armenians.

He also foresaw an "Americanization" of

the Turkish economy as workable and proper, trying to impress
the Turkish.ministers with the benefits, of American business
practices.

And he interfered in internal Turkish affairs

when he believed the Turks were forsaking the Allies for
the cause, of the Central Powers.

Unable to change the

decision of the Turkish government, he.devoted himself
exclusively to relief work, which inevitably resulted in his
disillusionment with his post.
PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH
In the broadest sense, Reinseh regarded American rela
tions with China as dependent upon "spontaneous cooperation"
between the two peoples in matters of education, commerce,
and industry.

During his service in China he had tried to

impress upon America a "new vision" of a modernized China.
Reinseh believed he was unsuccessful because of the pro
vincialism of the financiers of the United States, and
outside influences working in America.to halt business enter
prise in China.

Reinseh also believed.that Wilson had

misjudged the importance of China, and did not heed his
warnings about what could happen if Japanese incursions
continued,,

However, at the end of his service, the minister
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was unwilling, to advertise the difference, in their attitudes,
believing it would produce no practical results.

But he

never disclaimed his ideals for China, and his sole conso
lation seemed to be the lasting friendships he developed
with many

C h i n e s e . ^ 6

Historians.gave considerable attention to the appoint
ment of Reinseh to China and, in most cases, praised the
selection. .However, analyses of his performance as a dip
lomat have.varied.

Fifield believed Reinseh was unquestion

ably.one of.the most capable American diplomats ever sent to
China.

The minister was able, Fifield contended, to under

stand the.fundamental forces in the Orient, although he was
a strong partisan of the Chinese people and a steady critic
of Japan's Far East policies.^7
Pugach. was sympathetic towards.Reinseh.

More detailed

than Fifield, he emphasized the minister's economic programs
for China.

He argued that Reinseh was an expansionist,

whose ideology, resembled the ideas of Dollar Diplomacy,38
However, Reinseh wanted expansion to. be. gradual, based on
the practical needs and the actual power of the United States.
In the Ear East, the minister desired his country to forge
3^See Reinseh, China, x-xi, 298, 384.
■^Fifield, Far East, 14.
Policy, 39.

See also Curry, Far Eastern

•^Pugach, "Reinseh," 59.
Interest, 183-95.

See also Beard, National
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a partnership with China built on.mutual trust and advan
tage , which, included international cooperation as well.
Pugach further stated that Reinseh had a sense of mission-a feeling of responsibility to the United States, China,
and the world, and "threw himself" into the implementation
of his program when he became minister to China*,
program had:been practical as well as idealistic.

This
The

overseas expansion of American enterprise became his major
emphasis, and the primacy he attached to American investments
in China helped.to explain the inconsistencies between the
principles, which he advocated and the actions he pursued.
The apparent failure of American enterprise in China, however,
forced him. to search for the causes and seek a solution.

A

major concern became Japanese threats.to American,interests,
which he fought.with increasing resolve.

He also began

criticizing. Washington and Wall Street for not:supporting
his program, for China.

However, he won a few limited and

fleeting victories, i.e., he helped prevent the most dan
gerous and. obnoxious objectives of the.Twenty-One Demands
from being, implemented until approximately 1917, and he made
possible a. few loans and enterprises for China.

By 1918,

he finally became tired, angry and disappointed, since the
growing ambitions of Japan, the World War, and the lack of
American business interest in China,were too overwhelming to
counteract.

Pugach continued that although the minister did

not fulfill the objectives of his program, he had a "noble
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vision" of a "good society" which began with the unobstructed
application.of science, technology, and. the principles of
the Open Door.

And it was,ridiculous to assert that Reinseh

should have accepted the reality of the world situation and
revised his,programs, since the, question of his success or
failure, which some historians have belabored, was inconse
quential in assessing the minister's ideas and policies or
the events,of his day,

Pugach argued.that it was more

fruitful to examine Reinsch's major ideas, their validity,
and his faithfulness to them, since the minister was a lead
ing interpreter and a commentator as well, as a participant
involved in the major ideas and policies of his day,39
Kent took a harsher view of the failure of Reinsch's
mission.

He aruged that since the. minister always saw the

best in men, it was a logical consequence that he would
attempt to secure a better understanding between the United
States and China.

However, he developed an enduring parti

sanship towards the Chinese and, without regard to conse
quence, promised more than his instructions warranted.

When

the Chinese did not get results, they.lost faith in the
ability of the American government to fulfill its pledges.
Also, Reinsch's attempts to fashion his own foreign policy
in the field demonstrated his unfamiliarity with an environ
39 Pugach, "Reinseh," 70-71, 121-22, 263, 362, 587-99.
See also Pugach, Pacific Historical Review, XXXVIII, 157-60,
163-65, 174-75.
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ment which emphasized intrigue and deception, rather than
friendship and fair play.

Kent considered the lack of

American political and economic interest in the Orient and
the role of.Japan only secondary reasons.for Reinsch’s
failure as a diplomat.

He concluded, that the minister,

actually fared, well as a prophet, accurately predicting
that increased Japanese encroachment in China would con
tribute ,to. a. maj or .war .

But it was: tragic that an intell-

gence capable, of pointing out the menace of Japan and the
importance.of China in the international community should
have failed in the diplomatic arena in practical

affairs.
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Although. Gage concluded that.world political and eco
nomic conditions played a part in defeating Reinsch’s pro
grams for. China, he, like Kent, placed considerable blame,
on the minister himself.

He claimed Reinseh was the princi

pal protagonist of American political, financial, and
cultural imperialism, which he pursued, with great enthusiasm.
The minister brought to his post many distinctive qualities
and ideas compatible with Wilson's ideology, expressing them
as a sense, of.mission in China.

His genuine sympathy for

ancient Chinese culture, in all its aspects, encouraged him
to consider.it America's duty to assist in developing her
resources and culture.

But this led him to become almost a

jealous guardian, with the right to influence China left to
4®Kent, Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV, 114, 118,
155-57.
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the United. States.

However, on his arrival to China, he

did not realize that the scene in China.was prearranged by
the balance of power already in existence, and the internal
Chinese political and social unrest.

Gage continued that

much of the minister’s activities in China involved Ameri
can business interests, but he and the.American financiers
approached, commercial affairs from entirely different per
spectives.

Reinseh modified or ignored details that would

be insisted upon in regular business transactions.

Profit-

making and.strict financial practices were, for him, secon
dary to American.national interests and policy.

He also

considered, the war as an opportunity for the United States
to increase its economic and political influence in China.
But Japan, also regarded the war as an opportunity, and
Reinseh found himself in a clash of. major consequence, in
which Japan was.more successful than the American minister.
Like Kent, Gage realized that Reinseh 1s.diplomatic activ
ities illustrated his determination to construct policy and
define procedures without instructions.

While the minister's

programs demonstrated good historical insight,legal acumen,
and his ability to envisage ultimates, they were not always
practical in view of the problems of the moment.

And al

though Reinsch’s idealism and energy were laudable, he fell
into many contradictions.

For instance, he repeatedly

asserted that business and economic enterprise were sufficient
for the execution of American policy in China, but'he often
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resorted to political action of extreme.sorts«

The minis

ter further contended that public opinion would be adequate
to control Japanese activity in.China, while recommending
to Washington, that military action be taken against Japan.
In addition, he disclaimed the race for:concessions, but
engaged in such activities for the United States .41
Gage-and the other historians were,able to elucidate
many pertinent characteristics of the performance of
Reinseh ,in. China.

There are, however, a few additional-

points that, might, be. considered.

The. minister had the

intellectual.potential to become a good diplomat.

Yet, he

lacked a certain degree of pragmatism and experience.
was manifest, in the program he, developed for China.

This
His eco

nomic plan to develop China's industrial and agricultural
potential.,, increase American business interests, and reduce
European spheres of influence, was essentially positive and
optimistic, since he envisaged a modernized China of the
future, prominent in international affairs and closely allied
to the United States.

However, this, dream did not take into

consideration the existing problems of. internal strife in
China, the. World War, lingering European interests in Asia,
and the lack of enthusiasm of American financiers for busi
ness ventures in China.

Also, he unrealistically believed

4 1 Gage, "Reinseh," 46, 54, 141-42,.232-33, 284-85,
387, 404, 427-48, 585, 588-92. See also LaFargue, China
and the World War, 118, 127, 130; Link, Wilson, III','' '2TS-74.
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that unilateral aid to China from the United States was
essential.

On the other hand, his political goal was

immediate and negative--to dispel the steady encroachment
of Japan in,China, which not only endangered Chinese territorial and, administrative integrity, but threatened the
increase of American influence in Asia.

Realizing, as he

did, the increasing importance of the Orient, his antago
nizing and. baiting of the Japanese could create.many problems
for future American relations there.

Thus, Reinsch's pro

gram became.; a. weak compromise between long-term economic
goals and immediate political interests; which were incon
sistent -and. impractical in light of the realities of his
diplomatic environment.
HENRY LANE WILSON
Wilson's despatches and memoirs substantiate that he
believed he had made a correct appraisal of conditions in
Mexico, .and had acted accordingly.

The. ambassador also

flatly denied that he had interfered imprudently in Mexican
affairs or acted in collusion with Huerta and Diaz to over
throw Madero.42
Many of the historians who have studied Wilson's ser
vice in Mexico have endeavored to determine why he inter
fered in Mexico's internal affairs.

The conclusions of

Charles Curtis Cumberland were typical of many critics of
42por example, see Foreign Relations 1913, 768-76,
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the ambassador.

Cumberland claimed that Wilson believed

Mexicans were fitonly for dictatorship, and that direction
by a great power, namely the United States, was necessary.
In his ardent desire to return to the Diaz system, the
ambassador failed to comprehend that conditions in Mexico
had changed with the rise of Huerta.

It was ironic,

Cumberland, averred, that Wilson's.. desire for the restora
tion of a government subservient to the.American Embassy
was almost, completely lost, since Madero-'s overthrow, which
the ambassador had deliberately or accidentally encouraged,
led to the death and destruction following the Huerta coup
and the violent anti-Americanism in Mexican policy for many
years thereafter.43
While critical of Wilson's performance during the revolu
tion, Calvert admitted that the ambassador's actions were
not entirely his own fault.

The simultaneous death of his

brother and the election of Woodrow Wilson as President
placed the ambassador's career in the balance.

Calvert spec

ulated that.Ambassador Wilson believed that only a great dip
lomatic victory could save his career,.and when fate presented
the revolt against Madero, he took the chance, but unjustifi
ably earned an infamous reputation.

Moreover, the Department

of State was largely responsible for his predicament, since
^Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution Genesis
Under Madero (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969.
Origin a1ly pub1ishe d , Austin: University of Texas Press,
1952), 235-43. See also Haley, Revolution and Intervention,
16, 261; Link, Wilson, II, 353; Walworth, Wilson, T~t 358-59.
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the Mexican policy of the Democratic administration was
incoherent and.would have been difficult for the most gifted
diplomat to. convey.

However, Calvert added, the ambassador

became increasingly unfit for his post, because of his unpre
dictable and arbitrary behavior, attributable to his intem
perance, poor health, habitual drinking, and moodiness.

He

also became plagued by rumors and got caught up in the intri
gues of Mexico, increasingly detaching him from the Wilson
administration.44
Grieb and Blaisdell also evaluated Wilson in terms of
character.

Grieb believed the ambassador’s moods were the

major hindrance, to his performance, his short temper his
primary weakness.

Grieb added that Wilson’s inflated ego,

enhanced by his position as dean of the diplomatic corps in..
Mexico City, was also a detriment.

These characteristics

came to the fore as he attempted to promote American business
interests, and.assure adequate protection for Americans and
their property in

M e xi c o.

45

Blaisdell added that Wilson had

an active intelligence, a willingness to work hard, a desire
to represent American interests to the fullest, and a knack
of acquiring information not ordinarily available.

However,

he was too ambitious and contentious, clashing with many, if
not all, of his superiors.

In addition, the ambassador had

44ciavert, Mexican Revolution, 111, 288. For a less
speculative account, see Ross, Madero, 237-58.
^Grieb, Huerta, 3-4.
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a meddlesome nature and a pessimistic attitude, which also
influenced his actions.46
Masihgill's evaluation of Wilson was a defense rather
than an indictment.

He argued that it was not a singular

interest in American business which directed the ambassa
dor's -activity in Mexico;

it was his conviction that a

country where chaos was so prevalent, like Mexico, needed
the rule of a strong government.

However, the ambassador's

attitude was not an aberration, since he more often spoke
for his superiors than for himself.

And not until early

1913, when the Taft administration decided to leave the
Mexican problem to the Wilson administration, was the ambassa
dor warned, against meddling.

Masingill further insisted that

the ambassador would have been able to contribute his ex
perience and talents as a diplomat to the Democratic admin
istration.

However, he was never consulted, since his

recommendation to recognize Huerta was contrary to the
President's Mexican policy.

Also, Masingill argued, the

ambassador-was not necessarily responsible for the events
that occurred in Mexico during the revolution, but given
his impulsive nature, his tendency to arouse controversy
gave him a notorious reputation.47
46Blaisdell, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
XL, 127-35.
'
1 1 '
4 7]yiasingill, "Henry Lane Wilson," 62-64, 208-09, 23031, 239-45. See also Lowry, "Mexican Policy," iii, 34,
48-49.
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The various.assessments of Wilson's character were
useful in understanding why the ambassador decided to
interfere, in internal Mexican.affairs.
simply be criticized for his intentions.

However, he cannot
The fact that he

felt compelled to interfere not only demonstrated what he
thought the Mexican government should.be, but what authority
he believed an American ambassador in Mexico had at his
disposal.

His. interference, in some measure, jeopardized

the ability of his country to develop a~working relation
ship with Mexico.

Trying to solve Mexico's problems by

overstepping his authority alienated him from Washington,
made a compromise solution difficult, and set a precedent
for future unwarranted American intervention in Mexican
affairs.

Wilson's interference itself was the cardinal

error of his service in Mexico, and all other criticisms
or accolades are secondary.
FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON
Stimson's self-appraisal was mildly sarcastic and,
while favorable, was not laudatory.

His memoirs were not

extremely revealing, but attested to,his outspoken nature,
as exemplified in his censure of the Department of State,48
His attacks seemed to have arisen from his distrust of the
professional diplomat, who he believed was unfit in emer
gency situations.

He argued that the career man was often

48For example, see Stimson, My United States, 455.
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out of touch with his home country and. acted only by instruc
tion, employing.little personal initiative or discretion.49
Accordingly, his criticism was a defense, of amateur diplomacy
and, consequently, his own position.
There were few treatments of Stimson1s performance as
ambassador to Argentina, and none which considered his
complex character.

Harold F. Peterson’s sympathetic account

went little beyond the exterior of the. man.

He characterized

the Harvard.professor as a neophyte diplomat, with extensive
public service, who had charm and a "puckish humor."

Stim

son' s erect carriage, grey hair, and pointed beard got him
the nickname "Jesus in a dress suit."

Peterson further

asserted that no American visualized the. weaknesses of the
Department of State more effectively than Stimson and, at
the end of his service in Argentina, the ambassador set
forth some workable recommendations for the improvement.of
the Department and the diplomatic corps.

For example, he

recommended a closer relationship between commerce and
diplomacy in Latin America, believing, that the chiefs-ofmission should, coordinate all the reports of commercial
attaches and consuls to assure a reliable flow of informa
tion upon which to base policy .50
4 9 Ibid.,

374-75.

^°Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States
1810-1960 (New York: State University of New York, 1964)
304, 344.
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Peterson did not seem to realize that, although Stim
son was -a perceptive critic, he. was also a victim of his
own criticisms.

He blamed the Department of State for

having little confidence in the ability of its envoys, while
he demonstrated a similar lack of trust in the Department,
even denying the authority it represented.

He argued that

the Department was imperious and discourteous, corresponded
inadequately, and publicized confidential despatches imprud
ently.

However, besides arrogantly holding himself aloof

from the Department of State and its activities, Stimson
assumed that.his conclusions and evaluations were preferable
to those of.his;superiors, and indiscriminately gave impor
tant despatches, to the Associated. Press, for publication.
Furthermore, he accused professional diplomats of lacking
innovation, and. adaptability, as if amateurs, like himself,
innately possessed such qualities and were able to utilize
them without any diplomatic experience.

Thus, when Stim-

son's actions as well as his words are.considered, he
presents quite a paradox as.a diplomat.
While historians differed in their evaluations of the
chiefs-of-mission under Wilson, the self-appraisals of the
diplomats were quite similar.

And although the diplomats

did not assert that they had brought every task to a success
ful conclusion, they firmly avowed that they had tried their
best.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Although the diplomats under discussion intended to
serve their country well, and often exhibited humanitarian
concern for the foreign nationals and actively supported
relief programs, they generally performed poorly.

There

were three.major shortcomings, intricately woven together,
which hampered, them:

1)

lack of ability, and preparedness

for their posts; 2 ) problems concerning relations with the
foreign government; 3) problems concerning relations with
the home government.
Of the various inadequacies of these diplomats, inex
perience in foreign affairs was the salient characteristic.
With the exception of Egan, Herrick, Wilson, and to a minor
degree, Morris, the conglomeration of businessmen, politic
ians, college professors, and lawyers, lacked practical
exposure to the intricacies of diplomatic life prior to
their appointments.

Abundant examples have been presented

which demonstrated many of the problems.created by placing
inexperienced men in unfamiliar positions of responsibility,
Gerard was an excellent example.

He had difficulty even

determining which officials in Germany represented authority.
He also, for a time, placed excessive faith in German peace
offers, and could not clearly distinguish between genuine

188

offers and diplomatic maneuvers.

In addition, his reports

often neglected substantive issues, and emphasized such
manifestations as the German "hate campaigns."

Similarly,

Whitlock was not a shrewd observer, more concerned with the
details of. the work of the Belgian relief program than the
German activity in Western Europe and especially Belgium.
It is difficult to determine when inexperience ends
and naivete begins, since, in many, cases, they are closely
allied.

Some of the diplomats were gullible, and accepted

almost everything they observed at face.value.
possibly the most glaring example.

Francis was

He was not only unfamil

iar with Russia, but he drew many superficial conclusions
about the revolution and its participants.

He equated the

rise to power of the Provisional Government with American
political ideals; he neglected the war.-weariness of the
Russian people, while advocating that they continue the war
against Germany; and he labeled Lenin as an anarchist,
damning the Bolsheviks because he thought they were, under
German influence.

Whitlock, Gerard, Vopicka, Morgenthau,

and Page were similarly unfamiliar with.the political prob
lems of Europe and the rest of the world.

Even Reinseh,

who was purported to be a competent reporter, often accepted
the statements of Chinese officials without question.
Some of the chiefs-of-mission of.the Wilson adminis
tration were also self-deluded.

For instance, Page actually

assumed that his threat to resign influenced the Department
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of State to accept his proposal for the resolution of the
controversy over the Declaration of London.,

In similar

situations, Egan credited himself with, a preeminent role
in the purchase of the Danish West Indies, and Whitlock
believed himself an indispensable part, of the Belgian
relief program.

These illusions, unfortunately lacking

the benefit of perspective, often resulted in exaggerating
the role of the envoy.
Possibly the most serious self-delusion is unrestrained
idealism.

It goes without saying that.idealism is not

inherently destructive for the diplomat, but when it becomes
an obsession, it can hinder if not obstruct his: day-to-day
activities.

The concept of "world order" which Page and

Reinseh held bordered upon obsession.

Both were dedicated

to the rise of the United States as a great international
power.

In the mind of Page, the United.States especially

needed to become an active agent in. European affairs through
an alliance with Great Britain.

With the war, the United

States assumed a more dramatic role in his mind--to save
the world from the "Hun," and preserve."democracy„"
believed

Reinseh

the United States needed to increase its influence

in Asia through a close association.with.China, since he felt
the Orient had the potential for significance in international
affairs.

Also, both Page and Reinseh. attempted to execute

their goals without due regard for the. practicalities of
their day or the wishes and desires of their own government,
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the host government, and other nations of the world.
quest became personal.

Their

Their partisanship for their host

country increased, almost at the sacrifice of their duty
to the United States.

They distrusted, individuals and

governments which opposed their ends, i.e., Germany for
Page, Japan for Reinseh.

These envoys sometimes promised

more to the host country than they could deliver, often
exaggerating the power and wealth of the United States,

Page

and Reinseh became almost self-righteous and inflexible.
Partisanship and its counterpart,. disdain and distrust,
are the most obvious problems concerning the diplomat's
relations with the foreign government.

Biases, of course,

are natural for all human beings, but when they contribute
to an envoy's errors in judgment, prejudiced reports, and
unwarranted, conflicts, they are detrimental.

Vopicka's

hatred for the Central Powers was demonstrated in many in
judicious, ways while he was still a neutral minister.

The

pro-British sentiments of Page often,led him to support
English policy over American.
excessive.

Herrick's love of France was

The overtly dramatic despatches of Francis,

which decried the Bolsheviks, were misleading.
Whitlock's reports almost bled.

And some of

The examples are endless.

Interference in the internal affairs of the foreign
country is possibly the most serious charge that can be
leveled against the diplomats of the Wilson administration,
especially because of the numerous

instances of such inter-
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ference.

Not only was relations of.the envoy with the host

country jeopardized, but he was telling the foreign govern
ment--"! know what is best for you."

Henry Lane Wilson most

clearly exemplified a diplomat who.overstepped his authority,
and

complicated the relations between.his government and the

foreign government.

However, other diplomats during the Wil

son administration were equally guilty.of impolitic inter
ference, including Francis, Vopicka, and Morgenthau.
Poor relations
lem

with the home government was not a prob

for most of the envoys who have been discussed. Of

course, difficulties in communications, between the Department
of State and the chiefs-of-mission were.recurrent, most
dramatically in the case of Stimson.

Page and Henry Lane

Wilson had the most serious conflicts with the administration;
Gerard and Reinseh had conflicts to a lesser degree.

Most of

these problems concerned disputes over, policy or were person
ality clashes.

However, the administration reacted differently

in each caser-Henry Lane Wilson was, dismissed, Page was
ignored, Gerard was neglected, and. Reinseh was pacified.

In

all these instances,.the envoy was as. uncompromising as the
administration, and thus must*be equally criticized.
All of the shortcomings discussed restricted the effec
tiveness of the diplomats during the Wilson administration.
%

Yet, the question that needs to be answered is to what degree
these inadequacies can be attributed to amateurism, since
most of the problems could be exhibited by the professional
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as well,,

Inexperience in foreign affairs impeded the

amateur diplomats, and it was aggravated by the coming of
World War I.

The unfamiliarity of the amateurs with the

day-to-day.routine of diplomatic life, with the foreign
governments and their leaders, and with.the variety and
complexity.of diplomatic duties, was compounded by the
increased responsibilities which the war imposed,,

As

neutral ministers and ambassadors, these men (with the
exception of Henry Lane Wilson and Stimson) acquired such
tasks as .assuming the interests of a number of other
countries, inspecting prison camps, and.developing and
executing relief programs.

The expanded duties of the

envoy during this period would have been.difficult for the
most seasoned diplomat.

Thus many of the amateurs faltered

and were often overwhelmed by their duties.

Also, they

frequently, acted intemperately--interfering in internal
affairs, exhibiting profound biases, and reporting with a
dramatic flare.

Similarly, it was not difficult to under

stand why men such as Morgenthau, Page,.Whitlock, and Reinseh
became frustrated and disillusioned when their ideals were
dashed.
The chiefs-of-mission under discussion were almost
universally unprepared by their backgrounds and experiences
to become diplomats.

Unlike the professionals, they began

their service without the benefit of diplomatic training or
apprenticeship.

Therefore, through hindsight, it must be
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concluded that many of the amateurs should never have been
appointed.

The use of spoils politics by the Wilson admin

istration might have paid many political debts, but it pro
duced a number of envoys who were, in large measure, unfit
to serve.
However, the Wilson administration, was not unique in
appointing, amateurs as chiefs-of-mission.

As has been

demonstrated, this practice was common during the period
of the rise of the United States as a world power.

It

would seem that a strong trend toward.professionalizing the
ambassadorial and ministerial posts should have occurred
during this period, since the consular service and the
subordinate positions in the diplomatic corps had been
placed on the merit system.

Yet, it was. ironic indeed

that a government which demanded training and experience
of its consular officials and diplomatic, secretaries,
would simultaneously allow political favorites, heavy
campaign contributors, and businessmen to lead these sub
ordinates and represent American interests abroad.
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spicuous in this monograph, as was Birnbaumfs
abundant use o£ German sources.
Callahan, James Morton. American Foreign Policy in
Mexican Relations. New York: The Mac
Mi 11 an Co., 19 3 2,,
This work has been replaced by a number
of more comprehensive books. Callahan's inter
pretation of the role of Henry Lane Wilson in
Mexico was sketchy. He did not implicate the
ambassador in the plot to kill Madero or over
throw his government.
Callcott, Wilfrid Hardy. The Caribbean Policy of the
United States 1890-1920. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 19'42.
Callcott's evaluation of Ambassador
Wilson was. brief, but his criticism seemed perti
nent and well-taken.
Calvert, Peter. The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914
The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1968.
Calvert gave a great deal of attention
to the American ambassador to Mexico--criticizing
his actions, while sympathizing with his predica
ment. He was too speculative about Wilson's
motivations, however.
Childs, J. Rives. American Foreign Service. New York:
Holt and Co., 1948.
The account was brief and to the point,
but it should have included a few more examples.
Coletta, Paolo E. Progressive Politician and Moral
Statesman 1009-1915, Vol. IT of William
Jennings Bryan. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1969.
This work contributed some helpful infor
mation about Bryan's role .in the appointment .of
chiefs-of-mission, although the interpretations
were not new.
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Cramer, C.H. Newton D. Baker A Biography, Cleveland:
The World Publishing Co7, 1961„
There were no useful comments about the
appointment of Whitlock .in this work, However,
Cramer made some criticisms of Walter Hines Page.
Crane, Katherine. Mr. Carr of State Forty-Seven Years
in the" Department of StatFI New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1960.
Carr's long career.in the Department of
State made him an important subject in the study
of the professionalization of the Foreign Service.
However, there were few comments about the appoint
ments during the administration of Wilson, or
Bryan's role in the selection process.
Crunden, Robert M. A Hero In Spite of Himself: Brand
Whitlock in Art, Politics, and War. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.
This was possibly the best-balanced
account of Whitlock's performance in Belgium.
It
was still somewhat superficial, however, since
Crunden did not give sufficient attention to the
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the minister.
Cumberland, Charles Curtis. Mexican Revolution Genesis
Under Madero. New York: Greenwood Press,
Publishers, 1969; Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1952.
Cumberland's analysis of Henry Lane Wilson
was brief, but lucid.
Curry, Roy Watson. Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern
Policy 1915-19 21. New York: Bookman
Associates, 1957.
The comments about Reinsch were not abun
dant, but this work is.a standard study of Wilson's
policy toward China and Japan.
DeNovo, John A. American Interests and Policies in the
Middle East 1900-1939. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1963,
The broad nature of the work did not
allow for a comprehensive analysis of Morgenthau.
The few comments about him emphasized his concern
for the Armenians, but did not go much farther.

203

Dodd, William H. Woodrow Wilson and His Work.
Garden
City, Hew York: Doubleday, Page and Co.,
1920.
Dodd was almost defensive about Wilson's
appointments to the major diplomatic posts.
Dulles, Foster Rhea. The ^Road ..to Teheran The Story
of Russia and.America 1781-1943.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1944s

Dulles recognized-Francis's naivete as
ambassador to Russia, and its effects on his
despatches to Washington.
Evans, Laurence. United States Policy and the
Partition of Turkey 1914-192TI Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.
This study was of little value in ex
plaining the role of Morgenthau in Turkey.
Fifield, Russell H. Woodrow Wilson and the Far East
The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question.
New York: Thomas V. Crowell Co., 1952.
This was a useful supplement to Curry,
for an understanding of Wilson's Asian policy.
However, Fifield's evaluation of Reinsch was too
brief and too laudatory.
Gibson, Hugh. The Road to Foreign Policy«, Garden City,
New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc.,
1944.
Gibson's strongly critical account of the
diplomatic corps demonstrated some of the serious
weaknesses of non-professionals as envoys.
Grattan, C. Hartley, Why We Fought. New York: The
Vanguard Press, 19 29.
Grattan was critical of almost all phases
of American foreign policy during World War I.
Thus, his book should be used-with care.
Gregory, Ross. Walter Hines Page Ambassador to the
Court of St. James's. Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1970.
Gregory's objective and informative study
was a lucid reevaluation of a complex ambassador.
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Grieb, Kenneth J. The United States and Huerta.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1969.
Grieb attempted to present a balanced
view of Henry Lane Wilson, but his prejudice
against the Mexican policy of President Wilson
was too obvious.
Griswold, A. Whitney. The Far Eastern Policy of.the
United States. New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Co ., 19 38 „ . .
Although dated, this is a necessary over
view for the study of United States Asian policy.
Haley, P. Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The
Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico,
1910-1917 . Cambridge: M.I.T. Press , 11)70 „
This new study of the revolutionary
period in Mexico presented nothing new concerning
the performance of Henry Lane Wilson. There was
too much reliance upon United States sources.
Ilchman, Warren Frederick. Professional Diplomacy in
the United States 1779-1939. A Study in
Administrative History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
This was a well-researched study,
especially useful for its analysis of the effects
of professionalism upon the consular and diplomatic
services. However, Ilchman did not give sufficient
attention to'the use of spoils politics in the
appointment of ministers and ambassadors.
Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. New York: Dodd, Mead
and Co., 19 38. .
Jessup provided some useful comments
about Francis.
Johnson, Allen; Malone, Dumas; Starr, Harris E.; eds.
Dictionary -o f .American Biography.
Vol. VI-XXI. New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1931-44.
The biographical data was useful, but
the interpretations were often poorly supported.
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Kennan, George F. Soviet-American -Relations 1917-1920,
Two vo 1umes’.T.Princ eto n : Princeton
University Press, 1956, 1958.
Kennan's sympathetic evaluation o£
Francis's appointment, his -negotiations, his
reporting, and his ceremonial performance, was
useful.
Kerney, James. The Political Education of Woodrow
Wi 1son. New York: The Century Co., 1926.
The editor.and publisher of the Trenton
Evening Times had a close association with the
Wilson administration.
For this reason, he was
able to provide some valuable information about
various diplomatic .appointments
However, since
he relied primarily upon his personal experiences
during the Wilson, administrations to write his
book, his comments should be scrutinized carefully.
LaFargue, Thomas Edward. China and the World War.
Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1937.
There were relatively few comments about
the role of Reinsch in China.
Laserson, Max M. The American Impact on RussiaDiplomatic and Ideological--17 84-1917.
New York: MacMillan Co., 1950.
Laserson's evaluation of Francis was
typical of many critics.
Law, Frederick H. Modern Great Americans. Freeport,
New York: JBooks for Libraries Press,
1969. Originally published in 1926.
This was only useful insofar as it gave
some biographical information about Van Dyke.
Li, Tien-yi. Woodrow Wilson's China Policy 1913-1917.
New York: University of Kansas City Press Twayne Publishers,-1952.
Li's assessment of Reinsch was superficial,
due primarily to his sympathy for the involvement
of the American minister in the complicated Asian
problems.
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Link, Arthur S. Wilson. Five volumes. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1947, 1956,
1960, 1964, 1965.
Link's biography of Wilson was indis
pensable for this study. The discussion of various
appointments was especially important. However,
Link's evaluations of the diplomats were somewhat
uneven--he could-be overly critical or too sym
pathetic.
________

.Wilson the Diplomatist--A Look at His
Major Foreign .Policies^ Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press , T9 57.
This was helpful .for an understanding of
Wilson's motivations for his foreign policy.

_____________ . Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era
1910-1917. New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 19 54.
Many of the segments in this work relat
ing to the diplomatic corps can be found in
Link's Wilson.
Long, J.C. Bryan The Great Commoner. New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 192 8.
This dated.and.poorly researched work was
of little value in the.study of Bryan's role in
the selection of diplomats.
Mamatey, Victor S. The United States and East Central
Europe 1914-1918 A Study in, Wilsonian
Diplomacy and Propaganda. Princeton:
Princeton Univers tty Press, 1957 .
Mamatey included-One of the few accounts
of Vopicka's role as minister, although it was
highly critical and condemning.
May, Ernest R. Imperial Democracy The Emergence of
America as a Great PowerT New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961.
May's interpretation.of the ascendency
of the United States as a world power after the
Spanish-American War was worthy of consideration,
and a good background -for an understanding of
American diplomacy during the early twentieth
century.
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_____________ . The World War and American Isolation
1914-1917. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1766. .Originally published in
19 59.
There was little discussion of the
American diplomats during the World War I period,
although this work .provided a ,good background for
an understanding of American neutrality.
Mayer, Arno J. Political Origins of the New Diplomacy
191V-1918. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1959.
Mayer placed little emphasis on the per
formance of the various diplomats.
Millis, Walter. Road to War America 1914-1917.
Cambridge : TKe\Riverside Press, T9 35.
Millis's colorful narrative should be
viewed with caution.
Morrissey, Alice M. The American.Defense of Neutral
Rights 1914-1917. Cambridge: Harvard
University.Press, 1939.
Morrissey's few comments about Gerard.were
quite general, and she ignored the.performances of
many of the other chiefs-of-mission in Europe.
National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vols.
XXXIII, XLIX. New York: James T. White
and Co., 1947, 1966. .
The articles about Gerard and Schmedeman
were informative.
Nicolson, Harold. Diplomacy. London: Oxford Univer
sity Press, 1963. Originally published
in 1939.
Nicolson's colorful prose made his "ideal"
diplomat quite vivid.
_____________The Evolution of Diplomatic Method.
New York: The MacMillan Co., 1954.
The chapters were originally Chichele lec
tures at Oxford University and were concise, but
highly informative. This .is an excellent first
source for the study of any phase of diplomacy.
Notter, Harley. The Origins of the Foreign Policy of
Woodrow Wilson! Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins' Press',' 1937.
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One of the .first works to attempt to syn
thesize the foreign policy of Wilson, Notter's
work included some general comments about many of
the newly appointed diplomats, but little detail.
Page, Rosewell. Thomas Nelson Page A Memoir of a
Virginia Gentleman. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1923.
Brother.Rosewell's discussion of the
appointment of Thomas Nelson Page to Italy was
possibly the most thorough.
Palmer, Frederick. Newton D. Baker America at War.
New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1931..
Palmer included a few pertinent comments
about the performance.of Walter Hines Page in
London. The association between Baker and Whit
lock was not clearly made, however.
Perkins, Bradford, The Great.Rapprochement England
and the.United.States 1895-1914, New
York: Antheneum, l9b8.
Perkins gave.little .attention to Page's
first two years in England.
Peterson, Harold F. Argentina and the United States
1810- 196(h New York: State University
of New York,.1964.
The discussion of Stimson was not very
fruitful.
Rappaport, Armin. The British Press and Wilsonian
Neutrality. Palo .Alto, California:
Stanford University Press, 1951.
Rappaport was not seriously concerned
with Page's activities in London.
Ross, Stanley R, Francis I. Madero Apostle of
Mexican Democracy. New Yo rk: Columbia
University Press,. 1955.
Ross presented a well-balanced and wellwritten account.of Henry Lane Wilson's performance
in Mexico, especially.his .relations with the
Madero government.
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Selle, Earl Albert. Donald of China. New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1948.
Selle .asserted.that.William Henry Donald,
an Australian journalist, who worked in the inner
political circles of the Manchus, was almost a
legendary figure. Donald had.acted as a inter
mediary between.Reinsch and .the Chinese government,
and many episodes in .this work revealed the complex internal difficulties in China with which the
minister had to cope.
Seymour, Charles. American Diplomacy During the
World War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1934.
This is a standard study of the period,
like Notter's, but it is quite dated. He gave
minimal attention to the American chiefs-ofmission in Europe.
Smith, Daniel M. The Great.Departure The.United
States and World War .I 191.4-19.20. New
York: John Wiley and -Sons, Inc., 1965.
Smith's selective bibliography of secon
dary works was impressive.
_____________ . Robert Lansing and American Neutrality
1914-17. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1958.
Smith gave a brief account of the rela
tions between Lansing and Page.
Spaulding, E. Wilder. Ambassadors Ordinary and Extra
ordinary . Washington D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1961.
Spaulding's evaluations of the major
diplomats during the Wilson administration were,
not original. This seemed to be a popularization
of the diplomatic corps, rather than a genuine
research study.
Stephenson, George M. John Lind of Minnesota.
Minneapolis! The.University of Minnesota
Press, 1935.
This study had disappointingly little
about Henry Lane Wilson.
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Stuart, Graham H. American Diplomatic and Consular
Practice, New York: D. AppletonCentury Co., 1936.
This work was necessary for an under
standing of the functions and duties of the
American envoy. However, Stuart's discussion
of the history of the Foreign Service was
sketchy, and his evaluations of the diplomats
under Wilson were superficial.
_____________ . The Department of State A History of
Its Organization,' Procedure, and Personne 1 J New York: MacMi1lan Co., TST49.
There were some brief discussions of the
diplomatic appointments under Wilson.
________ . Latin America and the United States.
New York: The Century Co., 1922.
This work was of no value for an assess
ment of the diplomatic posts in Latin America
during the administrations of Wilson.
Tager, Jack. The Intellectual as Urban Reformer
Brand Whitlock and the Progressive
Movement. Cleveland: The Press of
Case Western Reserve University,
1968.
The emphasis of this study was not foreign
relations of the United States or Whitlock's role
as minister to Belgium, Consequently, Tager's
comments on these subjects were superficial and
unauthoritative.
Tansill, Charles Callan. America Goes to War. Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1942. Originally
published in 1938.
There were a number of comments about
Gerard and some of the other chiefs-of-mission in
Europe, but Tansill never presented a lucid
evaluation of the diplomatic corps during World
War I.
_____________ „ The Purchase of the Danish West Indies.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932.
Tansill not only provided the most com
prehensive assessment of Egan's role in the
negotiations for the islands, but indicated-some
of the inconsistencies in the minister's memoirs.
His general evaluation of Egan's performance was
quite limited, however.
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Tarulis, Albert N. American-Baltic Relations 1918192 2: The Struggle Over Recognition!
Washington B.C.: The Catholic University
of America Press, 1965.
This work was of little value in discus
sing the role of Francis, Egan and Morris.
In fact,
Tarulis did not use the memoirs of Morris.
Tassier, Suzanne. La Belgique et.L'Entree en Guerre
des Etats-Unis (1914-1917). Bruxelles:
La Renaissance du Livre, 1951.
Tassier was sympathetic to Whitlock,
although she mentioned him infrequently.
Thayer, Charles W. Diplomat-. New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 19 59.
Thayer was a useful supplement to Ilch
man and Stuart. His discussion of the qualities
needed by an ambassador was especially worthwhile.
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram. New York:
The Viking Press, 19 58.
Tuchman did not develop the relationship
between Gerard and the German Foreign Office very
clearly.
Unterberger, Betty Miller. America’s Siberian
Expedition, 1918-1920 A Study of
National Policy.. Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press, 1956.
This is a standard study of the Siberian
Expedition. Unterberger lucidly described the
reactions of Francis and Reinsch to the idea of
Allied intervention in Russia.
Walworth, Arthur. Woodrow Wilson. Two volumes.
York: Logmans, Green and Co., 1958.
This work is overshadowed by Link's
biography.

New

Welles, Sumner, Naboth's Vineyard The Dominican
Republic 1844-1924. 'New York: Pay son
and Clarke Ltd,, 19 28,
Welles was- critical of Bryan's role in
the appointment of Sullivan,
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White, John Albert. The_Siberian Intervention.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1950.

Unterberger’s work is more thorough than
his study.
Willert, Arthur. The .Road-to-Safety A Study in
Anglo-American-Relations. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger,..1953.,
Willert's treatment o£ Page was sketchy.
Williams, William Appleman., American-Russian Relations
1781- 1947.
New York: Rinehart and Co.,
1952.

This was .an. interesting contrast to Kennan,
since Williams was critical of Francis. However,
his discussion was too brief.
Willson, Beckles. America's Ambassadors to France
(1777-1927)
A Narrative of Branco-.
American biplbmatic Relations. FTew.York:
Frederick A. Stokes Co., 19 2 8.
_____________ . America's Ambassadors to England
(1785-1929)
A Narrative of AngloAmerican Diploma tic. Relations . New York:
Frederick. A. Stokes Co., 1 9 2 9 .
These two works were disappointing.
Willson's research-was. inadequate, and his inter
pretations were shallow.
B. Articles
Adler, Selig. "Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetra
tion. " Hispanic American Historical
Review, XX (May, 19T0)', '198-226.
This was useful background for an under
standing of. Wilsonian, policy in Latin America,
but little was mentioned about the various dip
lomatic appointments to Latin America.
Bailey, Thomas A. "The. Sinking of the Lusitania."
American Historical. Review, XLI
(October, 193 ip , 5iV73.
This article, clarified many misconceptions
about the sinking of the Cunard liner.
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Blaisdell, Lowell L. "Henry.Lane Wilson and the
Overthrow of.-Madero,/' Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly, XL
(September, 1962)., 126-35.
Blaisdell presented.a moderate criticism
of Ambassador Wilson's activities in Mexico, but
did not introduce much new evidence.
Coletta, Paolo E. "Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan and .'.Deserving Democrats.'"
Mi d -Arner ica,. XLVI11 (April, 1966), 75-98.
Coletta gave more pertinent information
about Bryan's use of ..spoils politics in this
article than in his biography.
Daniel, Robert L. "The Armenian Question and
American-Turkish Relations, 1914-19 27."
Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XLVI (September, 1959) , 252-275.
Daniel did. not give much attention to
Morgenthau'.s concern, for..the .Armenian genocide,
but the article was useful background.
_____________ . "The Friendship of Woodrow Wilson and
Cleveland ...Ho..Dodge.." Mid-America, XLIII
(July, 1961), 18 2-96Dodge's offers of-financial support to
Page and other diplomatic nominees were made clear.
Gregory, Ross. "A Look at the Case of the Dacia."
Journal of American History, LV
(September, 1968), 29 2-96.
This short article ..presented an excellent
clarification of the case of the "Dacia." It also
demonstrated that.the effectiveness of Page as a
diplomat was not necessarily what it seemed.
_____________ . "The Superfluous .Ambassador: Walter
Hines Page '.,s_Return to Washington 1916."
The Historian, XXVIII (May, 1966),
389-404.
Gregory demonstrated how Page had fallen
out of favor with the Wilson administration.
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Harvey, George. "The Diplomats of Democracy." North
American Review, February, 1914,. 161-74..
Harvey's frustration at not being offered
a diplomatic sinecure was apparent in this article.
Probably most noteworthy was his characterization
of the appointments ..to Latin America as a
"political debauchery." His indictment of Bryan
was severe.
Kennan, George F. "The Sisson Documents." Journal of
Modern History, XXVIII
(March, 19 56),
130-54.
This article clarified the nature of the
documents and why they were exploited as evidence
that Lenin and possibly Trotsky were in the pay
of the Germans.. Kennan did not give substantial
attention to the attitude of Francis.
Kent, Alan E. "Down From the Ivory Tower: Paul
Samuel Reinsch, Minister to China."
Wisconsin Magazine ,of History, XXXV
(Winter, 1951), 114-18.
Kent was severely critical of Reinsch's
qualifications for the post in Peking, and con
cluded that he failed.as a diplomat as a result.
His comment that .Reinsch*s educational back
ground was not compensation for his lack of
practical experience as a diplomat was quite
enlightening.
Kohlenberg, Gilbert C. "David Rowland Francis:
American Businessman in Russia." MidAmerica, XL (October, 1958), 19 5-217.
Kohlenberg's concentration upon Francis's
commercial negotiations was warranted, since it
has been established that the improvement of
commercial relations with Russia was one of the
ambassador's primary duties.
$

Lasch, Christopher. "American Intervention in
Siberia: A .Reinterpretation." Political
Science Quarterly, LXXVII (June~ 1962),
205-223.
Lasch believed Francis was no less con
fused about the situation in Russia than anyone
else.
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Leopold, Richard W. "The Problem of American Intervention, 1917 A Historical Retrospect."
World Politics, II (October, 1949 to
July, 19 50)," 405-25,
This was a helpful bibliographical aid.
Luce, Clare Boothe. "The Ambassadorial Issue: Pro
fessionals or Amateurs?" Foreign Affairs,
XXXVI (October , 19 57) , .10 5-21V. — ~
"
Most of Luce's examples were from.the
period after World War...I., .but her discussion of
the role of the diplomat^could easily be applied
to the appointments during any administration.
Padgett, James A. "Diplomats to Haiti and Their.
Diplomacy." The Journal of Negro History,
XXV (July, 1940), 265-330.
~ "
The biographical.
.information about
Wilson's ministers to Haiti was useful.
Pugach, Noel Harvey. "Making the Open Door Work:
Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-1919."
Pacific Historical .Review, XXXVIII
(May, 1969), .157?75.
Reinsch .was discussed in more detail in
Pugach's doctoral.dissertation.. In this
article, Pugach emphasi-zed..Reinsch's commercial
activities in China.
Shelton, Brenda Kurtz. "President Wilson and the
Russian Revolution." University of
Buffalo Studies, XXIII (March, 1957),
111-55.
Shelton was mildly critical of Francis
and made only passing references to him.
Stevens, Walter B. "David R. Francis, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to
Russia." The Missouri Historical
Review, XIII (April,. 1919), 195-225.
This article was. a laudatory account
rather than a research study.
It included.little
of value concerning .the ambassador's performance
in Russia.
Unterberger, Betty Miller. "President Wilson and the
Decision to Send American Troops to
Siberia." Pacific Historical Review,
XXIV (February, 19 55), 63-74.
The information in this article was-included in her book, America's Siberian Expedition.
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Van Alstyne, Richard W.."The Policy of the United
States Regarding .the-Declaration of
London, at the Outbreak of the Great
War," Journal .of Modern History, VII
(December, ..’19 3 5), -434r47.
Van Alstyne was quite critical of Page's
role in the negotiations over the Declaration
and Hendrick’s interpretation of Page's role,
Watson, Richard L. "Woodrow Wilson and His Inter
preters 1947-1957," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XLIV (September, 1957),
20 7-36,
This article is dated, but still valuable.
Wolgemuth, Kathleen Long, "Woodrow Wilson's Appoint
ment Policy and the Negro," Journal of
Southern History, XXIV (November, 1954),
457-80.
Wolgemuth's article was useful for.its
description of the appointment of Curtis to
Liberia.
It also made clear that few negroes
were appointed to prominent positions in the
Wilson administration.
III.

Secondary Materials--Unpublished
DeYoung, Charles Daniel. "David Rowland Francis-American in Russia," Unpublished M.A.*
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1949,
This was one of the few works dealing,
with the ambassador to.Russia. However, DeYoung's
conclusions were too speculative, and he relied
upon United States sources exclusively.
Gage, Daniel James. "Paul S. Reinsch and SinoAmerican Relations . Unpublished-Ph. D.
dissertation, Stanford-University, 1939.
Gage's treatment .of Reinsch was balanced,
although his style was uninspired.
Lowry, Philip Holt. "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow
Wilson." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Yale University, 1949.
Lowry was critical of the President and
sympathetic towards., the .ambassador. However , his
evaluation of ...the. latter was neither original nor
detailed.
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Masingill, Eugene Frank, "The Diplomatic Career of
Henry Lane Wilson in.Latin America,"
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana
State University, 1957.
Masingill spent too much time defending
Ambassador Wilson's actions.
Pugach, Noel Harvey. "Progress,~Prosper!ty and the
Open Door: The Ideas and Career of Paul S.
Reinsch." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University .of-Wisconsin., 1967.
This, former student.of William Appleman
Williams emphasized Reinsch's writings, which was
noteworthy. And.his discussion of the minister's
activities in China.was.substantive. However,
Pugach's conclusions were .weak--almost defensive
rather than analytical.
Thorburn, Neil Alfred. "Brand Whitlock: An Intellec
tual Biography." Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Northwestern University,
1965.
Thorburn examined the influence upon
Whitlock's intellectual development. Consequently
there was not.much information on the minister's
diplomatic experience, and what was included was
very general and speculative.

